Global Classified News

NSA Oversight Act

2007-01-11T12:36:00.000-08:00

H.L.C.
.....................................................................
(Original Signature of Member)
110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION H. R. ll
To reiterate that chapters 119 and 121 of title 18, United States Code,
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 are the exclusive
means by which domestic electronic surveillance may be conducted, and
for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. SCHIFF introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee
on llllllllllllll
A BILL
To reiterate that chapters 119 and 121 of title 18, United
States Code, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 are the exclusive means by which domestic
electronic surveillance may be conducted, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘NSA Oversight Act’’. 4
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 5
Congress finds the following: 6
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H.L.C.
(1) On September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous 1
violence were committed against the United States 2
and its citizens. 3
(2) Such acts render it both necessary and ap- 4
propriate that the United States exercise its right to 5
self-defense by protecting United States citizens 6
both at home and abroad. 7
(3) The Federal Government has a duty to pur- 8
sue al Qaeda and other enemies of the United States 9
with all available tools, including the use of elec- 10
tronic surveillance, to thwart future attacks on the 11
United States and to destroy the enemy. 12
(4) The President of the United States pos- 13
sesses the inherent authority to engage in electronic 14
surveillance of the enemy outside of the United 15
States consistent with his authority as Commander- 16
in-Chief under Article II of the Constitution. 17
(5) Congress possesses the authority to regulate 18
electronic surveillance within the United States. 19
(6) The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 20
guarantees to the American people the right ‘‘to be 21
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 22
against unreasonable searches and seizures’’ and 23
provides that courts shall issue ‘‘warrants’’ to au- 24
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H.L.C.
thorize searches and seizures, based upon probable 1
cause. 2
(7) The Supreme Court has consistently held 3
for nearly 40 years that the monitoring and record- 4
ing of private conversations constitutes a ‘‘search 5
and seizure’’ within the meaning of the Fourth 6
Amendment. 7
(8) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 8
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) and chapters 119 and 9
121 of title 18, United States Code, were enacted to 10
provide the legal authority for the Federal Govern- 11
ment to engage in searches of Americans in connec- 12
tion with criminal investigations, intelligence gath- 13
ering, and counterintelligence. 14
(9) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 15
1978 and specified provisions of the Federal crimi- 16
nal code, were expressly enacted as the ‘‘exclusive 17
means by which electronic surveillance . . . may be 18
conducted’’ domestically pursuant to law (18 U.S.C. 19
2511(2)(f)). 20
(10) Warrantless electronic surveillance of 21
Americans inside the United States conducted with- 22
out congressional authorization may have a serious 23
impact on the civil liberties of citizens of the United 24
States. 25
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H.L.C.
(11) United States citizens, such as journalists, 1
academics, and researchers studying global ter- 2
rorism, who have made international phone calls 3
subsequent to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 4
2001, and are law-abiding citizens, may have the 5
reasonable fear of being the subject of such surveil- 6
lance. 7
(12) Since the nature and criteria of the Na- 8
tional Security Agency (NSA) program is highly 9
classified and unknown to the public, many other 10
Americans who make frequent international calls, 11
such as Americans engaged in international busi- 12
ness, Americans with family overseas, and others, 13
have a legitimate concern they may be the inad- 14
vertent targets of eavesdropping. 15
(13) The President has sought and signed legis- 16
lation including the Uniting and Strengthening 17
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 18
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT 19
ACT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107–56), and the In- 20
telligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 21
2004 (Public Law 108–458), that have expanded 22
authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveil- 23
lance Act of 1978. 24
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H.L.C.
(14) It may be necessary and desirable to 1
amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2
1978 to address new challenges in the Global War 3
on Terrorism. The President should submit a re- 4
quest for legislation to Congress to amend the For- 5
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 if the 6
President desires that the electronic surveillance au- 7
thority provided by such Act be further modified. 8
(15) The Authorization for Use of Military 9
Force (Public Law 107–40), passed by Congress on 10
September 14, 2001, authorized military action 11
against those responsible for the attacks on Sep- 12
tember 11, 2001, but did not contain legal author- 13
ization nor approve of domestic electronic surveil- 14
lance not authorized by chapters 119 or 121 of title 15
18, United States Code, or the Foreign Intelligence 16
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.). 17
SEC. 3. REITERATION OF CHAPTERS 119 AND 121 OF TITLE 18
18, UNITED STATES CODE, AND THE FOREIGN 19
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 20
AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH DO- 21
MESTIC ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE 22
CONDUCTED. 23
(a) EXCLUSIVE MEANS.—Notwithstanding any other 24
provision of law, chapters 119 and 121 of title 18, United 25
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H.L.C.
States Code, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive 2
means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted. 3
(b) FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION.—Subsection 4
(a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for 5
electronic surveillance, other than as an amendment to 6
chapters 119 or 121 of title 18, United States Code, or 7
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 8
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory 9
authorization shall be the only exception to subsection (a). 10
SEC. 4. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS. 11
(a) REPORT.—As soon as practicable after the date 12
of the enactment of this Act, but not later than 14 days 13
after such date, the President shall submit to the Perma- 14
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 15
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 16
of the Senate a report— 17
(1) on the Terrorist Surveillance Program of 18
the National Security Agency; 19
(2) on any program which involves the elec- 20
tronic surveillance of United States persons in the 21
United States, and which is conducted by any de- 22
partment, agency, or other element of the Federal 23
Government, or by any entity at the direction of a 24
department, agency, or other element of the Federal 25
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H.L.C.
Government, without fully complying with the proce- 1
dures set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveil- 2
lance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) or chap- 3
ters 119 or 121 of title 18, United States Code; and 4
(3) including a general description of each 5
United States person who has been the subject of 6
such electronic surveillance not authorized to be con- 7
ducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 8
Act of 1978 or chapters 119 or 121 of title 18, 9
United States Code, and the basis for the selection 10
of each person for such electronic surveillance. 11
(b) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection 12
(a) may be submitted in classified form. 13
(c) ACCESS.—The Chair of the Permanent Select 14
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives 15
and the Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of 16
the Senate shall provide each member of the Committees 17
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 18
Senate, respectively, access to the report submitted under 19
subsection (a). Such access shall be provided in accordance 20
with security procedures required for the review of classi- 21
fied information. 22
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H.L.C.
SEC. 5. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 1
MATTERS. 2
(a) AUTHORITY FOR ADDITIONAL JUDGES.—The 3
first sentence of section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 4
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended 5
by striking ‘‘judicial circuits’’ and inserting ‘‘judicial cir- 6
cuits, and any additional district court judges that the 7
Chief Justice considers necessary for the prompt and time- 8
ly consideration of applications under section 104,’’; 9
(b) CONSIDERATION OF EMERGENCY APPLICA- 10
TIONS.—Section 105(f) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(f)) 11
is amended by adding at the end the following new sen- 12
tence: ‘‘The judge receiving an application under this sub- 13
section shall review such application within 24 hours of 14
the application being submitted.’’ 15
SEC. 6. STREAMLINING FISA APPLICATION PROCESS. 16
(b) IN GENERAL.—Section 104 of the Foreign Intel- 17
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is 18
amended— 19
(1) in subsection (a)—— 20
(A) in paragraph (6), by striking ‘‘detailed 21
description’’ and inserting ‘‘summary descrip- 22
tion’’; 23
(B) in paragraph (7)— 24
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H.L.C.
(i) in subparagraph (C), by striking 1
‘‘techniques;’’ and inserting ‘‘techniques; 2
and’’; 3
(ii) by striking subparagraph (D); and 4
(iii) by redesignating subparagraph 5
(E) as subparagraph (D); and 6
(C) in paragraph (8), by striking ‘‘a state- 7
ment of the means’’ and inserting ‘‘a summary 8
statement of the means’’; and 9
(2) in subsection (e)(1)(A), by striking ‘‘or the 10
Director of National Intelligence’’ and inserting ‘‘the 11
Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of 12
the Central Intelligence Agency’’. 13
(a) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 105(a)(5) 14
of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(5)) is amended by striking 15
‘‘104(a)(7)(E)’’ and inserting ‘‘104(a)(7)(D)’’. 16
SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF TARGETS. 17
Section 105(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil- 18
lance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), as redesignated 19
by section 7(4), is amended by adding at the end the fol- 20
lowing new paragraph: 21
‘‘(4) An order issued under this section shall remain 22
in force during the authorized period of surveillance not- 23
withstanding the absence of the target from the United 24
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H.L.C.
States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish 1
the order and the court grants the motion.’’. 2
SEC. 8. EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR APPLICATIONS FOR 3
ORDERS FOR EMERGENCY ELECTRONIC SUR- 4
VEILLANCE. 5
Section 105(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil- 6
lance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(f)) is further amended 7
by striking ‘‘72 hours’’ each place it appears and inserting 8
‘‘168 hours’’. 9
SEC. 9. ENHANCEMENT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 10
AUTHORITY IN WARTIME. 11
Section 111 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 12
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811) is amended by striking ‘‘the 13
Congress’’ and inserting ‘‘the Congress or an authoriza- 14
tion for the use of military force described in section 15
2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 16
1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific au- 17
thorization for electronic surveillance under this section.’’. 18
SEC. 10. ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN 19
PARTIES NOT IN THE UNITED STATES. 20
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 21
(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended— 22
(1) by adding at the end of title I the following 23
new section: 24
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H.L.C.
‘‘ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES 1
NOT IN THE UNITED STATES 2
‘‘SEC. 112. (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any 3
other provision of this Act, a court order is not required 4
for the acquisition of the contents of any communication 5
between persons that are not located within the United 6
States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence in- 7
formation, without respect to whether the communication 8
passes through the United States or the surveillance de- 9
vice is located within the United States. 10
‘‘(b) TREATMENT OF INTERCEPTED COMMUNICA- 11
TIONS INVOLVING A DOMESTIC PARTY.—If an acquisition 12
described in subsection (a) inadvertently collects a commu- 13
nication in which at least one party to the communication 14
is within the United States— 15
‘‘(1) in the case of a communication acquired 16
inside the United States, the contents of such com- 17
munication shall be handled in accordance with 18
minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney 19
General that require that no contents of any commu- 20
nication to which a United States person is a party 21
shall be disclosed, disseminated, or used for any pur- 22
pose or retained for longer than 168 hours unless a 23
court order under section 105 is obtained or unless 24
the Attorney General determines that the informa- 25
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H.L.C.
tion indicates a threat of death or serious bodily 1
harm to any person; and 2
‘‘(2) in the case of a communication acquired 3
outside the United States, the contents of such com- 4
munication shall be handled in accordance with 5
minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney 6
General.’’; and 7
(2) in the table of contents in the first section, 8
by inserting after the item relating to section 111 9
the following: 10
‘‘112. Acquisition of communications between parties not in the United
States.’’.
SEC. 11. ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FOR PREPARATION AND 11
CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATIONS FOR OR- 12
DERS APPROVING ELECTRONIC SURVEIL- 13
LANCE. 14
(a) OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND RE- 15
VIEW.— 16
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General may 17
hire and assign personnel to the Office of Intel- 18
ligence Policy and Review as may be necessary to 19
carry out the prompt and timely preparation, modi- 20
fication, and review of applications under section 21
104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 22
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) for orders approving elec- 23
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H.L.C.
tronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes 1
under section 105 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805). 2
(2) ASSIGNMENT.—The Attorney General shall 3
assign personnel hired and assigned pursuant to 4
paragraph (1) to and among appropriate offices of 5
the National Security Agency in order that such per- 6
sonnel may directly assist personnel of the National 7
Security Agency in preparing applications under sec- 8
tion 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 9
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804). 10
(b) NATIONAL SECURITY BRANCH OF THE FBI.— 11
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Federal 12
Bureau of Investigation may hire and assign per- 13
sonnel to the National Security Branch as may be 14
necessary to carry out the prompt and timely prepa- 15
ration of applications under section 104 of the For- 16
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 17
U.S.C. 1804) for orders approving electronic surveil- 18
lance for foreign intelligence purposes under section 19
105 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805). 20
(2) ASSIGNMENT.—The Director of the Federal 21
Bureau of Investigation shall assign personnel hired 22
and assigned pursuant to paragraph (1) to and 23
among the field offices of the Federal Bureau of In- 24
vestigation in order that such personnel may directly 25
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H.L.C.
assist personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 1
tion in such field offices in preparing applications 2
under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Sur- 3
veillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804). 4
(c) NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.—The Director of 5
the National Security Agency may hire and assign per- 6
sonnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and 7
timely preparation of applications under section 104 of the 8
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 9
1804) for orders approving electronic surveillance for for- 10
eign intelligence purposes under section 105 of such Act 11
(50 U.S.C. 1805). 12
(d) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 13
COURT.—The presiding judge designated under section 14
103(b) of such Act may hire and assign personnel as may 15
be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely consider- 16
ation of applications under section 104 of such Act (50 17
U.S.C. 1804) for orders approving electronic surveillance 18
for foreign intelligence purposes under section 105 of that 19
Act (50 U.S.C. 1805). 20
SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS. 21
In this Act: 22
(1) The term ‘‘electronic surveillance’’ has the 23
meaning given the term in section 101(f) of the For- 24
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H.L.C.
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 1
U.S.C. 1801(f)). 2
(2) The term ‘‘foreign intelligence information’’ 3
has the meaning given the term in section 101(e) of 4
such Act (50 U.S.C. 1801(e)). 5
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Islam: Sunnis and Shiites

2007-01-11T12:35:00.002-08:00

1 This report was originally written by Febe Armanios and has been updated to include
information relevant to the 110th Congress.
Order Code RS21745
Updated December 11, 2006
Islam: Sunnis and Shiites
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The majority of the world’s Muslim population follows the Sunni branch of Islam,
and approximately 10-15% of all Muslims follow the Shiite (Shi’ite, Shi’a, Shia)
branch. Shiite populations constitute a majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan.
There are also significant Shiite populations in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Sunnis and Shiites share most basic religious tenets.
However, their differences sometimes have been the basis for religious intolerance,
political infighting, and sectarian violence. This report1 includes a historical background
of the Sunni-Shiite split and discusses the differences in religious beliefs and practices
between and within each Islamic sect as well as their similarities. The report also relates
Sunni and Shiite religious beliefs to discussions of terrorism and Iraq that may be of
interest during the first session of the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as
necessary. Related papers include CRS Report RS21432 and CRS Report RS21695.
Historical Background
The differences between the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects are rooted in
disagreements over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad, who died in 632 AD, and
over the nature of leadership in the Muslim community. The historic debate centered on
whether to award leadership to a qualified, pious individual who would follow the
customs of the Prophet or to transmit leadership exclusively through the Prophet’s
bloodline. The question was settled initially when community leaders elected a
companion of the Prophet’s named Abu Bakr to become the first Caliph (Arabic for
"successor"). Although most Muslims accepted this decision, some supported the
candidacy of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, husband of the
Prophet’s daughter Fatima. Ali had played a prominent role during the Prophet’s lifetime,
but he lacked seniority within the Arabian tribal system and was bypassed.
CRS-2
This situation was unacceptable to some of Ali’s followers, who considered Abu
Bakr and the two succeeding caliphs (Umar and Uthman) to be illegitimate. Ali’s
followers believed that the Prophet Muhammad himself had named Ali as successor and
that the status quo was a violation of divine order. A few of Ali’s partisans orchestrated
the murder of the third Caliph Uthman in 656 AD, and Ali was named Caliph. Ali, in
turn, was assassinated in 661 AD, and his son Hussein (680 AD) died in battle against
forces of the Sunni caliph. Ali's eldest son Hassan (d. 670 AD) is also revered by Shiite
Muslims, some of who claim he was poisoned by the Sunni caliph Muawiyah. Those who
supported Ali’s ascendancy became later known as “Shi’a,” a word stemming from the
term “shi’at Ali,” meaning “supporters” or “helpers of Ali.” Others respected and
accepted the legitimacy of his caliphate but opposed political succession based on
bloodline to the Prophet. This group, who constituted the majority of Muslims, came to
be known in time as “Sunni,” meaning “followers of [the Prophet’s] customs [sunna].”
The caliphate declined as a religious and political institution after the thirteenth
century, although the term “caliph” continued to be used by some Muslim leaders until
it was abolished in 1924 by Turkey’s first President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The decline
and abolition of the caliphate became a powerful religious and political symbol to some
Sunni Islamic activists during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These activists
argued that leaders in the Islamic world had undermined the caliphate by abandoning the
“true path” of Islam. Inspired by these figures, some contemporary Sunni extremists, such
as Osama bin Laden and others, advocate the restoration of a new caliphate based on
“pure” Islamic principles.
International Terrorism and Sectarian Violence in Iraq. Islamic theology
and sectarian considerations are rarely sufficient explanations for instances of terrorism
and political violence in the contemporary Muslim world. Political, social, and economic
factors often determine whether a given dispute reflects sectarian identities or transcends
them. Sunni and Shiite organizations and governments are known to collaborate when
they perceive that their interests overlap. In other instances, theological differences can
directly fuel sectarian hatred and violence. Members and supporters of terrorist
organizations like Al Qaeda and its affiliates exhibit regional and theological diversity
that makes it difficult to identify shared motives that can be linked to specific religious
doctrines. Many Sunni and Shiite Muslims refer to members and supporters of Al Qaeda
and similar groups simply as takfiris (Arabic for “those who accuse others of apostasy”)
because of Al Qaeda’s habit of denouncing individuals who don’t accept a narrow
interpretation of Sunni Islam as non-believers and legitimate targets.
In Iraq, Sunni-Shiite relations are complicated by the dramatic shift in power
dynamics that accompanied the removal of the Sunni-dominated Saddam Hussein regime,
which ended centuries of Sunni political dominance. Lingering Shiite resentment and
Sunni fears associated with this shift have helped transform local and individual political
or economic disputes into broader sectarian confrontations in many areas. Both Sunni and
Shiite insurgent groups and militias have conducted attacks on coalition and Iraqi
government forces and civilians since 2003. Although major Shiite political factions
largely abandoned violent tactics in favor of political participation during 2005, intra-
Shiite political rivalries have led to outbreaks of violence, particularly in southern Iraq.
Similarly, some Sunni Iraqis in western Al Anbar province have organized themselves to
combat predominantly Sunni insurgent groups, foreign fighters, and Al Qaeda operatives,
whom they see as being primarily responsible for ongoing violence in their communities.
CRS-3
Core Beliefs and Shared Practices
Although there are considerable differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam, the two
Islamic sects share common traditions, beliefs, and doctrines. All Muslims believe that
the Prophet Muhammad was the messenger of Allah (the Arabic word for God). All
believe that they must abide by the revelations given to the Prophet by Allah (as recorded
in the Quran) and by the hadith (sayings of the Prophet and his companions). The
concepts of piety, striving for goodness, and social justice are fundamental to Islamic
belief and practice. Additionally, all Muslims are expected to live in accordance with the
five pillars of Islam: (1) shahada — recital of the creed “There is no God but Allah, and
Muhammad is His Prophet”; (2) salat — five obligatory prayers in a day; (3) zakat —
giving alms to the poor; (4) sawm — fasting from sunrise to sunset during the month of
Ramadan; and (5) hajj — making a pilgrimage to Mecca once during a lifetime if one is
physically and financially able.
Islamic Jurisprudence. The basic sources for Islamic jurisprudence, be it Sunni
or Shiite, are the Quran, the sunna (customs of the Prophet Muhammad) as relayed in the
hadith, qiyas (analogy), ijma’ (consensus), and ijtihad (individual reasoning). The
primary function of the learned religious leaders is the interpretation of Islamic law
(shari’a). There are no codified laws in either Sunni or Shiite Islam. Rather, there are
sources for the interpretation of law, and these sources are similar among Shiites and
Sunnis. Shiite hadith differ from Sunni hadith, mainly in that they include the sayings of
the Shiite imams who are considered to have been divinely inspired. Shiite legal
interpretation also allows more space for human reasoning than Sunni interpretation does.
Sunni Islam: Development and Basic Tenets
Religious Practices and Beliefs. The majority of Muslims today are Sunnis.
They accept the first four Caliphs (including Ali) as the “rightly guided” rulers who
followed the Prophet. In theory, Sunnis believe that the leader (imam) of the Muslim
community should be selected on the basis of communal consensus, on the existing
political order, and on a leader’s individual merits. This premise has been inconsistently
practiced within the Sunni Muslim community throughout history. Sunni Muslims do not
bestow upon human beings the exalted status given only to prophets in the Quran, in
contrast to the Shiite veneration of imams. Sunnis have a less elaborate and arguably less
powerful religious hierarchy than Shiites. In contrast to Shiites, Sunni religious teachers
historically have been under state control. At the same time, Sunni Islam tends to be more
flexible in allowing lay persons to serve as prayer leaders and preachers. In their day-today
practices, Sunnis and Shiites exhibit subtle differences in the performance of their
obligatory prayers. Both groups share a similar understanding of basic Islamic beliefs.
Islamic Law. Within Sunni Islam, there are four schools of jurisprudence that offer
alternative interpretations of legal decisions affecting the lives of Muslims. The four
schools of jurisprudence rely mostly on analogy as a way to formulate legal rulings, and
they also give different weight to the sayings of the Prophet and his companions (hadith)
within their decisions. In some secular countries, such as Turkey, the opinions issued by
religious scholars represent moral and social guidelines for how Muslims should practice
their religion and are not considered legally binding.
CRS-4
2 See CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, by Christopher
M. Blanchard.
The four legal schools, which vary on certain issues from strict to broad legal
interpretations, are the (1) Hanafi: this is the oldest school of law. It was founded in Iraq
by Abu Hanifa (d. 767 AD). It is prevalent in Turkey, Central Asia, the Balkans, Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh; (2) Maliki: this
was founded in the Arabian Peninsula by Malik ibn Anas (d. 795 AD). It is prevalent in
North Africa, Mauritania, Kuwait, and Bahrain; (3) Shaf’i: this school was founded by
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 819 AD). It is prevalent in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia,
Somalia, parts of Yemen, Indonesia, and Malaysia; and (4) Hanbali: this was founded by
Ahmad Hanbal (d. 855). It is prevalent in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, parts of Oman, and the
United Arab Emirates.
Sectarian Divisions. Sunni Islam has had less prominent sectarian divisions than
Shiite Islam. The Ibadi sect, which is centered mostly in Oman, East Africa, and in parts
of Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia, has been sometimes misrepresented as a Sunni sect. Ibadi
religious and political dogma generally resembles basic Sunni doctrine, although the
Ibadis are neither Sunni nor Shiite. Ibadis believe strongly in the existence of a just
Muslim society and argue that religious leaders should be chosen by community leaders
for their knowledge and piety, without regard to race or lineage.
The Sunni puritanical movement called “Wahhabism” has become well known in
recent years and is arguably the most pervasive revivalist movement in the Islamic world.2
This movement, founded in Arabia by the scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
(1703-1791 AD), is considered to be an offshoot of the Hanbali school of law. Abd
al-Wahhab encouraged a return to the orthodox practice of the “fundamentals” of Islam,
as embodied in the Quran and in the life of the Prophet Muhammad. In the eighteenth
century, Muhammad ibn Saud, founder of the modern-day Saudi dynasty, formed an
alliance with Abd al-Wahhab and unified the disparate tribes in the Arabian Peninsula.
From that point forward, there has been a close relationship between the Saudi ruling
family and the Wahhabi religious establishment. The most conservative interpretations
of Wahhabi Islam view Shiites and other non-Wahhabi Muslims as dissident heretics.
Following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Shiite Islamic revolution in Iran,
Saudi Arabia’s ruling Sunni royal family began more actively promoting Wahhabi
religious doctrine abroad and has since financed the construction of Wahhabi-oriented
mosques, religious schools, and Islamic centers in dozens of countries.
Shiite Islam: Development and Basic Tenets
Initially, the Shiite movement gained a wide following in areas that now include Iraq,
Iran, Yemen, and parts of Central and South Asia. In most of the world, Shiites would
continue as a minority. Today, according to some estimates, Shiite Islam is practiced
among approximately 10% to 15% of the world’s Muslim population.
Leadership of the Community. For Shiites, the first true leader of the Muslim
community is Ali, who is considered an imam, a term used among Shiites not only to
indicate leadership abilities but also to signify blood relations to the Prophet Muhammad.
As Ali’s descendants took over leadership of the Shiite community, the functions of an
CRS-5
3 Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, “Keeping the Shiites Straight,” Religion in the News 6, no. 2 (2003).
imam became more clearly defined. Each imam chose a successor and, according to Shiite
beliefs, he passed down a type of spiritual knowledge to the next leader. Imams served
as both spiritual and political leaders. But as Shiites increasingly lost their political battles
with Sunni Muslim rulers, imams focused on developing a spirituality that would serve
as the core of Shiite religious practices and beliefs. Shiites believe that when the line of
imams descended from Ali ended, religious leaders, known as mujtahids, gained the right
to interpret religious, mystical, and legal knowledge to the broader community. The most
learned among these teachers are known as ayatollahs (lit. the “sign of God”).
Shiite Practices and Core Beliefs. Shiite religious practice centers around the
remembrance of Ali’s younger son, Hussein, who was martyred near the town of Karbala
in Iraq by Sunni forces in 680. His death is commemorated each year on the tenth day of
the Islamic month of Muharram in a somber and sometimes violent ritualistic
remembrance known as “Ashura,” marked among some Shiites by the ritual of selfflagellation.
As a minority that was often persecuted by Sunnis, Shiites found solace in
the Ashura ritual, the telling of the martyrdom of Hussein and the moral lessons to be
learned from it, which reinforced Shiite religious traditions and practices.
Twelver Shiism. Twelver Shiism — the most common form of Shiism today —
is pervasive in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain. Twelvers accept a line of twelve
infallible imams descendent from Ali and believe them to have been divinely appointed
from birth. The twelve imams are viewed as harbors of the faith and as the designated
interpreters of law and theology. Twelvers believe that the twelfth and last of these
imams “disappeared” in the late ninth century. This “hidden imam” is expected to return
to lead the community. Following the twelfth imam’s disappearance, as one scholar
notes, a “pacifist” trend emerged among Twelvers who “chose to withdraw from politics
and quietly await his coming.”3 In the twentieth century, changes in the political
landscape of the Middle East led to a new competing “activist” trend among Twelver
groups in Iran and Lebanon, typified by the late Iranian religious leader Ayatollah
Khomeini.
Ismaili or Sevener Shiism. Although most Shiites agree on the basic premise
that Ali was the first rightful imam, they disagree on his successors. The Ismailis, who
are the second largest Shiite sect, broke off in the eighth century, recognizing only the first
seven imams (the seventh was named Ismail, hence the names “Ismaili” and “Sevener”).
Historically and at least until the sixteenth century, the Ismailis were far more disposed
than the Twelvers to pursuing military and territorial power. In the past, they established
powerful ruling states, which played significant roles in the development of Islamic
history. Today, Ismailis are scattered throughout the world but are prominent in
Afghanistan (under the Naderi clan), in India, and in Pakistan. There are also Ismaili
communities in East and South Africa.
Other Shiite Sects. The Zaydis, who acknowledge the first five imams and differ
over the identity of the fifth, are a minority sect of Shiite Islam, mostly found in Yemen.
The Zaydis reject the concepts of the imams’ infallibility and of a “hidden imam.” Other
sects, such as the Alawites and Druzes, are generally considered to be derived from Shiite
Islam, although their religious practices are secretive, and some do not regard their
CRS-6
adherents as Muslims. Alawites exist mostly in Syria and Lebanon. The Assad family that
effectively has ruled Syria since 1971 are Alawite. Many Alawites interpret the pillars
(duties) of Islam as symbolic rather than applied, and celebrate an eclectic group of
Christian and Islamic holidays. In Turkey, the Alevis are an offshoot group of Shiite Islam
that has been often confused with Syrian Alawites or other Shiites. Not much is known
about their religious practices. Most Alevis are well-integrated into Turkish society and
speak both Turkish and Kurdish. The Druze community was an eleventh-century offshoot
of Ismaili Shiite Islam and is concentrated in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. Today,
the Druze faith differs considerably from mainstream Shiite Islam.
Demographic Distribution Estimates
Notes: Figures in this map indicate the percentages of Sunni and Shiite Muslims in the citizen
population. Some figures do not total 100%, as they exclude Christians and other minorities.
In many countries, particularly where Shiites constitute a significant religious minority, there
are no reliable or exact statistics of the percentage of these groups in the broader population.
Non-citizen workers of non-Muslim faiths are common in the Persian Gulf states and are not
reflected in these figures. Existing indicators of religious affiliation in Iraq, as reported by the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are only estimates. In Lebanon, no census has been
conducted since 1932. These complications, in addition to general shortcomings in the
gathering of reliable statistical information about the region, must be considered when
examining this map. Statistics on Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Pakistan are
taken from CIA World Factbook (2006). Statistics on Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen are taken from the Department of State International
Religious Freedom Report (2005). Statistics on Lebanon are from Lebanon’s Political Mosaic,
published by the Directorate of Intelligence of the CIA, NESA 92-10020, LDA 92-13537,
August 1992. Not all Lebanese agree with the CIA figures. The Turkish government is a
secular government and does not produce official statistics on any religious or ethnic group in
Turkey. For Syria, “non-Sunni Muslims” include Twelvers, Seveners, Alawites, and Druzes.

Russian Natural Gas: Regional Dependence

2007-01-11T12:35:00.001-08:00

1 Energy Information Administration, Russia Country Analysis Brief, “Natural Gas,” January
2006; Eni, World Oil & Gas Review 2006, at [http://www.eni.it/eni/images_static/wogr/pdf/
wogr2006.pdf], viewed Dec. 21 and 27, 2006.
Order Code RS22562
Updated January 5, 2007
Russian Natural Gas: Regional Dependence
Bernard A. Gelb
Specialist in Industry Economics
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Summary
Russia is the dominant natural gas supplier to Europe and neighboring former
Soviet states, as well as a major provider of oil. Some countries are entirely or largely
dependent upon Russian energy supplies, particularly other Soviet successor states. As
such, Russia has some ability to dictate natural gas prices. Russia cut off the gas supply
to Ukraine and Moldova in January 2006 and threatened to cut off gas supplies to
Belarus and Georgia during late 2006 price negotiations. These and other actions in the
interim damaged Russia’s reputation as a reliable energy supplier, spurred importing
countries to seek other sources, and provoked criticism that it is using energy as a
political tool.
Russia is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas, the dominant gas supplier to
Europe and neighboring former Soviet states, and a major provider of oil. Some countries
are entirely or largely dependent upon Russian natural gas. Of Russia’s total natural gas
exports of 7.1 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2004, 6.7 tcf went to European countries,
including destinations in Eastern Europe.1 (In comparison, the United States consumed
an estimated 22 tcf in 2006.)
Moreover, Russian natural gas is imported in large quantities by European countries
and represents very high percentages of the total gas consumption of a number of them.
(See Table 1 and Table 2). For example, Russia exported 1.3 tcf of natural gas to
Germany, 0.9 tcf to Italy and to Ukraine, 0.7 tcf to Belarus, 0.5 tcf to Turkey, and 0.4 tcf
of gas to France in 2004; and Russian gas represented 98% to 100% of the total natural
gas consumed by Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, and Slovakia. Thus, non-Russian Soviet successor states tend to be particularly
dependent upon Russian gas. Ukraine’s 35% “dependence” shown in Table 2 is
deceptively low, in that a substantial portion of its natural gas supply comes from
Turkmenistan though Russian-controlled pipelines.
CRS-2
Table 1. Dependence Upon Russian Natural Gas
by Selected European Countries, 2004
Country
Natural Gas Imports from Russia
Quantity
(billion cu. ft./yr)
% of Domestic
Consumption
Germany 1,290 39%
Italy 855 31
Turkey 506 65
France 406 24
Austria 212 69
Poland 212 43
Netherlands 94 6
Greece 78 82
Sweden 39 b
Belgium 7 1
Denmark a b
Ireland a b
Portugal a b
Spain a b
United Kingdom a b
Sources: Energy Information Administration, Southeastern Europe Country Analysis Brief; Eni,
World Oil & Gas Review 2006, at [http://www.eni.it/eni/images_static/wogr/pdf/wogr2006.pdf],
viewed Dec. 21 and 27, 2006; International Energy Agency, IEA Statistics, at
[http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/index.asp], viewed Dec. 27, 2006.
a. Zero or less than 500 million cubic feet.
b. Zero or less than 0.5%.
As a major supplier of natural gas to European countries, Russia has some ability to
set prices. Gazprom, Russia’s 51%-owned state-run natural gas monopoly, briefly cut off
gas to Ukraine and, separately, to Moldova in January 2006 because they did not agree to
CRS-3
2 Much of Russia’s gas exports to Europe pass through Ukraine. Russia restored supply after
other European countries complained. The dispute has been resolved temporarily by a few
compromise agreements. Moldova and Russia reached an interim agreement mid-January 2006.
3 Neil Buckley and Arkady Ostrovsky, “Gas dispute threatens Belarus, Georgia,” Financial
Times, Dec. 13, 2006.
greatly increase what they were paying for the gas.2 As 2006 ended, Russia appeared to
be preparing to cut off natural gas supplies to Belarus and Georgia unless the two former
Soviet republics agreed by the year-end to pay much higher prices in 2007.3
Table 2. Dependence Upon Russian Natural Gas
by Selected Former Soviet and Soviet Satellite Countries, 2004
Country
Natural Gas Imports from Russia
Quantity
(billion cu. ft.)
% of Domestic
Consumption
Ukraine 850a 35a
Belarus 698 99
Hungary 318 64
Czech Republic 253 77
Slovakia 226 99
Poland 212 43
Finland 163 98
Romania 138 22
Lithuania 103 100
Bulgaria 99 99
Moldova 77 100
Latvia 62 100
Georgia 39 100
Estonia 34 100
Slovenia 20 52
Sources: Energy Information Administration, Southeastern Europe Country Analysis Brief; Eni,
World Oil & Gas Review 2006, at [http://www.eni.it/eni/images_static/wogr/pdf/wogr2006.pdf],
viewed Dec. 21 and 27, 2006; International Energy Agency, IEA Statistics, at
[http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/index.asp] viewed Dec. 27, 2006.
a. Estimate by CRS based on several disparate published and Internet sources.
The cutoffs to Ukraine and Moldova in price-dispute contexts damaged Russia’s
reputation as a reliable energy supplier and reportedly have prompted former Soviet
CRS-4
4 “Russia Turns up the Gas,”Guardian Weekly, Dec. 23, 2005, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 41; Peter Finn,
“Russia Reverses Itself on Gas Cuts,” The Washington Post, Jan. 3, 2006, p. A12; Andrew E.
Kramer, “Russia Restores Most of Gas Cut to Ukraine Line,” The New York Times, Jan. 3, 2006,
at [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/03/international/europe/03ukraine.html?pagewanted=print],
viewed Jan. 3, 2006.
5 Yuras Karmanau, Associated Press, “Belarus Braces for Russia to Turn off the Natural Gas
Spigot, The Washington Post, December 26, 2006; “No Deal for Gazprom, Belarus,” Oil Daily,
December 27, 2006.
6 On January 1, 2007, Belarus and Gazprom signed a five-year contract providing that Belarus
will pay increasingly more for gas (starting at more than twice the old price) and Gazprom will
purchase 50% of Belarus’ gas pipeline network. Alan Cullison, “Belarus Yields to Russia,” The
Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2007, p. A4; “Belarus, Russian Firm Sign 5-Year Deal for Gas,”
The Washington Post, January 2, 2007, p. A10.
7 Ed Reed, “Shtokmnanovskoye: the Wait Continues,” NewsBase CIS Oil & Gas Special Report,
July 2006; “G8 Adopts Energy Plan; Shtokman Slipping Away from U.S. Firms?” Oil Daily, July
18, 2006; “Russian State Interference” and “Test Drilling on Shtokmanovskoye Begins,” FSU
Oil & Gas Monitor, July 26, 2006.
Union and West European countries to investigate where they might obtain non-Russian
gas.4 Also reportedly, during late 2006 price negotiations, Gazprom warned Belarus that
its failure to agree to higher prices could jeopardize the country’s energy supply.5 6 In
addition, the actual and threatened cut-offs have provoked criticism that Russia is using
energy as a political tool.7

Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress

2007-01-11T12:34:00.000-08:00

Order Code RL32730
Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress
Updated December 19, 2006
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress
Summary
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba under Fidel Castro has consisted
largely of isolating the communist nation through comprehensive economic
sanctions, which have been significantly tightened by the Bush Administration.
Another component of U.S. policy has consisted of support measures for the Cuban
people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and
television broadcasting to Cuba. While there appears to be broad agreement on the
overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect
for human rights to the island — there are several schools of thought on how to
achieve that objective: some advocate maximum pressure on Cuba until reforms are
enacted; others argue for lifting some U.S. sanctions judged to be hurting the Cuban
people; and still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations. Fidel
Castro’s announcement in late July 2006 that he was temporarily ceding political
power to his brother Raúl in order to recover from surgery has prompted some
Members to call for re-examination of U.S. policy.
In the 109th Congress, legislative initiatives included the approval of five human
rights resolutions: H.Con.Res. 81, H.Res. 193, H.Res. 388, S.Res. 140, and S.Res.
469. P.L. 109-102 funded Cuba democracy projects in FY2006. Action on several
FY2007 appropriations measures were not completed, so action will need to be
completed in 2007: House-passed H.R. 5522 would have funded FY2007 democracy
projects, and House and Senate versions of the bill had contrasting provisions on
anti-drug cooperation; House-passed H.R. 5576 would have prohibited funds from
being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for agricultural exports
to Cuba; the Senate version of H.R. 5384 would have liberalized travel related to the
sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba; and H.R. 5522 and H.R. 5672 would
have funded Cuba broadcasting.
Other legislative initiatives not acted upon would have eased U.S. sanctions in
various ways: suspension of sanctions after Hurricane Dennis (H.Con.Res. 206);
overall sanctions (H.R. 208 and H.R. 579); overall travel (S. 894 and H.R. 1814);
family visits (H.R. 2617); educational travel (H.R. 3064); cash in advance for U.S.
agricultural sales (H.R. 1339 and S. 634); and facilitation of agricultural sales (H.R.
719 and S. 328). Other measures had provisions on Cuba’s trademark registrations
(H.R. 719, S. 328, H.R. 3372, S. 1604, H.R. 1689 and S. 69); Cuba broadcasting (S.
600, H.R. 2601); U.S. fugitives in Cuba (H.R. 2601, H.R. 332); sanctions related to
Cuba’s offshore oil development (H.R. 5292, S. 2682, S. 2795); participation in
Cuba’s offshore oil development (H.R. 5353, S. 2787); support for U.S. diplomats
in Cuba (H.Con.Res. 428); repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act (H.R. 5670);
assistance to facilitate a peaceful transition in Cuba (S. 3769); and authorization of
$5 million for scholarship and exchange programs (House-passed H.R. 2601).
For additional information, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba after Fidel Castro:
U.S. Policy Implications and Approaches; CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State
Sponsors of Terrorism List; and CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and
Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation.
Contents
Major Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Scenarios for Cuba after Fidel Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Severe Crackdown in 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Release of Several Prisoners in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Varela Project and the National Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Assembly to Promote Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Administration Actions: 2001-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Tightened Sanctions in 2004 and 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report . . . . . . . 16
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Helms/Burton Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Major Provisions and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Foreign Reaction and the EU’s WTO Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Section 211 Trademark Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Agricultural Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Travel and Private Humanitarian Assistance Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Offshore Oil Sector Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Drug Interdiction Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Cuba and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Cuba and Biological Weapons? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Guantanamo Naval Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Radio and TV Marti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Debate on TV Marti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Airborne Broadcasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
FY2006 Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
FY2007 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Migration Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1994 and 1995 Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Elian Gonzalez Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Migration Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Legislation Approved in the 108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Human Rights Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Legislative Initiatives in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Human Rights and Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Modification of Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Cuba Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Anti-Drug Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
U.S. Fugitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Support for U.S. Diplomatic Personnel in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress
Major Developments
On December 18, 2006, a private U.S. commercial television station in Florida
began broadcasting some TV Marti programs on a daily basis. The Office of Cuba
Broadcasting of the Broadcasting Board of Governors also contracted with a
commercial radio station in Miami to broadcast some Radio Marti programming.
On December 12, 2006, independent Cuban journalist Guillermo Fariñas
Hernández received the 2006 Cyber Dissident award from the Paris-based Reporters
Without Borders. Fariñas went on a seven-month hunger strike in 2006, demanding
broader Internet access for Cubans.
On December 6, 2006, the Cuban government released dissident Hector Palacios
from prison for health reason. Palacios, who had been sentenced to 25 years in
prison, was part of the group of 75 arrested in March 2003. Of the 75, 16 have been
released for health reasons. Some 300 political prisoners in all remain jailed in Cuba.
In a December 2, 2006, speech, Raúl reiterated an offer to negotiate with the
United States, as long as it respected Cuba’s independence and as long as the results
were based on “equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.”
On November 15, 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued
a report examining U.S. democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005 and
concluded that the U.S. program had significant problems and needed better
management and oversight.
On August 23, 2006, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to Cuba, first articulated by President
Bush in May 2002, that the Administration was willing to work with Congress to lift
U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba were to begin a political opening and a transition
to democracy.
On August 18, 2006, in an interview published in the Cuban daily Granma on
August 18, 2006, Raúl Castro asserted that Cuba has “always been disposed to
normalize relations on an equal plane,” but he also expressed strong opposition to
current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he described as “arrogant and
interventionist.”
On August 18, 2006, U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte
announced the establishment of the position of Mission Manager for Cuba and
CRS-2
Venezuela responsible for integrating collection and analysis on the two countries
across the Intelligence Community.
On August 13, 2006, Fidel’s 80th birthday, Cuba’s newspaper Juventud Rebelde
published the first photographs of Castro since his surgery, along with a message
from Castro indicating that his recovery would not be short.
On August 4, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in a statement
broadcast on Radio and TV Marti, encouraged “the Cuban people to work at home
for positive change” and reiterated U.S. support.
On August 3, 2006, President Bush issued a statement that “the United States
is absolutely committed to supporting the Cuban people’s aspiration for democracy
and freedom.” The President urged “the Cuban people to work for democratic
change” and pledged U.S. support to the Cuban people in their effort to build a
transitional government in Cuba.
On July 31, 2006, Cuban President Fidel Castro provisionally ceded political
power to his brother Raúl for several weeks in order to recover from intestinal
surgery. As a result, Raúl Castro became First Secretary of the Communist Party,
Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and President of the
Council of State and Government.
On July 27, 2006, the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held
a hearing on the new report on the Committee for Assistance to a Free Cuba.
On July 26, 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of
the FY2007 Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 5576 (S.Rept. 109-293,
with a provision (Section 846) that would prevent Treasury Department funds from
being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba that were issued in February 2005. The provision is identical to one
in the House version of the bill approved on June 14, 2006.
On July 10, 2006, the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba
issued its second report making recommendations to hasten political change in Cuba
toward a democratic transition, including the provision of $80 million over two years
for a variety of Cuba democracy projects. The Commission report received a mixed
response from Cuba’s dissident community. The full report is available at
[http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/]. (For further information, see section below on the “July
2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report.”)
On June 29, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State,
Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations bill, that would fund Cuba
broadcasting under the International Broadcasting Operations account. The report
to the bill (H.Rept. 109-520) recommends $36.102 million for Cuba broadcasting,
including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat for
broadcasting TV Marti. The Administration requested $36.279 for Cuba
broadcasting (For further information, see “Radio and TV Marti” below).
CRS-3
On June 22, 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of,
H.R. 5384 (S.Rept. 109-266), the FY2007 Agriculture appropriations bill, which
contains a provision (Section 755) liberalizing travel to Cuba related to the sale of
agricultural and medical goods. (Also see sections below on “Agricultural Exports”
and “Travel and Private Humanitarian Restrictions.”)
On June 14, 2006, the House approved by voice vote H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran,
Kansas) to the FY2007 Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 5576, that
would prevent Treasury Department funds from being used to implement tightened
restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that were issued in
February 2005. The House also rejected two amendments that would have eased
economic sanctions on Cuba: H.Amdt. 1050 (Rangel), defeated by a vote of 183-
245, which would have prohibited funds from implementing the overall embargo,
and H.Amdt. 1051 (Lee), defeated by a vote of 187-236, which would have
prohibited funs from being used to implement the Administration’s June 2004
tightened restriction on educational travel to Cuba. Another amendment, H.Amdt.
1032 (Flake), which would have prohibited the use of funds to amend regulations
relating to travel for religious activities in Cuba, was withdrawn from consideration.
On June 12, 2006, the State Department asserted the Cuban government had cut
off electricity to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana beginning on June 5, 2006, as
part of a campaign of harassment of U.S. diplomats. The mission was running on
generators, but electricity was restored on June 13, 2006.
On May 25, 2006, the Senate approved S.Res. 469 (Lieberman) by unanimous
consent, which condemned the April 25, 2006, beating of Cuban dissident Martha
Beatriz Roque.
On March 14, 2006, the Bahamas released two Cuban dentists from a detention
center into U.S. custody, whereupon they immediately traveled to the United States.
The two had been held in the detention center for 10 months after being picked up
at sea in Bahamian waters. The dentists had received U.S. visas while in Cuba, but
the Cuban government had denied them exit visas. Several Members of Congress
had sought the release of the two Cubans.
On February 3, 2006, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) asked Starwood Hotels, the U.S. owner of the Sheraton Maria Isabel
hotel in Mexico City, to expel a Cuban delegation that was meeting with U.S. oil
executives at a privately-sponsored U.S.-Cuba energy conference. The hotel
complied, but Mexican officials indicated that it could face fines under Mexican
legislation that permits the government to fine any company in Mexico that complies
with U.S. legislation governing economic sanctions imposed on Cuba. (Ultimately,
Mexico announced on March 24, 2006, that it was fining the hotel $112,000.) U.S.
economic sanctions prohibit financial transactions with Cuba, and this applies to U.S.
companies and their subsidiaries anywhere in the world. While these prohibitions
extend to the provision of services to Cuban nationals, this appears to be the first
time that OFAC has used its authority to block retail services such as a hotel stay
from Cuban nationals outside of the United States.
CRS-4
On January 23, 2006, OFAC suspended a South Florida travel agency, La
Estrella de Cuba, from booking travel to Cuba. The agency reportedly was one of the
largest licensed travel agencies, booking some 300 to 500 passengers monthly.
On January 20, 2006, OFAC issued a license to Major League Baseball allowing
a Cuban team to participate in the World Baseball Classic tournament in the United
States in March 2006. In mid-December 2005, OFAC had denied a license for
Cuba’s participation, reportedly because the Cuban government could have benefitted
financially, but the license ultimately approved assures that any proceeds earned by
the Cuban team would go to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.
On January 9, 2006, the U.S. Coast Guard repatriated 15 Cuban migrants that
had landed on a piling of an old bridge in the Florida Keys that does not connect to
land. The case prompted some Members to call for a review of the “wet foot/dry
foot” policy regarding Cuban migrants. On February 28, 2006, a U.S. federal judge
in Miami ordered that the U.S. government make arrangements for the 15 Cubans to
be brought back to the United States.
On January 6, 2006, U.S. federal agents arrested a Florida International
University professor and his wife, Carlos and Elsa Alvarez, for operating as covert
agents for Cuba for decades. They pled not guilty at an arraignment in Miami federal
court on January 17.
Political Conditions
Politically Cuba remains a hard-line communist state. Until he recently stepped
down temporarily while recuperating from surgery, Fidel Castro ruled as head of
state and government since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the corrupt
government of Fulgencio Batista. In April 1961, Castro stated that the Cuban
Revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a
Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A Constitution was
enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the leading force in the state
and in society (with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro).
The Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental
structures. Executive power has been vested in a Council of Ministers headed by
Fidel Castro as President of the Council.
Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power,
currently with 609 members, that meets twice annually for brief periods. When the
Assembly is not in session, a Council of State acts on its behalf. As President of the
Council of State until recently, Castro has served as head of state and head of
government. Although Assembly members were directly elected for the first time in
February 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. In October 1997, the
Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in
which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel
and Raúl Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries. Direct elections for the
National Assembly were again held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters
again were not offered a choice of candidates.
CRS-5
1 “U.S. Government Says Castro’s Condition is Terminal,” Latin America Regional Report:
Caribbean & Central America, November 2006; Julia Preston, “Castro to Recover, but not
Return, Cubans Say,” New York Times, December 18, 2006.
For a number of years, Fidel’s brother Raúl, as First Vice President of the
Council of State, has been the officially designated successor and was slated to
become head of state and head of government with Fidel’s departure. Raúl — who
turned 75 on June 3, 2006 — also served as First Vice President of the Council of
Ministers, as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and as second
secretary of the Communist Party.
On July 31, 2006, Fidel provisionally ceded political power to his brother Raúl
for several weeks in order to recover from intestinal surgery. As a result, in a
proclamation signed by Fidel, Raúl Castro became First Secretary of the Communist
Party, Commander in Chief of the FAR, and President of the Council of State and
Government.
At the same time, Fidel tapped six other high-ranking government officials on
a provisional basis for key roles in health, education, and energy projects. He
delegated the job of promoting public and international health projects to current
Minister of Public Health Jose Ramon Balaguer Cabrera. On education, he
designated Jose Ramon Machado Ventura and Esteban Lazo Hernandez, both
members of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Communist Party and both Vice
Presidents of the Council of State. On energy, he designated Carlos Lage, a Vice
President of the Council of State and Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers.
Lage is known for orchestrating Cuba’s economic recovery in the 1990s. Fidel also
directed Lage, as well as Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque and Central Bank
President Francisco Soberon Valdes, to form a commission to manage and prioritize
funds for the health, education, and energy programs.
Scenarios for Cuba after Fidel Castro
Because of Fidel’s recovery, celebrations for his 80th birthday on August 13,
2006, were postponed until December 2, 2006 (the 50th anniversary of the arrival of
Fidel and his followers from Mexico on the boat Granma), but Castro was unable
to appear at the celebration in December, fueling speculation that he is gravely ill
and will not be returning to power. A number of observers maintain that Castro is
suffering from cancer, although Cuban officials deny that he has cancer.1
Although many observers believe that the eventual demise of Cuba’s communist
government ultimately is inevitable, there is considerable disagreement over when
or how this may occur. Some still predict that the regime will collapse when Fidel
Castro permanently departs the political scene. Other observers stress that Fidel is
still not out of the picture and that the Cuban government has a plan for the
permanent succession of his brother Raúl. They point to Cuba’s strong security
apparatus and the extraordinary system of controls that prevents dissidents from
gaining popular support.
CRS-6
Before Fidel’s recent surgery, observers discerned several potential scenarios
for Cuba’s future when Fidel either dies in office or departs the political scene
because of age or declining heath. These fit into three broad categories: the
continuation of a communist government; a military government; or a democratic
transition or fully democratic government. According to most observers, the most
likely scenario, at least in the short term, is a successor communist government led
by Raúl Castro. This is true for a variety of reasons, but especially because of Raúl’s
designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as leader of the FAR.
The FAR has been in control of the government’s security apparatus since 1989 and
has played an increasing role in Cuba’s economy through the ownership of numerous
business enterprises. The scenario of a military-led government is viewed by some
observers as a possibility only if a successor communist government fails because of
divisiveness or political instability. For many observers, the least likely scenario upon
Fidel’s death or departure is a democratic or democratic transition government. With
a strong totalitarian security apparatus, the Castro government has successfully
impeded the development of independent civil society, with only a small and tightly
regulated private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified political
opposition. (For further information, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba after Fidel
Castro: U.S. Policy Implications and Approaches, by Mark P. Sullivan.)
Human Rights
Overview. Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government
sharply restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and
other basic rights. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and
independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Although some
anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the
Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists and
other dissidents have continued since that time, with a severe crackdown on activists
in 2003. As of early December 2006, 59 of the “group of 75” political prisoners held
since a severe crackdown on dissidents in March 2003 remained in prison. The most
recent release of the group of 75 was Hector Palacios, released for health reasons on
December 6, 2006; Palacios had been sentenced to 25 years in prison in 2003.
According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2005, the Cuban
government is one of the world’s most systematic human rights violators, controlling
all aspects of life through the Communist Party and state-controlled mass
organizations. As noted in the report, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and
National Reconciliation maintained that the government held 333 documented
political prisoners at the end of 2005, including 39 detainees held without formal
charges, compared to an estimate of 300 political prisoners the previous year.
The State Department report for 2005 asserted that the Cuban government
continued to commit numerous serious abuses in 2005. These included arbitrary
arrest and detention of human rights advocates and members of independent
professional organizations; denial of the right to a fair trial, especially for political
prisoners; abuse of detainees and prisoners; harsh and life-threatening prison
conditions; denial of freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association; and
targeted “acts of repudiation” (organized public protests) against those who disagree
with the government. The government maintained a pervasive system of surveillance
CRS-7
2 Nancy San Martin, “Cuba: Dissidents Were Eroding Socialist System,” Miami Herald,
April 10, 2003.
through undercover agents, informers, neighborhood-based Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). The government also continued to retaliate
against those seeking peaceful political change, including supporters of the Varela
Project, which proposes a national referendum to bring about political and economic
reform.
In 2005, although the government allowed some opposition gatherings to take
place, most notably the May 20-21 meetings of the Assembly to Promote Civil
Society, it continued to suppress other dissent through harassment, threats,
intimidation, and detention. According to Amnesty International, more than 50
Cubans were detained for their role in organizing or participating in demonstrations
on July 13 and 22, 2005. In early August, three of those arrested in July — René
Gomez Manzano, Oscar Mario González, and Julio César López — were informed
that they would be tried on charges of working to undermine the government.
On October 26, 2005, a Cuban human rights group known as the Ladies in
White (Damas de Blanco) received the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought from
the European Parliament. The group, formed after Cuba’s March 2003 crackdown,
consists of wives, mothers, and sisters of dissidents who conduct peaceful protests
calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners.
On December 12, 2006, independent Cuban journalist Guillermo Fariñas
Hernández received the 2006 Cyber Dissident award from the Paris-based Reporters
Without Borders. Fariñas went on a seven-month hunger strike in 2006, demanding
broader Internet access for Cubans.
Severe Crackdown in 2003. In March 2003, the Cuban government began
a massive crackdown on independent journalists and librarians, leaders of
independent labor unions and opposition parties, and other democracy activists,
including those supporting the Varela Project. Human rights activist Elizardo
Sanchez, head of the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation, called the crackdown “the most intense wave of repression in the
history of Cuba.”2 Some 75 activists were arrested, subjected to summary trials and
prosecutions, and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Foreign
journalists and diplomats were excluded from the trials. Among the activists were
27 independent journalists, including Raúl Rivero and Oscar Espinosa Chepe,
sentenced to 20 years, and Omar Rodríguez Saludes, sentenced to 27 years. Other
sentenced democracy activists included economist Marta Beatriz Roque (who had
been imprisoned from July 1997 until May 2000), who received 20 years; Hector
Palacios, a leader of the Varela Project, who received 25 years; and Luis Enrique
Ferrer García of the Christian Liberation Movement, who received 28 years. Another
prominent political prisoner, Oscar Elías Biscet, (who had been arrested in December
2002 after three years in prison) was also tried in April 2003 and sentenced to 25
years in prison.
CRS-8
In a further deterioration of the human rights situation, the Cuban government
executed three men on April 11, 2003, who had hijacked a ferry in Havana in an
attempt to reach the United States. The men were executed by firing squads after
summary trials that were held behind closed doors; four other ferry hijackers received
life sentences while another received 30 years in prison.
Analysts see a variety of potential reasons for the 2003 crackdown on
democracy activists. The Cuban government asserts that the crackdown was justified
because the defendants were supported by the U.S. government and that U.S.
diplomats in Cuba, most notably the head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana,
James Cason, often met with the dissidents. Some analysts believe that the
crackdown was a clear message by the Cuban government that it will not tolerate the
U.S. government’s active and open support for the opposition movement. Other
analysts emphasize that the crackdown was an effort by Castro to strengthen the
regime’s political control in light of a faltering economy and dim economic prospects
ahead. According to this view, an increasingly assertive opposition movement could
become a national security threat to the Castro regime in the tough economic times
ahead. Along these lines, some analysts see the crackdown as a way for the regime
to clear away any potential opposition in order to ensure that the eventual succession
of Raúl Castro to power will be smooth.
Some observers maintain that the Cuban government’s willingness to jeopardize
the possibility of eased U.S. trade and travel restrictions as an indication that it
currently views the dissident movement as a serious security threat. Others, however,
believe that the Cuban government judged that there would not be any movement to
ease the embargo under the Bush Administration under any circumstances, and felt
that it had little to lose in cracking down on the opposition movement. Finally, a
view often heard when Castro takes harsh action that jeopardizes an improvement in
relations with the United States is that Castro actually is opposed to any further
opening to the United States because it could threaten his regime’s control.
According to this view, the crackdown against the opposition blocks any potential
easing of U.S. policy.
Release of Several Prisoners in 2004. In 2004, the Cuban government
released 14 of the 75 arrested in March 2003, and 4 other political prisoners, for
health reasons. In the first half of the year, seven prisoners were released for health
reasons, including noted economist and democracy activist Marta Beatriz Roque,
who was released in April. From late November until early December 2004, the
Cuban government released seven prisoners: Oscar Espinosa Chepe, Margarito
Broche, and Marcelo Lopez on November 29; Raúl Rivero, and Oswaldo Alfonso
Valdes on November 30; Edel José Garcia on December 2; and Jorge Olivero
Castillo on December 6. Many observers maintain that the releases were aimed at
improving Cuba’s relations with Europe. The prisoners were only released on parole
(licencia extrapenal) so that they could be incarcerated again at any time. Human
rights groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have expressed
concerns that the prisoners were not released unconditionally.
Varela Project and the National Dialogue. Named for the 19th century
priest, Felix Varela, who advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of
slavery, the Varela Project has collected thousands of signatures supporting a national
CRS-9
3 “Text of Jimmy Carter’s Speech, Broadcast Live to Cuban People,” Associated Press, May
15, 2002.
4 Oswaldo Payá, “Dissidents’ Goal: A National Dialogue,” Miami Herald, August 9, 2005.
plebiscite for political reform in accordance with a provision of the Cuban
Constitution. The referendum, if granted, would call for respect for human rights,
an amnesty for political prisoners, private enterprise, and changes to the country’s
electoral law that would result in free and fair elections. The initiative is organized
by Oswaldo Payá, who heads the Christian Liberation Movement, and it is supported
by other notable Cuban human rights activists.
On May 10, 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures
to the National Assembly calling for a national referendum. This was more than the
10,000 required under Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President
Jimmy Carter noted the significance of the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002
address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter noted that “when Cubans
exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see
that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.”3
In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own
referendum in late June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending
the Constitution to declare Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable.
The Varela Project has persevered despite the 2003 human rights crackdown,
which included the arrest of 21 project activists. On October 3, 2003, Oswaldo Payá
delivered more than 14,000 signatures to Cuba’s National Assembly, again
requesting a referendum on democratic reforms.
Since December 2003, Payá has been involved in another project known as the
National Dialogue with the objective of getting Cubans involved in the process of
discussing and preparing for a democratic transition. According to Payá, thousands
of Cuban have met in dialogue groups to discuss a working document covering such
themes as economic change, political and institutional change, social issues, public
health and the environment, public order and the armed forces, media, science and
culture, reconciliation and reuniting with the exile community. The next step will
be the drafting of a transition program document to be presented to Cubans for
discussion and to help prepare for a future transition.4
Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Led by three prominent Cuban
human rights activists — Marta Beatriz Roque, Rene Gomez Manzano, and Felix
Bone — the Assembly to Promote Civil Society held two days of meetings in Havana
on May 20-21, 2005, with some 200 participants. The date was significant because
May 20 is Cuba’s independence day. Many observers had expected the government
to prevent or disrupt the proceedings. The Cuban government did prevent some
Cubans and foreigners from attending the conference, but overall the meeting was
dubbed by its organizers as the largest gathering of Cuban dissidents since the 1959
CRS-10
5 Nancy San Martin, “‘A Triumph’ in Cuba as Dissidents Gather,” Miami Herald, May 21,
2005.
6 The full text of the resolution is available in Spanish from Cubanet: [http://www.cubanet.
org/ref/dis/052305.htm].
7 See the full text of “The Homeland Belongs to Us All” online at [http://www.cubanet.org/
CNews/y97/jul97/homdoc.htm].
Cuban revolution.5 The Assembly issued a ten-point resolution laying out an agenda
for political and economic change in Cuba.6 Among its provisions, the resolution
called for the release of all political prisoners, demanded respect for human rights,
demanded the abolition of the death penalty, and endorsed a 1997 dissident document
entitled the “Homeland Belongs to Us All” on political and economic rights.7
Legislative Initiatives. In the 109th Congress, four resolutions were approved
regarding Cuba’s human rights situation.
H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez), passed by the House on April 27, 2005, expresses
the sense of Congress regarding the two-year anniversary of the human rights
crackdown in Cuba. The resolution demanded that Cuba release all political
prisoners; legalize all political parties, labor unions, and press; and hold free and fair
elections. It further calls for all UN members to vote against Cuba’s membership on
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).
Two resolutions — H.Res. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario), approved by the House on
May 10, 2005, and S.Res. 140 (Martinez), approved by the Senate on May 17 —
express support of the organizers and participants of the May 20, 2005, meeting in
Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. The resolutions also urge the
international community to support the Assembly and its mission to bring democracy
to Cuba.
H.Res. 388 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln), approved by the House on September 29,
2005, expresses the sense of the House regarding the Cuban government’s
crackdown against dissidents in July 2005. The measure also calls on the European
Union to reexamine its current policy toward the Cuban regime and calls on the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations and other international organizations
to work with member countries of the UNCHR to ensure a strong resolution on Cuba
at the 62nd session of the UNCHR in 2006.
S.Res. 469 (Lieberman), approved by the Senate on May 25, 2006, condemns
the April 25, 2006, beating and intimidation of Cuban dissident Martha Beatriz
Roque. Roque, who was imprisoned from 1997 until 2000, and again from March
2003 until April 2004, is one of the leaders of the Assembly to Promote Civil
Society.
In terms of oversight, two subcommittees of the House International Relations
Committee (Western Hemisphere and Africa, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations) held a March 3, 2005, hearing on the second anniversary
of Cuba’s human rights crackdown, featuring testimony by the State Department,
human rights organizations, and political dissidents in Cuba.
CRS-11
8 For an overview of the Cuban economy, see CRS Report RL30837, Cuba: An Economic
Primer, by Ian F. Fergusson.
9 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2006.
10 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2006.
In addition to resolutions on, and oversight of, Cuba’s human rights situation,
Congress funds democracy and human rights projects for Cuba in annual Foreign
Operations and Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations measures. For more
details, see U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights, below.
Economic Conditions8
With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced
severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, with estimates of economic decline
ranging from 35-50%, but there has been considerable improvement since 1994.
From 1994-2000, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually, with a high of 7.8% in
1996. In 2001 and 2002, economic growth slowed in the aftermath of the effects of
Hurricane Michelle and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.
The terrorist attacks severely affected Cuba’s tourist industry, with reports of some
hotels closing and restaurants being empty. Hurricane Michelle damaged some
45,000 homes and severely hurt the agricultural sector. Economic growth in 2004
measured 4.2%, and was affected negatively by a drought in eastern Cuba, the worst
in 40 years, that severely damaged agricultural crops. Hurricanes Charley and Ivan
also caused significant damage and flooding in western Cuba.9
In 2005, despite the widespread damage caused by Hurricane Dennis that struck
in July and Hurricane Wilma that struck in October, economic growth still registered
an impressive 9.5%. Hurricane Dennis killed 16 people and resulted in $1.4 billion
in damages to housing, infrastructure, and agriculture. The storm damaged some
120,000 homes as well as Cuba’s national power grid causing significant electrical
outages. Hurricane Wilma caused significant flooding in Havana, with more than
$700 million in damage according to the Cuban government. On the positive side,
economic growth benefitted from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors.
Cuba is also benefitting from a preferential oil agreement with Venezuela, which
provides Cuba with 90,000 barrels of oil a day. Promises of substantial Chinese
investment could further boost Cuba’s nickel production. Economic growth for 2006
is forecast to be 7.5%.10
Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and
education. The World Bank estimates that in 2004, the adult literacy rate was 97%
and life expectancy was 77 years. The under-5 years of age mortality rate was 9 per
1,000, the lowest rate in Latin America and comparable to the rate of the United
States.
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little
willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993,
faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction.
CRS-12
11 Larry Luxner, “New Decree Limits Dollar Transactions as Cuba Tightens Controls Once
Again,” CubaNews, April 2004.
12 Larry Luxner, “Cuba’s ‘Convertible Peso’ No Longer Linked to U.S. Dollar,” CubaNews,
April 2005, p. 3.
Beginning in 1993, Cubans were allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at
dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was
authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by
1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Other Cuban economic
reforms included breaking up large state farms into smaller, more autonomous,
agricultural cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs) in 1993;
opening agricultural markets in September 1994 where farmers could sell part of
their produce on the open market; opening artisan markets in October 1994 for the
sale of handicrafts; allowing private food catering, including home restaurants
(paladares) in June 1995 (in effect legalizing activities that were already taking
place); approving a new foreign investment law in September 1995 that allows fully
owned investments by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of
defense, health, and education; and authorizing the establishment of free trade zones
with tariff reductions typical of such zones in June 1996. In May 1997, the
government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established a new
Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.
Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult —
characterized by low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of
medicines, and power outages — and the government has backtracked on some of
its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes have made it extremely difficult for
many of the nation’s self-employed. Some home restaurants have been forced to
close because of the regulations. Some foreign investors in Cuba have also begun to
complain that the government has backed out of deals or forced them out of business.
In April 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state companies
for any services or products not considered part of their core business. Some analysts
viewed the measure as an effort to turn back the clock on economic reform
measures.11
On October 25, 2004, Fidel Castro announced that U.S. dollars no longer would
be used in entities that currently accept dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and
hotels). Instead, Cubans would need to exchange their dollars for “convertible
pesos,” with a 10% surcharge for the exchange. Cubans could exchange their dollars
or deposit them in banks with the surcharge until November 14. Dollar bank
accounts will still be allowed, but Cubans will not be able to deposit new dollars into
the accounts. Beginning on April 9, 2005, convertible pesos were no longer on par
with the U.S. dollar, but instead were linked to a basket of foreign currencies. This
reduced the value of dollar remittances sent to Cuba and provides more hard currency
to the Cuban government.12
CRS-13
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro
began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward
close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-
Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as U.S. covert operations
to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of
Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted
the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban
support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments
in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans
to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than
30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and
Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian
planes operated by the Cuban American group, Brothers to the Rescue, which
resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating
the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. These sanctions were
made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L.102-484, Title
XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L.
104-114), often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S.
subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United
States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it has engaged in trade with Cuba
within the last 180 days. The Helms/Burton legislation, enacted in the aftermath of
Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a
variety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist
Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy. Among the law’s sanctions is a
provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S.
property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S.
federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, however, both President Clinton
and President Bush have suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month
intervals.
Another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of support
measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations,
medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S.
government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and
television broadcasting to Cuba. In addition, the 106th Congress approved the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that
allows for agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with restrictions on financing such
exports.
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the
aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster
U.S. support for the Cuban people. These included the resumption of direct flights
to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S.
civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances for the support of close relatives
in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis
CRS-14
13 The White House, “Remarks by the President in Recognition of Cuba Independence Day”,
May 18, 2001.
14 Direct mail service was suspended in 1962. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 directed
the U.S. Postal service to take actions to provide direct mail service. In January 1999,
President Clinton called for the resumption of direct mail service. In the past, Cuba has
responded to U.S. overtures about direct mail service by maintaining that the two countries
(continued...)
with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for the commercial sale of medicines
and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. In January 1999, President Clinton
announced several additional measures to support the Cuban people. These included
a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those
with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct
passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct
flights later in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion
of people-to-people contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain
categories of travelers, such as professional researchers and those involved in a wide
range of educational, religious, and sports activities.
Bush Administration Policy
Overview. The Bush Administration essentially has continued the two-track
U.S. policy of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the
Cuban people through a variety of measures. However, within this policy
framework, the Administration has emphasized stronger enforcement of economic
sanctions and has moved to further tighten restrictions on travel, remittances, and
humanitarian gift parcels to Cuba. There was considerable reaction to the
Administration’s June 2004 tightening of restrictions for family visits and to the
Administration’s February 2005 tightening of restrictions on payment terms for U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba.
Administration Actions: 2001-2003. President Bush made his first major
statement on his Administration’s policy toward Cuba on May 18, 2001. He affirmed
that his Administration would “oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against
Cuba’s government ... until this regime frees its political prisoners, holds democratic,
free elections, and allows for free speech.” He added that he would “actively support
those working to bring about democratic change in Cuba.”13 In July 2001, President
Bush asked the Treasury Department to enhance and expand the enforcement
capabilities of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The President noted the
importance of upholding and enforcing the law in order to prevent “unlicenced and
excessive travel,” enforce limits on remittances, and ensure that humanitarian and
cultural exchanges actually reach pro-democracy activists in Cuba.
On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced a new initiative on Cuba that
included four measures designed to reach out to the Cuban people: 1) facilitating
humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people by U.S. religious and other nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs); 2) providing direct assistance to the Cuban
people through NGOs; 3) calling for the resumption of direct mail service to and
from Cuba;14 and 4) establishing scholarships in the United States for Cuban students
CRS-15
14 (...continued)
would need to enter into a civil-aviation agreement. Cuba in the past has also expressed
concern about potential terrorism that could occur with direct mail service and would want
to discuss with the United States measures to prevent such activity before the resumption
of direct mail. See Philip Brenner, “Washington Loosens the Knot Just a Little,” NACLA
Report on the Americas, March 1, 1999.
15 “President Bush Announced Initiative for a New Cuba,” Remarks by the President on
Cuba Policy Review, White House, May 20, 2002.
16 Presidential Proclamation 7757 of February 26, 2004, Federal Register, March 1, 2004,
p. 9515; Carol Rosenberg, “New Rule Restricts American Boaters from Sailing to Island,”
Miami Herald, February 27, 2004.
17 U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, Washington File, “U.S. to
Deny Visas to Cubans Who Took Part in Dissident Trials,” March 18, 2004; Nancy San
Martin, “U.S. Bans Anti-Dissidents: The United States Will Deny Entry to 300 Cubans
Identified by the States as Cuban Regime Authorities Who Are Involved in Acts of
Repression,” Miami Herald, March 20, 2004.
and professionals involved in building civil institutions and for family members of
political prisoners. While the President said that he would work with Congress to
ease sanctions if Cuba made efforts to conduct free and fair legislative elections and
adopt meaningful market-based reforms, he also maintained that full normalization
of relations would only occur when Cuba had a fully democratic government, the rule
of law was respected, and human rights were fully protected. The President’s
initiative did not include an explicit tightening of restrictions on travel to Cuba that
some observers had expected. The President did state, however, that the United
States would “continue to enforce economic sanctions on Cuba, and the ban on travel
to Cuba, until Cuba’s government proves that it is committed to real reform.”15
On October 10, 2003, the President announced three initiatives “to hasten the
arrival of a new, free, democratic Cuba.” First, the President instructed the
Department of Homeland Security to increase inspections of travelers and shipments
to and from Cuba in order to more strictly enforce the trade and travel embargo.
Second, the President announced that the United States would increase the number
of new Cuban immigrants each year, improve the method of identifying refugees,
redouble efforts to process Cubans seeking to leave Cuba, initiate a public
information campaign to better inform Cubans of the routes to safe and legal
migration to the United States. Third, the President announced the establishment of
a “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba,” that would help plan for Cuba’s
transition from communism to democracy and help identify ways to help bring it
about.
Tightened Sanctions in 2004 and 2005. The Bush Administration took
several measures in 2004 to tighten U.S. sanctions against Cuba. In February,
President Bush ordered the Department of Homeland Security to expand its policing
of the waters between Florida and Cuba with the objective of stopping pleasure
boating traffic.16 In March, the State Department announced that it would deny visas
to those Cubans who participated in the “show trials” of dissidents in March 2003,
an action that will reportedly cover some 300 Cubans.17
CRS-16
18 U.S. Department of State, Second Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba, Briefing, July 10, 2006.
On May 6, 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report
issued by the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by
then Secretary of State Colin Powell. The Commission made recommendations for
immediate measures to “hasten the end of Cuba’s dictatorship” as well as longer-term
recommendations to help plan for Cuba’s transition from communism to democracy
in various areas. The President directed that up to $59 million be committed to
implement key recommendations of the Commission, including support for
democracy-building activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to
Cuba. The report’s most significant recommendations included a number of measures
to tighten economic sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on
private humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels.
Subsequent regulations issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments in June
2004 implemented these new sanctions. (The full Commission report is on the State
Department website at [http://www.state. gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/].)
In 2005, the Administration continued to tighten U.S. economic sanctions
against Cuba by further restricting the process of how U.S. agricultural exporters may
be paid for their sales. In July 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed
Caleb McCarry as the State Department’s new Cuba Transition Coordinator to direct
U.S. government “actions in support of a free Cuba.” Secretary Rice reconvened the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in December 2005 to identify additional
measures to help Cubans hasten the transition to democracy and to develop a plan to
help the Cuban people move toward free and fair elections.
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. On
July 10, 2006, the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba issued its
second report making recommendations to hasten political change in Cuba toward
a democratic transition. The full report is available at [http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/].
The Commission called for the United States to provide $80 million over two
years for the following: to support Cuban civil society ($31 million); to fund
education programs and exchanges, including university training in Cuba provided
by third countries and scholarships for economically disadvantaged students from
Cuba at U.S. and third country universities ($10 million); to fund additional efforts
to break the Cuban government’s information blockade and expand access to
independent information, including through the Internet ($24 million); and to support
international efforts at strengthening civil society and transition planning ($15
million). According to the Cuba Transition Coordinator, this assistance would be
additional funding beyond what the Administration is already currently budgeting for
these programs.18 Thereafter, the Commission recommended funding of not less than
$20 million annually for Cuba democracy programs “until the dictatorship ceases to
exist.” This would roughly double the amount currently spent on Cuba democracy
programs.
The report also set forth detailed plans of how the U.S. government, along with
the international community and the Cuban community abroad, could provide
CRS-17
19 Nicholas Kralev, “Bush OKs Initiative to Support Opposition,” Washington Times, July
11, 2006.
20 Frances Robles and Pablo Bachelet, “Plan for Change in Cuba Gets OK,” Miami Herald,
July 11, 2006.
21 Miriam Leiva, “We Cubans Must Decide,” Miami Herald, July 15, 2006.
22 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Message to the People
of Cuba,” Aug. 4, 2006.
assistance to a Cuba transition government to help it respond to critical humanitarian
and social needs, to conduct free and fair elections, and to move toward a marketbased
economy. The report also outlined a series of preparatory steps that the U.S.
government can take now, before Cuba’s transition begins, so that it will be well
prepared in the event that assistance is requested by the new Cuban government.
These included steps in the areas of government organization, electoral preparation,
and anticipating humanitarian and social needs.
The Commission report received a mixed response from Cuba’s dissident
community. Although some dissidents, like former political prisoner Vladimiro
Roca, maintain that they would welcome any U.S. assistance that helps support the
Cuba dissident movement, others expressed concerns about the report. Dissident
economist and former political prisoner Oscar Espinosa Chepe stressed that Cubans
have to be the ones to solve their own problems. According to Chepe, “We are
thankful for the solidarity we have received from North America, Europe, and
elsewhere, but we request that they do not meddle in our country.”19 Miriam Leiva,
a founding member of the Ladies in White, a human rights organization consisting
of the wives, mothers, and sisters of political prisoners, expressed concern that the
report could serve as supposed evidence for the government to imprison dissidents.20
Leiva also faulted the Commission’s report for presuming what a Cuban transition
must be before U.S. recognition or assistance can be provided. According to Leiva,
“Only we Cubans, of our own volition ... can decide issues of such singular
importance. Cubans on the island have sufficient intellectual ability to tackle a
difficult, peaceful transition and reconcile with other Cubans here and abroad.”21
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power. In response to Fidel Castro’s
announcement that he was ceding power to his brother Raúl, President Bush issued
a statement on August 3, 2006, that “the United States is absolutely committed to
supporting the Cuban people’s aspiration for democracy and freedom.” The President
urged “the Cuban people to work for democratic change” and pledged U.S. support
to the Cuban people in their effort to build a transitional government in Cuba. U.S.
officials indicated that there are no plans for the United States to “reach out” to the
new leader. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated U.S. support for the
Cuban people in an August 4, 2006, statement broadcast on Radio and TV Marti.
According to Secretary Rice, “All Cubans who desire peaceful democratic change
can count on the support of the United States.”22
Although there was some U.S. concern that political change in Cuba could
prompt a migration crisis, there has been no unusual traffic since Castro ceded power
temporarily to his brother. The U.S. Coast Guard has plans to respond to such a
CRS-18
23 “No Enemy Can Defeat Us,” interview of Raúl Castro by Laszar Barredo Medina, Diario
Granma, Aug. 18, 2006.
24 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,” Thomas Shannon, Assistant
Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Aug. 23, 2006.
25 “English Transcript of Raul Castro’s Speech,” Miami Herald, Dec. 2, 2006.
26 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Creates Five Groups to Eye Cuba,” Miami Herald, Sept. 13, 2006.
migration crisis, with support from the Navy if needed. In her August 4, 2006,
message to the Cuban people, Secretary of State Rice encouraged “the Cuban people
to work at home for positive change.” Department of Homeland Security officials
also announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the
open seas. U.S. officials also discouraged those in the Cuban American community
wanting to travel by boat to Cuba to speed political change in Cuba.
Raúl Castro asserted in an August 18, 2006, published interview that Cuba has
“always been disposed to normalize relations on an equal plane,” but at the same time
he expressed strong opposition to current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he
described as “arrogant and interventionist.”23 In response, Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to
Cuba, first articulated by President Bush in May 2002, that the Administration was
willing to work with Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba were to begin
a political opening and a transition to democracy. According to Shannon, the Bush
Administration remains prepared to work with Congress for ways to lift the embargo
if Cuba is prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the
creation of independent organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward
free and fair elections.24
In a December 2, 2006 speech, Raúl reiterated an offer to negotiate with the
United States. He said that “we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the
longstanding dispute between the United States and Cuba, of course, provided they
accept, as we have previously said, our condition as a country that will not tolerate
any blemishes on its independence, and as long as said resolution is based on the
principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.”25
In the aftermath of Fidel’s ceding of power to his brother, the Bush
Administration established five interagency working groups to manage U.S. policy
toward Cuba. The State Department is leading working groups on diplomatic
actions, to build international support for U.S. policies; strategic communications,
to ensure that Cubans understand U.S. government positions; and democratic
promotion. The Commerce Department is leading a working group on humanitarian
aid, in the event that a democratic transition government requests assistance. The
Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Council are heading a
working group on migration.26 In addition to these working groups, U.S. Director
of National Intelligence John Negroponte announced in mid-August 2006 the
establishment of the position of Mission Manager for Cuba and Venezuela
responsible for integrating collection and analysis on the two countries across the
Intelligence Community.
CRS-19
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective
of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for human rights
to the island — there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve that
objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban
government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to
support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as
constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are
hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others
call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.
In general, those advocating a loosening of the sanctions-based policy toward
Cuba make several policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated
its policy toward Cuba — through increased travel, trade, and diplomatic dialogue
— that the seeds of reform would be planted in Cuba, which would stimulate and
strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to
the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass
exodus to the United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil
war scenario. They argue that since Castro’s demise does not appear imminent, the
United States should espouse a more realistic approach in trying to induce change in
Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for
lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities to U.S. businesses because of
the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the
embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be
consistent in its policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments,
including China, and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human
rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current
two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through
measures of support, is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba. They
point out that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth a
road map of the steps Cuba that needs to take in order for the United States to
normalize relations, including lifting the embargo. They argue that softening U.S.
policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro regime
politically and economically, and facilitate the survival of the communist regime.
Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the United States should stay the
course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba; that sustained
sanctions can work; and that the sanctions against Cuba have only come to full
impact with the loss of large subsidies from the former Soviet bloc. Opponents of
loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the
U.S. embargo, are the causes of the economy’s rapid decline.
Fidel Castro’s July 31, 2006, announcement that he was ceding political power
to his brother Raúl temporarily in order to recover from surgery could foster a reexamination
of U.S. policy. In this new context, there are two broad policy
CRS-20
approaches to contend with political change in Cuba: a stay-the-course or status-quo
approach that would maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban
government while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at
influencing the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and
engagement. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba after
Fidel Castro: U.S. Policy Implications and Approaches.)
Helms/Burton Legislation
Major Provisions and Implementation. The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114) was enacted into law on March 12, 1996.
Title I, Section 102(h), codifies all existing Cuban embargo executive orders and
regulations. No presidential waiver is provided for any of these codified embargo
provisions. This provision is significant because of the long-lasting effect on U.S.
policy options toward Cuba. In effect, the executive branch is circumscribed in any
lifting of the embargo until certain democratic conditions are met.
Title III, controversial because of the ramifications for U.S. relations with
countries investing in Cuba, allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S.
federal court those persons who traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. It extends
the right to sue to Cuban Americans who became U.S. citizens after their properties
were confiscated. The President has authority to delay implementation for six
months at a time if he determines that such a delay would be in the national interest
and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.
Beginning in July 1996, President Clinton used this provision to delay for six
months the right of individuals to file suit against those persons benefitting from
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. At the time of the first suspension on July 16,
1996, the President announced that he would allow Title III to go into effect, and as
a result liability for trafficking under the title became effective on November 1, 1996.
According to the Clinton Administration, this put foreign companies in Cuba on
notice that they face prospects of future lawsuits and significant liability in the United
States. At the second suspension on January 3, 1997, President Clinton stated that
he would continue to suspend the right to file law suits “as long as America’s friends
and allies continued their stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in
Cuba.” He continued, thereafter, at six-month intervals, to suspend the rights to file
Title III lawsuits.
President Bush has continued to suspend implementation of Title III at sixmonth
intervals, most recently on July 16, 2006, by determining that it “is necessary
to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba.” When President Bush first used his authority to suspend Title
III implementation in July 2001, he cited efforts by European countries and other
U.S. allies to push for democratic change in Cuba. In testimony before the House
Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on Human Rights and Wellness on
October 16, 2003, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega justified the continued
suspension of Title III implementation by noting numerous examples of countries
condemning Cuba for its human rights crackdown in 2003.
CRS-21
27 “April Likely to Mark Beginning of Epic Battle Over Cuba Policy Between White House,
Congress,” Cuba Trader, March 11, 2002, p. 2-3; “Congress Expected to Make New Push
for Title IV Enforcement after Settlement Fails,” Cuba Trader, December 9, 2002.
Title IV of the law denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in
the confiscation of U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated U.S.
property in Cuba. This includes corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with
a controlling interest in an entity involved in the confiscation of U.S. property or
trafficking of U.S. property. It also includes the spouse, minor child, or agent of
aliens who would be excludable under the provision. This provision is mandatory,
and only waiveable on a case-by-case basis for travel to the United States for
humanitarian medical reasons or for individuals to defend themselves in legal actions
regarding confiscated property.
To date the State Department has banned from the United States a number of
executives and their families from three companies because of their investment in
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba: Grupos Domos, a Mexican telecommunications
company; Sherritt International, a Canadian mining company; and BM Group, an
Israeli-owned citrus company. In 1997, Grupos Domos disinvested from U.S.-
claimed property in Cuba, and as a result its executives are again eligible to enter the
United States. Action against executives of STET, an Italian telecommunications
company was averted by a July 1997 agreement in which the company agreed to pay
the U.S.-based ITT Corporation $25 million for the use of ITT-claimed property in
Cuba for ten years. For several years, the State Department has been investigating
a Spanish hotel company, Sol Melia, for allegedly investing in property that was
confiscated from U.S. citizens in Cuba’s Holguin province in 1961. Press reports in
March 2002, indicated that a settlement was likely between Sol Melia and the
original owners of the property, but by the end of the year settlement efforts had
failed.27 In mid-June 2004, Jamaica’s SuperClubs resort chain decided to disinvest
from two Cuban hotels. The State Department had written to the hotel chain in May
advising that its top officials could be denied U.S. entry because the company’s
Cuban investments involved confiscated U.S. property.
Foreign Reaction and the EU’s WTO Challenge. Many U.S. allies —
including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and European Union (EU) nations — strongly
criticized the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. They
maintain that the law’s provisions allowing foreign persons to be sued in U.S. court
constitute an extraterritorial application of U.S. law that is contrary to international
principles. U.S. officials maintain that the United States, which reserves the right to
protect its security interests, is well within its rights under NAFTA and the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
Until mid-April 1997, the EU had been pursuing a case at the WTO, in which
it was challenging the Helms/Burton legislation as an extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. The beginning of a settlement on the issue occurred on April 11, 1997,
when an EU-U.S. understanding was reached. In the understanding, both sides
agreed to continue efforts to promote democracy in Cuba and to work together to
develop an agreement on agreed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of
investment protection relating to the confiscation of property by Cuba and other
CRS-22
28 “EU, U.S. Take Sharply Different Tacks on Dispute Resolution,” Inside U.S. Trade, June
22, 2001.
29 “Is the US After a Helms-Burton Solution?” Cuba Trader, July 14, 2003.
30 For additional information, see CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of
Cubans: WTO Decision and Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
governments. As part of the understanding, the EU agreed that it would suspend its
WTO dispute settlement case. Subsequently in mid-April 1998, the EU agreed to let
its WTO challenge expire.
Talks between the United States and the European Union on investment
disciplines proved difficult, with the European Union wanting to cover only future
investments and the United States wanting to cover past expropriations, especially
in Cuba. Nevertheless, after months of negotiations, the European Union and the
United States reached a second understanding on May 18, 1998. The understanding
set forth EU disciplines regarding investment in expropriated properties worldwide,
in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s obtaining a waiver from Congress for
the legislation’s Title IV visa restrictions. Under the understanding, future
investment in expropriated property would be barred. For past illegal expropriations,
government support or assistance for transactions related to those expropriated
properties would be denied. A Registry of Claims would also be established to warn
investors and government agencies providing investment support that a property has
a record of claims. These investment disciplines were to be applied at the same time
that the President’s Title IV waiver authority was exercised.
Reaction was mixed among Members of Congress to the EU-U.S. accord, but
opposition to the agreement by several senior Members has forestalled any
amendment of Title IV in Congress. The Bush Administration initially indicated that
the Administration was looking into the possibilities of legislation to enact a
presidential waiver for the provision, but during the June 2001 U.S.-EU summit,
President Bush noted the difficulty of persuading Congress to amend the law.28 In
July 2003, some press reports indicated that the Administration was considering an
arrangement with the EU in which the EU would take a stronger policy stance toward
Cuba in exchange for the Administration securing waiver authority for Title IV and
permanent waiver authority for Title III of the Helms/Burton legislation.29
Section 211 Trademark Provision30
Another European Union challenge of U.S. law regarding Cuba in the World
Trade Organization involves a dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod
Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint
venture with the Cuban government to produce and export Havana Club rum, but
Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name. A provision in the
FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, title II, P.L.
105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from
accepting payment for trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign
nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were
confiscated unless the original owner of the trademark has consented. The provision
CRS-23
31 United States Trade Representative, “WTO Issues Report Upholding Key Aspects of U.S.
Law in Trademark Dispute,” Press Release, January 2, 2002.
32 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside
U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks without the consent of the
original owner. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United
States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights
should the embargo be lifted.
After Bacardi began selling rum in the United States under the Havana Club
label, Pernod Ricard’s joint venture unsuccessfully challenged Bacardi in U.S.
federal court. In February 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
New York upheld a lower court’s ruling that the joint venture had no legal right to
use the Havana Club name in the United States and also that it was barred from
recognizing any assertion of treaty rights with regard to the trade name.
After formal U.S.-EU consultations on the issue were held in 1999 without
resolution, the EU initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings in June 2000,
maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS). An August 6, 2001 ruling by the WTO panel was
described as mixed, with both sides claiming a partial victory. The panel ruled that
WTO rules on intellectual property rights did not cover trade names, but also ruled
that a portion of the law (Section 211(a)(2)) prohibiting U.S. courts from recognizing
such Cuban trademarks based on common law rights or registration is in violation of
the TRIPS because it denies access to U.S. courts by trademark holders.
In early October 2001, the EU formally notified the WTO that it was appealing
the ruling. The WTO appeals panel issued its ruling on January 2, 2002, and again
the ruling was described as mixed. According to the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), the appellate panel upheld the “U.S. position that WTO
intellectual property rights rules leave WTO members free to protect trademarks by
establishing their own trademark ownership criteria” and overturned the earlier ruling
that Section 211 was in violation of TRIPs because it denied access to U.S. courts by
trademark holders.31 However, the appellate panel also found that Section 211
violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment,
which could require the United States to amend Section 211 so that it does not violate
WTO rules. Although there is access to courts to enforce trademark rights, Section
211 restricted access in a discriminatory manner (against Cuban nationals and foreign
successors-in-interest).
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into compliance
with the WTO ruling through legislative action by Congress by January 3, 2003.32
That deadline was extended several times since no legislative action had been taken
to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. On July 1, 2005,
however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would not request
CRS-24
33 “Japan, EU Suspend WTO Retaliation Against U.S. in Two Cases,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 15, 2005.
34 Brian Lehman, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on “An
Examination of Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,” July 13, 2004.
35 “USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, April 1, 2002.
authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date,
and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.33
Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into
compliance with the WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211
would be amended so that it also applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited
to foreign companies. Advocates of this approach argue that it would affirm that the
United States “will not give effect to a claim or right to U.S. property if that claimed
is based on a foreign compensation.”34 Others want Section 211 repealed altogether.
They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S. companies
registered in Cuba.35 They maintain that Cuba could retaliate against U.S. companies
under the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection.
In the 108th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a July 13, 2004,
hearing on the Section 211 trademark issue featuring those advocating the narrow fix
as advanced by S. 2373 (Domenici) and H.R. 4225 (Smith of Texas), as well as those
calling for the repeal of Section 211 as advanced by S. 2002 (Baucus) and H.R. 2494
(Rangel), but no action was taken on any of these measures in the 108th Congress.
In the 109th Congress, several legislative initiatives would have repealed the
Section 211 trademark provision from law, while two identical bills would have
advanced the narrow fix to Section 211 in order to comply with the WTO ruling, but
no action was taken on these measures. H.R. 3372 (Flake) and S. 1604 (Craig)
would have repealed Section 211. Two bills that would have lifted the overall
embargo, H.R. 208 (Serrano) and H.R. 579 (Paul), included provisions that would
have repealed Section 211. In addition, two identical bills that would have facilitated
U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, H.R. 719 (Moran of Kansas) and S. 328 (Craig), also
had provisions that would have repealed Section 211. A proposed amendment
(S.Amdt. 281) to S. 600 (Lugar), the FY2006 and FY2007 Foreign Affairs
Authorization Act consisted of the language of S. 328, including a provision that
would have repeal Section 211. In contrast, two identical bills — S. 691 (Domenici)
and H.R. 1689 (Feeney) — would have advanced the narrow fix in which Section
211 would be amended so that it also applied to U.S. companies. The July 2005 EUU.
S. bilateral agreement, in which the EU agreed not to retaliate against the United
States, but reserved the right to do so at a later date, reduced pressure on Congress
to take action to comply with the WTO ruling.
Agricultural Exports
U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several
years, but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th
Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
CRS-25
36 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before
the House Committee on Agriculture, March 16, 2005.
37 Christopher S. Rugaber, “Treasury Clarifies Cuba Farm Export Rule, and Baucus Relents
on Nominees,” International Trade Reporter, August 4, 2005.
or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for selling
agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign
assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance
such exports. TSRA, furthermore, denies exporters access to U.S. private
commercial financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance
or with financing from third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on
importing goods from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific license,
to conduct business related to the newly allowed agricultural sales. Regulations
implementing the new provisions were published in the Federal Register on July 12,
2001.
In November 2004, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) instructed U.S. banks to stop transfers of funds to U.S. companies for sales
of agricultural and medical products to Cuba. The temporary move was taken so that
OFAC could examine whether there were any violations of the provisions of the
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which requires that
the sales be conducted in “payment of cash in advance.”
OFAC ultimately amended the Cuba embargo regulations on February 22, 2005,
to clarify that TSRA’s term of “payment of cash in advance” means that the payment
is received by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from
the port at which they are loaded. The new regulations, published in the Federal
Register on February 25, went into effect on March 24, 2005, providing a 30-day
window for exporters to comply. U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members of
Congress strongly objected that the action constitutes a new sanction that violates the
intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to
Cuba. OFAC Director Robert Werner maintains that the clarification “conforms to
the common understanding of the term in international trade.”36
On July 29, 2005, OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the
commercial sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as
soon as a foreign bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action
would reportedly ensure that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for
unrelated claims while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning OFAC’s
February 22, 2005 amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, were
pleased by the clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the
February rule.37
Since late 2001, Cuba has purchased more than $1.4 billion in agricultural
products from the United States. Overall U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to about
$7 million in 2001, $146 million in 2002, $259 million in 2003, $404 million in
2004, $369 million in 2005, and $263 for the first eight months of 2006, the majority
in agricultural products. In the first seven months of 2005, U.S. agricultural exports
to Cuba had fallen by 25%, but rebounded beginning in August 2005 so that for the
CRS-26
38 World Trade Atlas. Department of Commerce Statistics.
39 Jane Bussey, “Export Reversal, Food Exports to Cuba Dipped by 11% in 2005,” Miami
Herald, Feb. 25, 2006.
40 “Ag Groups Split Over Trade With Cuba,” Congress Daily AM, National Journal,
February 11, 2003.
41 “Farm Equipment Exports Likely to Face Tough Opposition from White House,
Congress,” Cuba Trader, Vol. III, No. 7, February 17, 2003.
year overall, U.S. exports to Cuba had declined just 8.7% compared to 2004.38 The
rebound in U.S. exports to Cuba in the second half of 2005 coincided with OFAC’s
late July 2005 clarification regarding “payment of cash in advance” noted above.
The Cuban government maintains that the overall decline in U.S. agricultural exports
to Cuba in 2005 was because of the stricter U.S. regulations. Other observers
maintain that the decline was a result of Cuba’s efforts to influence U.S. companies,
local and state officials, and Members to lobby for changes in U.S. policy as well as
a result of the financial support that Cuba receives from Venezuela and China.39
Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba.
They argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban
population. Some believe the embargo plays into Castro’s hands by allowing him to
use U.S. policy as a scapegoat for his failed economic policies and as a rationale for
political repression. U.S. agribusiness companies that support the removal of
restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out
on a market of over $700 million annually so close to the United States. Some
exporters want to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm
equipment to Cuba.40 Some agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the
prohibition on financing contend that allowing such financing would help smaller
U.S. companies expand purchases to Cuba more rapidly.41
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain
that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount
of sales since 2001. Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban
Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed billions of
dollars in private humanitarian donations. Opponents further argue that easing
pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and extending
the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States should
remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could
prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural producers
that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing for
agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid.
Legislative Initiatives. In the first session of the 109th Congress, attention
focused on overturning the Treasury Department’s new regulations that clarify the
meaning of “payments of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba
under TSRA. The House Agriculture Committee held a hearing on the issue on
March 16, 2005, featuring the OFAC Director and representatives of U.S. companies
exporting agricultural commodities to Cuba.
CRS-27
42 “White House Rejects Compromise on Cuba Trade Provisions,” Congress Daily AM,
November 15, 2005.
In legislative action, the House- and Senate-passed versions of the FY2006
Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 3058, had identical provisions (Section 945 in the
House version and Section 719 in the Senate version) that would have prohibited
funds from being used to implement the Administration’s February 25, 2005,
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations that tightened restrictions on
“payments of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The
Administration’s Statements of Policy on the bill, for both the House and Senate
versions, maintained that the President would veto the bill if the final version
contained such a provision. Ultimately the provision was not included in the
November 18, 2005, conference report (H.Rept. 109-307) to the bill. Press reports
indicated that the White House rejected, during conference, language that would have
denied $5 million to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) until the Treasury Department changed the tightened restrictions.42
In the second session of the 109th Congress, both the House-passed and Senate
Appropriations Committee-reported versions of the FY2007 Transportation/Treasury
appropriation bill, H.R. 5576, contained a provision similar to that approved in 2005,
which would have prohibited funds from being used to implement the February 2005
tightened restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The House
provision (Section 950) was added by H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran, Kansas), adopted by
voice vote on June 14, 2006. The Senate provision (Section 846) was in the Senate
Appropriations Committee’s version of the bill reported on July 26, 2006 (S.Rept.
109-293); it was added by an amendment offered by Senator Dorgan by voice vote
during the committee’s July 20, 2006, markup of the bill. The Administration’s
Statement of Policy on the bill had a presidential veto threat if the bill contained any
provision weakening Cuba sanctions. Action on H.R. 5576 was not completed by the
end of the 109th Congress, so final action on FY2007 Transportation/Treasury
appropriations will be completed in early 2007.
Also in the second session, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its
version of the FY2007 Agriculture appropriations bill, H.R. 5384 (S.Rept. 109-266),
which contains a provision (Section 755) liberalizing travel to Cuba related to the
sale of agricultural and medical goods. It would have provided for such travel under
a general license, instead of under a specific license currently issued by the Treasury
Department on a case-by-case basis. Action on H.R. 5384 was not completed by the
end of the 109th Congress, so FY2007 agriculture appropriations will need to be
addressed early in the new Congress.
Among other legislative initiatives in the 109th Congress, H.R. 1339 (Emerson)
and S. 634 (Chambliss), both introduced March 16, 2005, would have clarified that
TSRA’s “payment of cash in advance” term means that the payment by the purchaser
and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the
commodity and the release of control of the commodity to the purchaser. A similar
provision was included in H.R. 719 (Moran of Kansas) and S. 328 (Craig), the
Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2005, both introduced February 9, 2005.
These two bills also included provisions that would have provided for a general
CRS-28
license for travel transactions related to the marketing and sale of agricultural
products, as opposed to the current requirement of a specific license for such travel
transactions. The bills also would have expressed the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of State should issue visas for the temporary entry of Cuban nationals to
conduct activities related to purchasing U.S. agricultural commodities. A proposed
amendment — S.Amdt. 281 (Baucus) — to S. 600 (Lugar), consisted of the language
of S. 328, the Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2005. Two additional bills,
H.R. 208 (Serrano) and H.R. 579 (Paul), would have lifted the overall embargo,
including restrictions on agricultural trade with Cuba.
Travel and Private Humanitarian Assistance Restrictions
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component
of U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the
past 40 years. Over time there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and
for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions
on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
(CACR), the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Under the Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel
has increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba have been
tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people
educational exchanges unrelated to academic course work. In June 2004, the
Administration significantly restricted travel, especially family travel, and the
provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of remittances and
gift parcels.
Among the June 2004 restrictions are the following.
! Family visits are restricted to one trip every three years under a
specific license and are restricted to immediate family members.
Under previous regulations, family visits could occur once a year
under a general license, with travel more than once a year allowed
but under a specific license. Previously travel had been allowed to
visit relatives to within three degrees of relationship to the traveler.
! Cash remittances, estimates of which range from $400 million to
$800 million, are further restricted. Quarterly remittances of $300
may still be sent, but it is now restricted to members of the remitter’s
immediate family and may not be remitted to certain government
officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The
regulations were also changed to reduce the amount of remittances
that authorized travelers may carry to Cuba, from $3000 to $300.
! Gift parcels are limited to immediate family members and are denied
to certain Cuban officials and certain members of the Cuban
Communist Party. The contents of gift parcels may no longer
include seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines
CRS-29
43 Oscar Corral, “Is Santería Used as Ploy to Skirt Travel Rules?,” Miami Herald, February
27, 2005
44 Jim Abrams, “Veteran of Iraq War Denied Trip Home to Cuba,” Associated Press, June
29, 2005.
and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making
equipment.
! The authorized per diem allowed for a family visit is reduced from
the State Department per diem rate, currently $167 per day, to $50
per day.
! With the exception of informational materials, licensed travelers
may not purchase or otherwise acquire merchandise and bring it
back into the United States. Previous regulations allowed visitors to
Cuba to import $100 worth of goods as accompanied baggage.
! Fully-hosted travel is no longer allowed as a permissible category of
travel.
! Travel for educational activities is further restricted, including the
elimination of educational exchanges sponsored by secondary
schools.
There was mixed reaction to the tightening of Cuba travel and remittance
restrictions. Supporters maintain that the increased restrictions will deny the Cuban
government dollars that help maintain its repressive control. Opponents argue that
the tightened sanctions are anti-family and will only result in more suffering for the
Cuban people. There have also been concerns that the new restrictions were drafted
without considering the full consequences of their implementation. For example, the
elimination of fully-hosted travel raised concerns about the status of 70 U.S. students
receiving full scholarships at the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who were instrumental in the
establishment of the scholarship program for U.S. students, expressed concern that
the students may be forced to abandon their medical education because of the new
OFAC regulations. As a result of these concerns, OFAC ultimately licensed the
medical students in August 2004 to continue their studies for a period of two years
and engage in travel-related transactions.
Several high profile cases highlighted the Cuba travel issue in 2005. In April,
OFAC cracked down on certain religious organizations promoting licensed travel
to Cuba and warned them not to abuse their license by taking individuals not
affiliated with the religious organizations. OFAC’s action were prompted by reports
that groups practicing the Afro-Cuban religion Santería had been taking large groups
to Cuba as a means of skirting U.S. travel restrictions.43 During the year, attention
also focused on the case of a U.S. military member who served in Iraq, Sgt. Carlos
Lazo, who is prohibited by the travel restrictions from visiting his two sons in Cuba
since he had visited them in 2003.44 In December 2005, OFAC initially denied a
license to Major League Baseball that would allow a Cuba team to participate in
World Baseball Classic tournament in the United States. OFAC had concerns that
CRS-30
45 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Gets Tougher on Groups Defying Cuba Travel Rules,” Miami
Herald, Jan. 12. 2006; Meghan Clyne, “Bush Enforcing Cuba Embargo in New Push,” New
York Sun, Jan. 12, 2006.
46 Oscar Corral, “Feds Lay Down the Law on Cuba to Travel Agents,” Miami Herald, April
29, 2006; Pablo Bachelet, “New Rules Impede Religious Travel,” Miami Herald, March 16,
2006.
the Cuban government could have benefitted financially from its team’s
participation. On January 20, 2006, however, OFAC ultimately approved the
license after assurances that any proceeds earned by the Cuban team would go to
charity, in this case to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.
In 2006, there were further indications of the Administration’s strict
enforcement of travel restrictions. Press reports in January indicated that OFAC
reportedly sent letters to some 200 travelers from two U.S. groups — Pastors for
Peace (which organizes caravans of aid from the United States to Cuba via Mexico)
and the Venceremos Brigade — both of which have long organized trips to Cuba in
defiance of U.S. sanctions.45 On January 23, OFAC suspended one of the largest
licensed travel service providers in Florida, La Estrella de Cuba, from booking
travel to Cuba. Another three agencies had their OFAC license suspended, and
some 26 of the approximate 200 travel agencies licensed by OFAC to book travel
to Cuba chose not to renew their licenses. Several religious organizations also had
their licenses suspended, and Church groups and several Members of Congress have
expressed concern about more restrictive licenses for religious travel.46
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it contributes to
the suffering of Cuban families; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba
and may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; it abridges the
rights of ordinary Americans; and Americans can travel to other countries with
communist or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting
the Cuba travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by
providing his government with millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are
legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by
thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict
travel for foreign policy reasons.
Legislative Initiatives. In the first session of the 109th Congress, on June
30, 2005, the House rejected three amendments to the FY2006 Transportation
appropriations bill, H.R. 3058, that would have eased Cuba travel restrictions:
H.Amdt. 420 (Davis) on family travel, by a vote of 208-211; H.Amdt. 422 (Lee) on
educational travel, by a vote of 187-233; and H.Amdt. 424 (Rangel) on the overall
embargo, by a vote of 169-250. An additional amendment on religious travel,
H.Amdt. 421 (Flake), was withdrawn, and an amendment on travel by members of
the U.S. military, H.Amdt. 419 (Flake), was ruled out of order for constituting
legislation in an appropriations bill. The introduction of H.Amdt. 419 was prompted
by the case of U.S. military member Sgt. Carlos Lazo, noted above, who wants to
visit his two sons in Cuba. In Senate action, during June 29, 2005, consideration of
H.R. 2361, the FY2006 Interior appropriations bill, the Senate rejected a motion to
suspend the rules with respect to S.Amdt. 1059 (Dorgan), which would have
CRS-31
allowed travel to Cuba under a general license for the purpose of visiting a member
of the person’s immediate family for humanitarian reasons. The Dorgan amendment
had also been prompted by the case of Sgt. Lazo.
In the second session, on June 14, 2006, the House rejected two amendments
to the FY2007 Transportation/Treasury appropriation bill, H.R. 5576, that would
have eased Cuba travel restrictions. H.Amdt 1050 (Rangel), rejected by a vote of
183-245, would have prohibited funds from being used to implement the overall
economic embargo of Cuba. H.Amdt. 1051 (Lee), rejected by a vote of 187-236,
would have prohibited funds from being used to implement the Administration’s
June 2004 tightening of restrictions on educational travel to Cuba. An additional
Cuba amendment, H.Amdt. 1032 (Flake), that would have prohibited the use of
funds to amend regulations relating to travel for religious activities in Cuba, was
withdrawn from consideration.
In other action, on June 22, 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee
reported its version of the FY2007 Agriculture appropriations bill, H.R. 5384
(S.Rept. 109-266), which contained a provision (Section 755) that would have
liberalized travel to Cuba related to the sale of agricultural and medical goods. The
provision would have provided for such travel under a general license, instead of
under a specific license as currently allowed, issued on a case-by-case basis by the
Treasury Department. Final action on the bill was not completed before the end of
the 109th Congress. Similar Senate provisions in FY2004 and FY2005 agricultural
appropriations bills were stripped out of the final enacted measures.
Among other legislative initiatives in the 109th Congress, two bills would have
specifically lifted overall restrictions on travel to Cuba: S. 894 (Enzi) and H.R.
1814 (Flake); H.R. 2617 (Davis) would have prohibited any additional restrictions
on per diem allowances, family visits to Cuba, remittances, and accompanied
baggage beyond those that were in effect on June 15, 2004; and H.R. 3064 (Lee)
would have prohibited the use of funds available to the Department of the Treasury
to implement regulations from June 2004 that tightened restrictions on travel to
Cuba for educational activities. H.Con.Res. 206 (Serrano), introduced in the
aftermath of Hurricane Dennis that struck Cuba on July 8, 2005 (causing 16 deaths
and significant damage), would have expressed the sense of Congress that the
President should temporarily suspend restrictions on remittances, gift parcels, and
family travel to Cuba to allow Cuban-Americans to assist their relatives.
Two bills that would have lifted the overall embargo on trade and financial
transaction with Cuba, H.R. 208 (Serrano) and H.R. 579 (Paul), included restrictions
removing restrictions on travel to Cuba. Two identical bills dealing with easing
restrictions on exporting agricultural commodities to Cuba, H.R. 719 (Moran of
Kansas) and S. 328 (Craig), included provisions that provide for a general license
for travel transactions related to the marketing and sale of agricultural products, as
opposed to the current requirement of a specific license for such travel transactions.
Finally, pending amendments — S.Amdt. 281 (Baucus) and S.Amdt. 282 (Craig)
— to S. 600 would have added the language of S. 328, with a provision on travel
transactions for the marketing and sale of agricultural products.
CRS-32
(For further information, including details on legislative action since the 106th
Congress, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan.)
Offshore Oil Sector Development
The issue of Cuba’s development of its offshore oil reserves along its northwest
coast, which reportedly could amount to more than 5 billion barrels of oil, has been
a concern among some Members of Congress. Cuba has signed agreements with
four foreign oil companies — Repsol (Spain), Sherritt International (Canada),
Norsk-Hydro (Norway), and ONGC (India) — for the exploration of offshore oil
and gas. Some Members expressed concern about the oil development so close to
the United States and about potential environmental damage to the Florida coast.
Legislation was introduced in both houses that would have imposed sanctions
related to Cuba’s offshore oil development on its northern coast. S. 2682 (Nelson)
would have nullified the 1977 U.S.-Cuba maritime boundary agreement and would
have excluded from admission to the United States aliens who have made
investments directly that significantly contribute to Cuba’s ability to develop its
petroleum resources. H.R. 5292 (Ros-Lehtinen) and S. 2795 (Martinez) would
have imposed similar visa restrictions as S. 2682 and also impose economic
sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have
made an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the
enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged
lands of Cuba’s northern coast.
In contrast, other Members have introduced legislation, H.R. 5353 (Flake) and
S. 2787 (Craig), that would have authorized U.S. companies to work with Cuba for
the offshore exploitation and extraction of oil along Cuba’s northern coast. They
argued that U.S. companies’ involvement in Cuba’s offshore oil development
would reduce the likelihood of potential environmental damage caused by an oil
spill.
Drug Interdiction Cooperation
Because of Cuba’s geographic location, the country’s waters and airspace have
been used by illicit narcotics traffickers to transport drugs for ultimate destinations
in the United States. Over the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed
concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as well as
increased domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of
measures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for
traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with
a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics
agreements with 33 countries and less formal arrangements with 16 others,
according to the Department of State. In 2003, Cuba began nationwide multiagency
anti-drug efforts: Operation Hatchet III, focusing on maritime and air
interdiction; and Operation Popular Shield, focusing on investigations.
CRS-33
47 On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section
in Washington delivered three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and
the State Department in Washington proposing agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism,
and migration issues. See “Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Prominent Drug
Trafficker Arrested in our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section, March 17,
2002; “Cuba Offers to Sign Anti-Drug Pact,” Miami Herald, April 8, 2006.
48 Anthony Boadle, “U.S. Thanks Cuba, But Declines Anti-Drug Accord,” Reuters, March
19, 2002.
There has been a mixed record of cooperation with Cuba on anti-drug efforts.
In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6
tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba
turned over the cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully in the investigation
and subsequent prosecution of two defendants in the case in the United States.
Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana
to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba accepted an upgrading
of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S. Coast
Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist
(DIS) at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted
to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination
has increased somewhat.
The State Department, in its March 2006 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, maintains narcotics cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis
through the Coast Guard specialist. The report notes that Cuba has provided to the
United States’ investigation information on narcotics trafficking cases as well as
information on suspect vessels and aircraft. The report contends, however, that
Cuba consistently seeks to engage U.S. cooperation on counternarcotics efforts in
order “to project an aura of normalization with the United States.” The report
maintains that broader cooperation with Cuba, such as through a bilateral agreement,
is not possible until the Cuba “abandons its totalitarian character and its role as a
state sponsor of terrorism.”
Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat
drug trafficking, and on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug
cooperation agreement with the United States.47 In January 2002, Cuba deported to
the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug charges, and in
early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug trafficker, Rafael
Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. At the time, while Drug
Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba’s
actions, he indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not
through a bilateral agreement.48
Legislative Initiatives. In the first session of the 109th Congress, the Housepassed
version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3057,
had a provision (Section 572) providing that no International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds could be made available for assistance to the
Cuban government. The Senate-passed version, in Section 6089, would have
provided $5 million in INCLE funds for preliminary work to establish cooperation
CRS-34
49 For further information, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.
with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. The money would not be available if the
President certified that Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect
against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the
interdiction of illegal drugs and there was evidence of involvement of the Cuban
government in drug trafficking. In the end, the conference report (H.Rept. 109-265)
to the bill did not include either the House or Senate provision.
In the second session of the 109th Congress, the House-passed provision of the
FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 5522, included a provision
that no INCLE assistance could be made available to the Cuban government. The
report to the bill (H.Rept. 109-486) maintains that full reporting and transparency
by the Cuban government and that U.S. monitoring of counternarcotics assistance
in Cuba would be difficult, if not impossible, given Cuba’s hostility toward the U.S.
government. As in past years, the Senate version of the bill had a provision, in
Section 551(e), that would have provided $5 million in INCLE funds for preliminary
work to establish cooperation with Cuba on counternarcotics matters with the same
conditions noted above. Final action on H.R. 5522 was not completed before the
end of the 109th Congress.
Cuba and Terrorism49
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring
international terrorism in 1982 because of its alleged ties to international terrorism
and its support for terrorist groups in Latin America. Cuba had a long history of
supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa,
but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was
a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part because of the breakup
of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual
subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.
Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list. According to the State
Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 report (issued in April 2006),
Cuba has “actively continued to oppose the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the
global war on terror and has publicly condemned various U.S. polices and action.”
The State Department report also noted that Cuba maintains close relationships
with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and North Korea and has
provided safe haven for members of several Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The
report maintained that Cuba provides safe haven to various Basque ETA members
from Spain and to members of two Colombian insurgent groups, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN),
although the report also maintained that there is no information concerning terrorist
activities of these or other organizations in Cuba. The State Department’s 2002 and
2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism reports acknowledged that Colombia acquiesced
to this arrangement and that Colombia publicly said that it wanted Cuba’s continued
mediation with the ELN in Cuba. In December 2005, a group of international
CRS-35
50 Andrew Cawthorne, “Cuba’s Castro Urges U.S. to Keep Calm,” Reuters, September 11,
2001.
51 Kevin Sullivan, “Castro Warns About U.S. Military Plans,” Washington Post, September
23, 2001, p. A38.
52 Ibid.
facilitators representing Cuba, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland oversaw exploratory
talks between the Colombian government and the ELN in Havana. In April 2006,
Colombia and the ELN held four days of talks in Cuba and reiterated their
commitment to continue meeting after Colombia’s May 28, 2006, elections.
The 2005 report also maintained that Cuba permits U.S. fugitives from justice
to live legally in Cuba. Many are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions
in the United States, including Joanne Chesimard, who is wanted for the murder of
a New Jersey State Trooper in 1973. The State Department report noted that most
of the fugitives entered Cuba in the 1970s and that Cuba has stated that it will no
longer provide safe haven to new fugitives who may enter Cuba. In the 109th
Congress, Section 101(1)(H) of House-passed H.R. 2601 would have authorized
funds for the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to disseminate the names of U.S.
fugitives residing in Cuba and any rewards for their capture. H.R. 332 (King) would
have amended the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require
that, in order to determine that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists,
the government extradite to the United States individuals who are living in Cuba in
order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the
United States.
In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that
there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the
government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin
America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members
of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining
Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War. They
argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and
maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles
against serious terrorist threats.
Although Cuba offered support to the United States in the aftermath of the
World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, Fidel Castro also stated that the
attacks were in part a consequence of the United States having applied “terrorist
methods” for years.50 Cuba’s subsequent statements became increasingly hostile,
according to press reports, which quoted Cuba’s mission to the United Nations as
describing the U.S. response to the U.S. attacks as “fascist and terrorist” and that the
United States was using the attack as an excuse to establish “unrestricted tyranny
over all people on Earth.”51 Castro himself said that the U.S. government was run
by “extremists” and “hawks” whose response to the attack could result in an
“infinite killing of innocent people.”52
CRS-36
53 For more information, see CRS Report RL31367, Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees”
in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer Elsea.
54 United States Information Agency, “Text: Defense Secretary’s Letter to Thurmond on
Cuban Threat,” May 6, 1998.
55 Teo A. Babun, Jr., “A Business Guide to Cuba,” CubaNews, Miami Herald Publishing
Company, 1996, pp. 66-67.
56 Michael Kranish, “Biotechnology; Incubating Biotech Cuba Becomes Biotech Hotbed,”
Boston Globe, May 15, 2002, p. D1.
57 Glenn Baker, ed. Cuban Biotechnology, A First-Hand Report, Center for Defense
Information, Washington, D.C. May 2003. 50 p.
58 John R. Bolton, “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lectures, May 6, 2002.
The Cuban government, however, had a much more muted reaction to the U.S.
decision to send captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to the
U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although the Cuban government
objects to the U.S. presence at Guantanamo as a national security threat and opposes
the presence as illegal, it has not opposed the new mission of housing detainees
from Afghanistan.53 The Cuban government has, however, expressed concerns
about the treatment of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo. (Also see “Guantanamo
Naval Base” below.)
Cuba and Biological Weapons? U.S. government concerns about Cuba’s
capability to produce biological weapons date back several years. In 1998, then U.S.
Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated in a transmittal letter (accompanying a
report to Congress on Cuba’s threat to U.S. national security) that he was
“concerned about Cuba’s potential to develop and produce biological agents, given
its biotechnology infrastructure...”54
Cuba began building up its biotechnology industry in the 1980s and has spent
millions investing in the sector. The industry was initially geared “to apply
biotechnology and genetic engineering to agriculture in order to increase yields” but
has also produced numerous vaccines, interferon, and other drugs and has exported
many of its biotechnology products.55 In 1999, the British pharmaceutical company
GlaxoSmithKline announced an agreement to test and market a new Cuban
meningitis vaccine that might eventually be used in the United States.56 In May
2003, the Center for Defense Information published a report on a delegation sent to
Cuba that visited nine Cuban biotechnology facilities.57
In 2002, the State Department made controversial allegations that Cuba
biotechnology sector, has been involved in developing biological weapons. On May
6, 2002, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John
Bolton stated that “the United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited
offensive biological warfare research-and-development effort” and “has provided
dual-use technology to other rogue states.” Bolton called on Cuba “to cease all BWapplicable
cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its
obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”58 Although Bolton’s
statement received considerable media attention, it was similar to a March 19, 2002
CRS-37
59 David Gonzalez, “Carter and Powell Cast Doubt on Bioarms in Cuba,” New York Times,
May 14, 2002.
60 Kevin Sullivan, “Carter Says He Was Told U.S. Had No Proof Cuba Shared Bioweapons
Data,” Washington Post, May 14, 2002, p. 14.
61 U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs. Cuba’s Pursuit of Biological Weapons:
Fact or Fiction? 107th Congress, June 5, 2002. S.Hrg. 107-736.
62 James Risen and Douglas Jehl, “Expert Said to Tell Legislators He Was Pressed to Distort
Some Evidence,” New York Times, June 25, 2003.
statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
When questioned on the issue, Secretary of State Powell maintained that Under
Secretary Bolton’s statement was not based on new information. Powell asserted
that the United States believes Cuba has the capacity and the capability to conduct
research on biological weapons but emphasized that the Administration had not
claimed that Cuba had such weapons. Some observers viewed Powell’s statement
as contradicting that of Under Secretary Bolton.59
In response to Under Secretary Bolton’s statement, the Cuban government
called the allegations a lie and maintained that the Bush Administration was trying
to justify its hard-line policies just when the momentum is increasing in the United
States to ease the embargo. During his trip to Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter
criticized the Bush Administration for the allegations and said that Administration
officials who had briefed him before the trip assured him that Cuba had not shared
anything with other countries that could be used for terrorist purposes.60
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs held a hearing on the issue on June
5, 2002.61 At the hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Carl Ford distinguished between the term “effort” and “program,” and maintained
that Cuba has a biological weapons effort and not a biological weapons program.
Ford characterized a program as something substantial and multifaceted that
includes test facilities, production facilities, and a unit within the military
specifically designated for such weapons capability. In contrast, he characterized
an effort as the research and development that would be necessary to create
biological weapons.
In late June 2003, news reports stated that an employee of the State
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research maintained that Undersecretary
Bolton’s assertions about Cuba and biological weapons were not supported by
sufficient intelligence.62
In March 30, 2004, congressional testimony before the House International
Relations Committee, Under Secretary of State John Bolton asserted that “Cuba
remains a terrorist and BW threat to the United States.” According to Bolton: “The
Bush Administration has said repeatedly that we are concerned that Cuba is
CRS-38
63 U.S. Congress. House International Relations Committee, “The Bush Administration and
Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges,” Hearing, March 30, 2004. Federal News Service.
64 Steven R. Weisman, “In Stricter Study, U.S. Scales Back Claim on Cuba Arms,” New
York Times, September 18, 2004.
65 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments, U.S. Department of State, August 2005.
66 Frances Robles, “An Old Foe of Castro Looks Back on His Fight,” Miami Herald,
September 4, 2003.
developing a limited biological weapons effort, and called on Fidel Castro to cease
his BW aspirations and support of terrorism.” Bolton went on to add a caveat,
however, that “existing intelligence reporting is problematic, and the Intelligence
Community’s ability to determine the scope, nature, and effectiveness of any Cuban
BW program has been hampered by reporting from sources of questionable access,
reliability, and motivation.”63 The New York Times reported on September 18, 2004
that the Bush Administration, using more stringent intelligence standards, had
“concluded that it is no longer clear that Cuba has an active, offensive bio-weapons
program.”64
An August 2005 State Department report to Congress indicated that while
observers agree that Cuba has the technical capability to pursue some aspects of
offensive biological warfare, there is disagreement over whether Cuba has an active
biological warfare effort now, or even had one in the past.65 The State Department’s
Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 report (issued in April 2006) also maintained
that although Cuba invests heavily in biotechnology, “there is some dispute about
the existence and extent of Cuba’s offensive biological weapons program.”
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism. Cuba has been the target of various
terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73
people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in Havana
and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and
several others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to
death for the bombings in March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to
prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002. Cuban officials maintain
that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot
to kill Fidel Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was allegedly
involved in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner.66 The four stood trial in March
2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges in the case to prison terms ranging
from seven to eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President Mireya
Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her presidential term. Three of
the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received strong support
from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada Carriles reportedly
traveled to another country. U.S. State Department officials did not criticize
CRS-39
67 George Gedda, “Terrorists or Liberators?,” Washington Times, September 4, 2004.
68 Alfonso Chardy and Nancy San Martin, “Lawyer Expects Posada to Show Soon,” Miami
Herald, April 14, 2005.
69 Ann Louise Bardach, “Our Man’s in Miami. Patriot or Terrorist?,” Washington Post,
April 17, 2005.
70 While Posada was acquitted by a military court, a higher court ordered a new civilian trial
Reportedly a first set of prosecutors recommended against charging Posada, but a second
set of prosecutors took the case to trial, and Posada escaped during that time in 1985. See
Oscar Corral, “Debate Focuses on Escape,” Miami Herald, June 19, 2005.
71 Oscar Corral and Alfonso Chardy, “Victim’s Kin Oppose Posada Bid for Asylum,” Miami
Herald, May 7, 2005.
72 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, Statement, May 17, 2005.
73 Alicia Caldwell, “Judge Says Cuban Militant Can’t Be Deported to Venezuela,”
Associated Press, September 28, 2005.
74 Oscar Corral, “Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Denied Release,” Miami Herald, March
22, 2006.
President Moscoso’s pardon of the four, but maintained that they did not lobby
Panama for the pardons.67
On April 13, 2005, Posada’s lawyer said that his client, reportedly in the United
States for a month after entering the United States illegally from Mexico, would
seek asylum in the United States because he has a “well-founded fear of
persecution” for his opposition to Fidel Castro.68 Posada, a Venezuelan citizen, had
been imprisoned in Venezuela for the bombing of the Cuban airliner in 1976, but
reportedly was allowed to “escape” from prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a
bribe to the prison warden.69 He had been acquitted for the bombing but remained
in prison pending a prosecutorial appeal.70 Posada also reportedly admitted, but
later denied, involvement in a string of bombings in Havana in 1997, one of which
killed an Italian tourist.71 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
arrested Posada on May 17, 2005, and subsequently charged him with illegally
entering the United States. A Department of Homeland Security press release
indicated that ICE does not generally deport people to Cuba or countries believed
to be acting on Cuba’s behalf.72 Venezuela requested Posada’s extradition and
pledged that it would not hand Posada over to Cuba, but on September 26, 2005, a
U.S. immigration judge ruled that Posada cannot be deported to Venezuela because
he could be tortured.73 ICE reviewed the case and determined on March 22, 2006,
that Posada would not be freed from a federal immigration facility in El Paso,
Texas.74
In early November 2006, however, a U.S. federal judge, who is considering
Posada’s plea that he be released, ordered the government to supply evidence, by
February 1, 2007, justifying his continued detention. Federal grand juries are
reportedly investigating Posada’s activities that could lead to his indictment and
justify his continued detention. In Texas, a grand jury reportedly is focusing on
CRS-40
75 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami
Herald, Nov. 12, 2006.
76 Background information on Guantanamo is drawn from out of print CRS Report 94-701,
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba: Background and Current Issues, by Ronald O’Rourke
and Mark P. Sullivan, Sept. 2, 1994; copies available from author, Mark Sullivan at 7-7689.
77 Jerry Seper, “U.S. Prepares for Haitian Refugees; Guantanamo Could Hold 20,000,”
Washington Times, February 24, 2004.
78 “Cuba Would Hand Over Escapees, Raul Castro Says,” Miami Herald, January 20, 2002.
whether he lied about how he entered the United States, while in New Jersey, a
grand jury is examining Posada’s alleged role in the 1997 bombings in Cuba.75
Guantanamo Naval Base76
The 45-square mile U.S. naval facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a
U.S. base since 1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S.
presence can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by the
United States. When Fidel Castro assumed power in the 1959 Cuban revolution, the
new government gave assurances that it would respect all its treaty commitments,
including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base. Subsequently, however,
as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence
as illegal.
The mission of the base has changed over time. During the Cold War, the base
was viewed as a good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to
the Soviet presence in the Caribbean, and as a location for supporting potential
military operations in the region. In 1994-1995, the base was used to house
thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but by 1996 the last of
refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States, pursuant
to a May 1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord. Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while
a much smaller number, those deemed at risk for persecution, have been taken to
Guantanamo and then granted asylum in a third country. In the aftermath of
increased violence in Haiti in February 2004, the base reportedly was being
considered as a contingency option to house Haitian migrants in the event of a mass
exodus from Haiti.77
Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global
campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks in the United States. With the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United
States decided to send captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to be imprisoned in
Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government has objected to the U.S. presence
at Guantanamo, it did not initially oppose the new mission of housing detainees.
Defense Minister Raúl Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would
escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the
base.78 The Cuban government, however, has expressed concerns about the
treatment of prisoners at the U.S. base and has said it will keep pressing the
CRS-41
79 For information on terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo, see CRS Report RL31367,
Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer Elsea; and CRS
Report RS22173, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
80 Ana Radelat, “Cuba Turns Up Rhetoric on Guantanamo as UN Condemns Human Rights
Abuses,” CubaNews, April 2005.
international community to investigate the treatment of terrorist suspects.79 In
January 2005, it denounced what it described as “atrocities” committed at the
Guantanamo base.80 Some Members of Congress have called on the Administration
to close the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo, while others support the
continued use of Guantanamo to hold terrorist detainees.
With regard to the future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 210), states
that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, U.S. policy will
be to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to
renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.
Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba —
Radio and TV Marti — began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the
Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2007 Budget Request, the objectives of Radio
and TV Marti are 1) to support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers; 2) to be
effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas through use
of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; 3) to serve as a consistently reliable
and authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; and 4) to
provide news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and
elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba.
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting
programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency
(USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the
Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such entities as the
Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free
Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV
Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami, Florida. Legislation in the 104th Congress
(P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington D.C. to south
Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Radio Marti broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours
six days per week, and for18 hours one day per week. TV Marti broadcasts 24 hours
a day, seven days a week on the Hispasat satellite and is also available on the
Internet 24 hours a day. Until July 2005, TV Marti had also been broadcast via
blimps from facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but
the aerostats were destroyed by Hurricane Dennis. Since mid-2004, both Radio and
TV Marti programming have been transmitted for several hours once a week via
CRS-42
81 “TV Marti Broadcasts to Cuba Have Increased to Six-Times-a-Week,” Miami Herald,
August 6, 2006.
82 Christina Hoag, “Radio, TV Marti To Be Aired Locally,” Miami Herald, Dec. 19, 2006.
83 See the following reports and audits: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts
to Cuba, TV Marti Surveys are Flawed, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV
Marti, Costs and Compliance with Broadcast Standards and International Agreements,
GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO, Letter to Hon. Howard L. Berman and Hon.
John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-126R, February
17, 1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio
and TV Marti, Three Volumes, March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review
Processes Need Strengthening, GAO/NSIAD-94-265, September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S.
Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Inspector General, Review of Polices and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti
Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements, 99-IB-010, June 1999; U.S. Department of
State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Review of the
Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s New Program
Initiatives, Report No. IBO-A-03-01, January 2003.
84 Oscar Corral, “Radio, TV Marti Face Another Government Audit,” Miami Herald, Dec.
18, 2006, and “Problems Dog Broadcaster,” Miami Herald, Dec. 19, 2006.
airborne broadcasts conducted by the Air Force. Since August 2006, a dedicated
contracted private aircraft has been used to transmit TV Marti Monday through
Saturday evenings, and Radio Marti broadcasts will reportedly be added in the
future.81 In addition, the OCB contracted with a private U.S. commercial television
station to broadcast some TV Marti programs daily, beginning on December 18,
2006. OCB also contracted with a private commercial radio station in Miami, Radio
Mambi, to broadcast some Radio Marti programming.82
Both Radio and TV Marti have at times been the focus of controversies,
including questions about adherence to broadcast standards. There have been
various attempts over the years to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV
Marti, which has not had an audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. Various
studies and audits of these programs have been conducted, including investigations
by the U.S. General Accounting Office, by a 1994 congressionally established
Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, and by the State Department’s and BBG’s
Inspector General offices in 1999 and 2003.83 More recently, in December 2006,
press reports alleged significant problems in the OCB’s operations, with claims of
cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage.84 (For background on Cuba
broadcasting through 1994, see CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television
Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein
and Mark P. Sullivan.)
From FY1984 through FY2005, about $493 million has been spent for
broadcasting to Cuba, with about $300 million for Radio Marti (since FY1984) and
$193 million for TV Marti (since FY1989).
Debate on TV Marti. In the various congressional debates on TV Marti over
the years, opponents of continued funding of the program maintain that virtually the
CRS-43
85 Advisory Panel on Radio Marti and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio
Marti and TV Marti, Executive Summary, March 1994.
86 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, “EC-130E/J COMMANDO SOLO,” April 2003.
only people who see TV Marti in Cuba are those Cubans who visit the consular
section of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, which has a waiting room in which
TV Marti may be viewed. These critics argue that some $190 million has been
spent by the United States for TV Marti, while the Cuban government only needs
to spend a few thousand dollars to jam the broadcasts effectively. They argue that
TV Marti is a waste of taxpayers’ money because it does not contribute to the
promotion of freedom and democracy in Cuba, unlike Radio Marti, which some
Cubans listen to as a source of information. Opponents also argue that the
conversion of TV Marti from VHF to UHF transmission has not succeeded in
overcoming Cuba’s jamming efforts.
In contrast, supporters of continued TV Marti funding point to a
congressionally mandated Advisory Panel in 1994, which stated that “the Cuban
people have an ardent desire and a genuine need to receive the programming
produced by TV Marti.”85 Supporters argue that eliminating TV Marti would send
a message to the Cuban people that the United States is not committed to the cause
of freedom in Cuba. They believe that eliminating TV Marti would be giving in to
the dictatorial Castro government, which suppresses the free flow of information in
Cuba. These proponents contend that it is impossible for the Cuban government to
completely jam TV Marti, and maintain that significant numbers of Cubans have
attempted to tune in to the programming. Still others point to the potential use of
TV Marti in the event of a crisis or upheaval in Cuba’s future, and argue that in such
a scenario, it would be important to have TV Marti available as a news source.
Airborne Broadcasts. In early May 2004, the Commission for Assistance
for a Free Cuba called for the immediate deployment of the EC-130E/J Commando
Solo airborne platform for weekly airborne radio and television broadcasts to Cuba
in order to overcome Cuban jamming. It also called for funds “to acquire and refit
a dedicated airborne platform for full-time transmission of Radio and TV Marti into
Cuba.” In support of these recommendations, President Bush directed that up to $18
million be committed “for regular airborne broadcasts to Cuba and the purchase of
a dedicated airborne platform for the transmission of Radio and Television Marti
into Cuba.” The longer term proposal for a dedicated airborne platform would not
be a military aircraft but an aircraft acquired and operated by the Broadcasting
Board of Governors’ Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB).
EC-130E/J Commando Solo aircraft, flown by the Air Force Special
Operations Wing at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, are specialized assets that have been
used to conduct information operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs
broadcasts worldwide including Grenada in 1983, Operation Desert Storm in 1990-
1991, Kosovo in 1999, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation
Iraqi Freedom.86 In May 2003, the aircraft was used in a test to broadcast Radio and
TV Marti to Cuba in an effort to overcome Cuban jamming of the U.S.-government
broadcasts. Since August 2004, the aircraft has been used periodically to transmit
Radio and TV Marti programming; most recently the aircraft has been transmitting
CRS-44
87 See CRS Report RL31370, State Department and Related Agencies: FY2006
Appropriations and FY2007 Request, by Susan B. Epstein.
programming for several hours on Saturday. As noted below, Congress
appropriated almost $10 million in FY2006 for an aircraft for dedicated airborne
radio and television broadcasts to Cuba. According to the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, the OCB planned to use contractor-owned-and-operated aircraft that will
provide up to 5 hours a day of Radio and TV Marti broadcasts to Cuba. The aircraft
was expected to be operational by late August 2006, but political developments in
Cuba caused U.S. officials to announce August 6, 2006 that the private aircraft
would be used to transmit TV Marti Monday through Saturday evenings, with Radio
Marti broadcasts to be added in the future.
FY2006 Funding. The Administration requested $37.7 million for Cuba
broadcasting in FY2006, and although Congress originally funded this amount,
subsequent across-the-board rescissions ultimately brought the amount funded to an
estimated $37.1 million, almost a $10 million increase from the $27.6 million
appropriated for FY2005.87 The increase is for the Broadcasting Board of Governors
to acquire and outfit an aircraft for dedicated airborne radio and television
broadcasts to Cuba. According to the budget request, the aircraft would support
Radio and TV Marti broadcasts with the goal of overcoming Cuban government
jamming.
The report to the House-passed version of H.R. 2862 (H.Rept. 109-118), the
FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, included a committee recommendation for $27.9 million for Cuba
broadcasting, about $10 million below the Administration’s request. According to
the report, the committee does not provide funding for an aircraft to transmit Radio
and TV Marti programming but assumes the continuation of periodic Commando
Solo flights, operating within U.S. air space, for such transmissions. The House
approved H.R. 2862 on June 16, 2005. In the Senate, appropriations for Cuba
broadcasting was included in the Senate version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations
appropriations bill, H.R. 3057 (S.Rept. 109-96). As approved by the Senate on July
20, 2005, the bill would provide $37.7 million for Cuba broadcasting, including
funds for an aircraft to transmit Radio and TV Marti programming. During July 19,
2005, floor consideration, the Senate defeated (33-66) S.Amdt. 1294 (Dorgan) that
would have eliminated funding for television broadcasting to Cuba. Ultimately,
Congress included appropriations for Cuba broadcasting in H.R. 2862, which was
signed into law on November 22, 2005 as P.L. 109-108. Although the conference
report (H.Rept. 109-272) to the bill noted full funding of the Administration’s
request of $37.7 million, across-the-board rescissions brought the funded amount
to an estimated $37.1 million.
In other legislative action, both H.R. 2601 and S. 600, the FY2006 and FY2007
Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, in Section 503 of each bill, would authorize the
OCB to use additional AM frequencies as well as FM and shortwave frequencies for
Radio Marti in order to help overcome Cuban jamming. House-passed H.R. 2601
(Section 106) would authorize the Administration’s full request of $37.7 million for
Cuba broadcasting for FY2006 and $29.9 million for FY2007, including funds for
CRS-45
88 See USAID’s Cuba program website: [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america
_caribbean/country/cuba/].
an aircraft to improve radio and television transmission and reception. S. 600
(Section 111) would authorize funding for Cuba broadcasting under the
International Broadcasting Operations account, but without a specific earmark.
During Senate floor consideration of S. 600 on April 6, 2005, the Senate rejected
S.Amdt. 284 (Dorgan), by a vote of 65-35, that would have prohibited funds from
being used for television broadcasting to Cuba.
FY2007 Request. The Administration requested $36.279 million for Cuba
broadcasting in FY2007, with $2.7 million of this to purchase an aerostat for
broadcasting TV Marti. The request was slightly below the $37.129 million
appropriated in FY2006 (when Congress funded the Administration’s request for a
dedicated aircraft), but almost $9 million above the $27.6 million appropriated in
FY2005.
On June 29, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State,
Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations bill, that would fund Cuba
broadcasting under the International Broadcasting Operations account. The report
to the bill (H.Rept. 109-520) recommended $36.102 million for Cuba broadcasting,
including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat for
broadcasting TV Marti.
In the Senate, the Senate version of H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign Operations
appropriations bill, would fund Cuba broadcasting. The Senate report to the bill
(S.Rept. 109-277) recommended full funding of the Administration’s request of
$36.279 million.
Final action was not completed on either bill before the end of the 109th
Congress.
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights
Over the past several years, the United States provided assistance — primarily
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through
the State Department — to increase the flow of information on democracy, human
rights, and free enterprise to Cuba. USAID’s Cuba program supports a variety of
U.S.-based non-governmental organizations to promote rapid, peaceful transition
to democracy, help develop civil society, and build solidarity with Cuba’s human
rights activists.88 These efforts are largely funded through Economic Support Funds
(ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations bill. Funding for such
projects amounted to $4.989 million in FY2001, $5 million in FY2002, $6 million
in FY2003, $21.4 million in FY2004 (because of re-programmed ESF assistance to
fund the democracy-building recommendations of the Commission to Provide
Assistance for a Free Cuba), $8.9 million in FY2005, and an estimated $10.9 million
in FY2006.
CRS-46
In terms of authorization legislation, during April 6, 2005, Senate floor
consideration of S. 600, the FY2006 and FY2007 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act,
an amendment was proposed — S.Amdt. 319 (Ensign) — that would have
authorized not more than $15 million in assistance and other support “for
individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracybuilding
efforts for Cuba” and up to $5 million for the OAS to support work on
Cuba’s human rights situation. The House-passed version of H.R. 2601 had a
provision (Section 215) that would have authorized $5 million for the State
Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs for a variety of U.S.
government scholarship and exchange programs, with priority given to human rights
dissidents, pro-democracy activists, and independent civil society members for
participation in these programs. Action was not completed on either S. 600 or H.R.
2601 in the 109th Congress.
For FY2006, the Administration had requested $15 million in ESF assistance
for democracy activities for Cuba. According to the request, the funds will support
USAID-administered programs with democracy and human rights groups, focusing
on those groups that disseminate information to the Cuban people and those that
provide humanitarian assistance to victims of political repression and their families.
USAID will also continue to work with third-country non-governmental
organizations in Latin America and Europe to raise awareness of Cuban government
repression. Neither the House- nor Senate-passed versions of H.R. 3057, the
FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, addressed this issue, and the
conference report on the measure (H.Rept. 109-265) did not include a Cuba earmark
for ESF assistance. Ultimately, the Administration allocated $10.89 million for
Cuba projects, consisting of $8.91 million in ESF and $1.98 million in development
assistance.
For FY2007, the Administration requested $9 million in ESF to support the
recommendations of the President’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, and
to support USAID-administrated democracy and human rights programs. The report
to the House-passed version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations bill,
H.R. 5522 (H.Rept. 109-486), recognized the work of USAID in promoting
democracy and humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urges the agency to continue
to promote its Cuba program. The report to the Senate version of H.R. 5522
(S.Rept. 109-277) recommended $2.5 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs,
$6.5 million less than the request. Final action on H.R. 5522 was not completed
before the end of the 109th Congress, so action on FY2007 Foreign Operations
appropriations will be completed in 2007. The July 2006 report of the Commission
for Assistance to a Free Cuba recommended, in addition to current funding, $80
million over two years for a variety of measures to hasten Cuba’s transition to
democracy, and not less than $20 million annually thereafter for Cuba democracy
programs. (For additional information, see “July 2006 Commission for Assistance
to a Free Cuba. Report” above.)
In addition to funding through foreign operations appropriations, the United
States provides democratization assistance for Cuba through the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), which is funded through the annual Commerce,
Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure. Cuba funding through NED has
steadily increased over the past several years. NED-funded democracy projects for
CRS-47
89 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs
Better Management and Oversight, GAO-07-147, November 2006.
90 Oscar Corral, “Federal Program to Help Democracy in Cuba Falls Short of Mark,” Miami
Herald, Nov. 14, 2006, and “Is U.S. Aid Reaching Castro Foes?” Miami Herald, Nov. 15,
2006.
91 For more, see CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
Cuba amounted to $765,000 in FY2001; $841,000 in FY2002; $1.143 million in
FY2003; and $1.149 million in FY2004. For FY2005, NED funded 17 Cuba
projects with $2.4 million.
In the aftermath of Fidel’s July 31, 2006, announcement that he was
temporarily ceding political power to his brother Raúl, legislation was introduced,
S. 3769 (Ensign), that would have authorized assistance for the OAS for Cuban
human rights activities, but no action was taken on the measure. The bill would also
have authorized assistance for a fund to support civil-society building efforts in
Cuba and create a “Fund for a Free Cuba” to provide assistance to a transition
government in Cuba. During August 3, 2006, Senate floor consideration of the
FY2007 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 5631, Senator Nelson
offered S.Amdt. 4853, ultimately ruled out of order, that would have provided $40
million for a “Cuba Fund for a Democratic Future.” The funding would have
supported the Cuban people and the democratic opposition take advantage of
opportunities to promote a transition to democracy.
In mid-November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued
a report examining U.S. democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and
concluded that the U.S. program had significant problems and needed better
management and oversight. According to GAO, internal controls, for both the
awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide
adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in
compliance with applicable law and regulations.”89 Investigative news reports on
the program maintained that high shipping costs and lax oversight have diminished
its effectiveness.90 Representative William Delahunt, who along with
Representative Jeff Flake had requested the GAO study, promised hearings on the
Cuba democracy funding in the 110th Congress.
Migration Issues91
1994 and 1995 Agreements. In 1994 and 1995, Cuba and the United
States reached two migration accords designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans
attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers
was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with
the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Castro’s threat to unleash another
Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid
escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton
abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their
homeland were allowed into the United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast
CRS-48
92 For more information, see CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal
Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in
large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks
that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of
Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and
Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United
States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to
ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change
of policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to
all Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take
measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which
the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo
into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to
enter the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries
would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no
action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of
their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of
Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and
housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Base, most having been paroled into
the United States.
Elian Gonzalez Case.92 From late November 1999 through June 2000,
national attention became focused on Cuban migration policy as a result of the Elian
Gonzalez case, the five-year old boy found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of
Fort Lauderdale. The boy’s mother drowned in the incident, while his father, who
resided in Cuba, called for his return. Although the boy’s relatives in Miami wanted
him to stay in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ruled
that the boy’s father had the sole legal authority to speak on his son’s behalf. After
numerous legal appeals by the Miami relatives were exhausted, the boy returned to
Cuba with his father in June 2000. In Cuba, Fidel Castro orchestrated numerous
mass demonstrations and a media blitz on the issue until the boy’s return. The case
generated an outpouring of emotion among the Cuban population as well as in south
Florida.
Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy. Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country,
while those deemed at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo and
then found asylum in a third country. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed
to apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has
been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make
CRS-49
93 U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement,
“Total Interdictions, Calender Year 1982 to Present,” April 28, 2006.
94 U.S. Department of State. “Cuban Emigration Policies, Report Submitted by the
Department of State Pursuant to Section 2245 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-277)” May 2004.
it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. Others maintain that
U.S. policy should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not
they are able to make it to land.
The number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard has risen in
recent years, from 931 in 2002 to 1,464 in 2003 and 1,499 in 2004. In 2005, 2,952
Cubans were interdicted, almost twice the number of Cubans interdicted in 2004.
As of early December 2006, more than 2,200 Cubans had been interdicted so far this
year.93
U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent
years with numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in
which Cuban migrants have brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials
have used force to prevent Cubans from reaching shore. In July 2003, a U.S. federal
court in Florida convicted a Cuban national for hijacking a plane to Key West on
April 1, 2003. Another six Cubans were convicted in Key West in December 2003
for hijacking a Cubana Airlines plane to Florida earlier in the year.
The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging
in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against
those engaging in alien smuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a
life sentence may be imposed. On April 11, 2003, the Cuban government executed
three men who had hijacked a ferry in Havana on April 2 in an attempt to reach the
United States. The ferry hijacking had been preceded by the hijacking of two small
planes to the United States. The summary execution prompted worldwide
condemnation of the Cuban government. The Cuban government maintained that
it took the action to prevent additional hijackings.
The U.S. Interest Section in Havana has officers that visit the homes of
returned migrants to assess the Cuban government’s treatment of those repatriated.
The Department of State (pursuant to P.L. 105-277, Section 2245) makes a semiannual
report to Congress on the methods employed by the Cuban government to
enforce the the 1994 migration agreement and on the Cuban government’s
treatment of those returned. In a May 2004 report to Congress, the State Department
noted that it has been unable to monitor returnees outside Havana since March 2003.
The State Department noted, however, that prior to that time, “a majority of the
returnees it monitored did not suffer retribution from the Cuban authorities as a
result of their attempt to depart illegally” but noted that “there continued to be clear
and credible instances of harassment and punishment of returnees.”94
In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s July 31, 2006, announcement that he was
temporarily ceding political power to his brother, Department of Homeland Security
officials announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives
CRS-50
95 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces Additional Measures to Combat
Alien Smuggling of Cubans,” and “USCIS Will Further Strengthen Measures that Support
the Reunification of Families Separated by the Castro Regime,” Press Releases, Aug. 11,
2006.
96 U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing, Richard Boucher. January
7, 2004.
97 “Migration Talks Cancelled,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2004.
on the open seas. On August 11, 2006, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson urged “the Cuban people to stay on the island”
and discouraged “anyone from risking their life in the open seas in order to travel
to the United States.” At the same time, DHS announced additional measures to
discourage Cubans from turning to alien smuggling as a way to enter the United
States. The measures support family reunification by increasing the numbers of
Cuban migrants admitted to the United States each year who have family members
in the United States, although the overall number of Cuban admitted to the United
States annually will remain at about 21,000. Cubans who attempt to enter the United
States illegally will be deemed ineligible to enter under this new family reunification
procedure. In another change of policy, Cuban medical personnel currently
conscripted by the Cuban government to work in third countries will be allowed to
enter the United States; their families in Cuba will also be allowed to enter the
United States.95
Migration Talks. Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba
and the United States had been held regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and
1995 migration accords, but the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks
scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks have been held since.
According to the State Department, Cuba has refused to discuss five issues
identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified
migrants; (2) Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant
lottery; (3) the need for a deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the
repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S.
diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba’s obligation to accept
the return of Cuban nationals determined to be excludable from the United States.96
In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the
U.S. decision was irresponsible and that it was prepared to discuss all of the issues
raised by the United States.97 The last time talks were suspended was in 2000 by the
Cuban government when Elian Gonzalez was in the United States.
CRS-51
Legislation Approved in the 108th Congress
For a complete listing of legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 108th Congress,
see CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
Appropriations Measures
P.L. 108-447 (H.R. 4818), Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005.
Originally introduced as FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations, which the
House approved on July 13, 2004, and the Senate approved, amended, on September
23, 2004. Conference report, H.Rept. 108-792, filed November 20, 2004, which
incorporated nine regular appropriations bills. The House agreed (344-51) to the
conference report on November 20, 2004, as did the Senate (65-30). President
signed into law December 8, 2004.
Division A, covering Agriculture appropriations, dropped the Cuba provision
that had been included in the Senate committee version of S. 2803 (Section 776) that
would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba if it was related to the commercial
sale of agricultural and medical products.
Division B, covering Commerce, Justice and State appropriations, dropped the
Cuba provision in the House-passed version of H.R. 4754 (Section 801) that would
have prohibited funds from being used to implement recent restrictions on gift
parcels and on baggage for travelers. The omnibus measure also earmarked $27.629
million for broadcasting to Cuba, the full amount requested by the Administration.
Division D, covering Foreign Operations appropriations, dropped contrasting
House- and Senate-approved provisions from the original versions of H.R. 4818
related to assistance for cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. The
Senate version would have provided $5 million in International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement assistance for such efforts, while the House version would
have prohibited such assistance. The omnibus measure also earmarked $9 million
in Economic Support Funds, as requested by the Administration, for Cuba projects
to promote democratization, respect for human rights, and the development of a free
market economy.
Division H, covering Transportation/Treasury appropriations, dropped all
House and Senate provisions that would have eased Cuba sanctions. These
consisted of three House provisions in H.R. 5025 that would have eased Cuba
sanctions on family and educational travel and on private commercial sales of
agricultural and medical products; and one Senate provision in the committee
version S. 2806 that would have prohibited funds from administering or enforcing
restrictions on Cuba travel.
P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673), Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004.
Originally introduced as the FY2004 agriculture appropriations measure, which the
House passed July 14, 2003, and the Senate passed November 6, 2003. On
November 25, 2003, a conference report was filed, H.Rept. 108-401, which
CRS-52
incorporated seven regular appropriations acts for the year. Conference report
agreed to (242-176) in House November 25, 2003; agreed to (65-28) in Senate
January 22, 2004. Signed into law January 23, 2004.
Division A, covering Agriculture appropriations, dropped the Cuba provision
that had been included in the Senate-approved version of H.R. 2673 (Section 760)
that would have allowed travel to Cuba under a general license (without applying
to the Treasury Department) for travel related to commercial sales of agricultural
and medical goods.
Division B, covering Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations, funds Radio
and TV broadcasting to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations
Account, but without a specific earmark. The conferees stated that they expected the
Broadcasting Board of Governors to provide $1.2 million to pursue alternative
means of transmission, including Internet transmission, of Cuba broadcasting. The
Administration requested $26.901 million for Cuba broadcasting, with $16.355
million for Radio Marti and $10.546 million for TV Marti.
Division D, covering Foreign Operations appropriations, did not include
assistance for counter-narcotics cooperation with Cuba that had been in the Senateapproved
version of H.R. 2800 (Section 680), nor did it include the provision in the
House version of bill (Section 571) that would have prohibited such assistance.
Division D also funded democracy programs for Cuba. While the conferees did not
earmark assistance for Cuba democracy programs in the bill, the conference report
recommended full funding of the Administration’s $7 million in Economic Support
Funds for democracy programs supported by USAID. The House-passed version of
H.R. 2800 had no earmark (although the House report, H.Rept. 108-122,
recommended full funding of the Administration’s $7 million request), while the
Senate-passed version of H.R. 2800 (Section 699G) would have provided not more
than $5 billion in Transition Initiatives funds for democracy-building efforts for
Cuba.
Division F, covering Transportation/Treasury appropriations, dropped all
provisions easing Cuba sanctions that had been included in the House- and Senateapproved
versions of H.R. 2989. Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2989
had a nearly identical provision (Section 745 in the House version and Section 643
in the Senate verison) that would have prevented funds from being used to
administer or enforce restrictions on travel or travel-related transactions. In addition,
the House version of H.R. 2989 had provisions that would have prevented funds
from being used to administer or enforce restrictions on remittances (Section 746)
and from being used to eliminate the travel category of people-to-people educational
exchanges (Section 749).
P.L. 108-7 (H.J.Res. 2), Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for
FY2003. President signed into law February 20, 2003. While the measure did not
earmark funding for human rights and democracy projects for Cuba, it funded
FY2003 Foreign Operations appropriations; the Administration’s FY2003 foreign
aid request had included $6 million for such projects ($5.750 was ultimately
allocated by the Administration). The omnibus bill also provided $24.996 million
for Radio and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba.
CRS-53
Human Rights Resolutions
H.Res. 179 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln). Expresses the sense of the House regarding
the systematic human rights violations in Cuba committed by the Castro regime,
calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners, and supports respect for
basic human rights and free elections in Cuba. Introduced April 7, 2003. House
passed (414-0, 11 present) April 8, 2003.
S.Res. 62 (Ensign). Calling upon the OAS Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the European
Union, and human rights activists throughout the world to take certain actions in
regard to the human rights situation in Cuba. Introduced February 24, 2003; referred
to Committee on Foreign Relations. Senate agreed to by unanimous consent on June
27, 2003.
S.Res. 97 (Nelson, Bill). Expresses the sense of the Senate regarding the
arrests of Cuban democracy activists by the Cuban government. Introduced March
25, 2003; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by unanimous
consent. Senate amended and agreed to the resolution April 7, 2003, by unanimous
consent.
S.Res. 328 (Nelson, Bill). Expresses the sense of the Senate regarding the
continued human rights violations committed by Fidel Castro and the Cuban
government, calls on Cuba to immediately release individuals imprisoned for
political purposes, and calls upon the 60th session of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights to condemn Cuba for its human rights abuses and demand that
inspectors from the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to visit
and inspect Cuban prisons. Introduced April 1, 2004; Senate passed, amended, April
8, 2004, by unanimous consent.
CRS-54
Legislative Initiatives in the 109th Congress
Human Rights and Democracy
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057). FY2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs. Reported by House Committee on Appropriations June 24,
2005 (H.Rept. 109-152). House approved (393-32) June 29, 2005. Reported by
Senate Committee on Appropriations June 30, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-96). Senate
approved (98-1), amended, July 20, 2005. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-265)
filed November 2, 2005. House approved (358-39) November 4; Senate approved
(91-0) November 10. Signed into law November 14. The Administration requested
$15 million in ESF assistance for democracy activities for Cuba. Neither the House
nor the Senate versions addressed this issue, and the conference report did not
include a specific earmark for Cuba. (Also see provisions on Cuba Broadcasting
and Anti-drug Cooperation below.)
H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez). Expresses the sense of Congress regarding the
two-year anniversary of the human rights crackdown in Cuba. Introduced March 2,
2005; approved by the House Committee on International Relations March 9, 2005.
House passed (398-27, 2 present) April 27, 2005.
H.Con.Res. 165 (Andrews). Expresses the sense of Congress that the embargo
should not be lifted until the Cuban government agrees to decriminalize free speech,
association, and movement and other elements crucial to the development of
democracy and the protection of fundamental human rights; and calls on the Cuban
government to immediately release all political prisoners in Cuba, eliminate all of
Cuba’s criminal laws that unnecessarily restrict fundamental human rights, respect
fundamental human rights and immediately schedule free multiparty and
internationally supervised elections. Introduced May 24, 2005; referred to the
Committee on International Relations.
H.R. 5522 (Kolbe). FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
Related Programs. Introduced June 5, 2006, and reported by the House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486); House passed (373-34) June 9, 2006.
The Senate Appropriations reported its version of the bill July 10, 2006 (S.Rept.
109-277); this version recommends $2.5 million in ESF for Cuba democracy
programs, $6.5 million less than the request. The House report to the bill recognizes
the work of USAID in promoting democracy and humanitarian assistance for Cuba
and urges the agency to continue to promote its Cuba program. Final action was
not completed before the end of the 109th Congress. (Also see provisions on Antidrug
Cooperation and Cuba Broadcasting below.)
H.Res. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario). Expresses support of the House of
Representatives to the organizers and participants of the May 20, 2005, meeting in
Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced April 6, 2005;
approved by the Committee on International Relations April 27, 2005. House
passed (392-22, 1 present) May 10, 2005.
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H.Res. 388 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln). Expresses the sense of the House of
Representatives regarding the Cuban government’s extreme repression against
members of Cuba’s pro-democracy movement in July 2005; condemns gross human
rights violations committed by the Cuban regime; calls on the Secretary of State to
initiate an international solidarity campaign on behalf of the immediate release of
all Cuban political prisoners; calls on the European Union to reexamine its current
policy toward the Cuban regime; and calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations and other international organizations to work with member
countries of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to ensure a strong
resolution on Cuba at the 62nd session of the UNCHR. Introduced July 26, 2005.
House passed (393-31) September 29, 2005.
S. 600 (Lugar)/H.R. 2601 (Smith). Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 2006 and 2007. S. 600 introduced and reported by Senate Foreign Relations
Committee March 10, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-35). H.R. 2601 introduced May 24, 2005;
reported, amended, by House International Relations Committee July 13, 2005
(H.Rept. 109-168). House approved (351-78) July 20, 2005. As approved by the
House, H.R. 2601 has a provision (Section 215) that would authorize $5 million for
the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs for a variety of
U.S. government scholarship and exchange programs, with priority given to human
rights dissidents, pro-democracy activists, and independent civil society members
for participation in these programs. During Senate consideration of S. 600, S.Amdt.
319 (Ensign) offered on April 6, 2005, would authorize not more than $15 million
in assistance and other support “for individuals and independent nongovernmental
organizations to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba” and up to $5 million
for the OAS to support work on Cuba’s human rights situation. Final action was not
taken before the end of the 109th Congress. (See Cuba Broadcasting and U.S.
Fugitives sections for additional Cuba provisions.)
S.Res. 140 (Martinez). Expresses support of the Senate for the May 20, 2005
meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced May 12,
2005; Senate approved by unanimous consent May 17, 2005.
S.Res. 469 (Lieberman). Condemns the April 25, 2006, beating and
intimidation of Cuban dissident Martha Beatriz Roque. Introduced May 8, 2006;
Senate passed May 25, 2006, by unanimous consent.
S. 3769 (Ensign). Encourages multilateral cooperation and authorizes a
program of assistance to facilitate a peaceful transition in Cuba. Introduced August
1, 2006; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
Modification of Sanctions
P.L. 109-108 (H.R. 2862). FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Reported by Appropriations Committee
(H.Rept. 109-118). House passed June 16, 2005. Senate passed September 15, 2005.
Conference report (H.Rept. 109-272) filed November 7, 2005. House approved
conference November 9; Senate approved November 16, 2005. Signed into law
November 22, 2005. During June 15, 2005, House floor consideration, the House
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rejected H.Amdt. 270 (Flake), by a vote of 210-216, that would have prohibited use
of funds to implement, administer, or enforce amendments to the Cuba embargo
regulations from June 22, 2004, that tightened restrictions on gift parcels. H.Amdt.
269 (McDermott), which would have prohibited the use of funds in the bill to
prosecute any individual for travel to Cuba, was offered but subsequently withdrawn
on June 15, 2005. Also see provision on Cuba Broadcasting below.
P.L. 109-115 (H.R. 3058). FY2006 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations. House Committee on Appropriations reported June 24, 2005
(H.Rept. 109-153). House approved (4-5-18) June 30, 2005. Senate Committee on
Appropriations reported July 26, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-109). Senate approved (93-1)
October 20, 2005. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-307) filed November 18, 2005.
House approved conference November 18, 2005. Senate approved conference
November 21, 2005. Signed into law November 30, 2005. As approved by the
House, Section 945 would have prohibited funds from being used to implement
February 25, 2005, amendments to Section 515.533 of Title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations, regarding a clarification of the term “payment of cash in advance.”
The Senate-passed version contained an identical provision, Section 719, regarding
the “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; the
provision was adopted by an amendment offered by Senator Dorgan during July 19,
2005, consideration by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee. The conference
report did not include the provision.
In the House, during June 30, 2005, floor consideration, the House rejected
three Cuba amendments: on family travel, H.Amdt. 420 (Davis), by a vote of 208-
211; on educational travel, H.Amdt. 422 (Lee), by a vote of 187-233; and on the
overall embargo, H.Amdt. 424 (Rangel), by a vote of 169-250. An additional
amendment on religious travel, H.Amdt. 421 (Flake), was withdrawn, and an
amendment on travel by members of the U.S. military, H.Amdt. 419 (Flake), was
ruled out of order for constituting legislation in an appropriations bill.
During Senate consideration, S.Amdt. 2133 (Dorgan), proposed on October 19,
2005, would have prohibited funds from being used to enforce restrictions on travel.
The amendment was withdrawn the following day after a second-degree
amendment, S.Amdt. 2158 (Ensign), related to abortion (and unrelated to Cuba) was
proposed.
H.Con.Res. 206 (Serrano). Expresses the sense of Congress that the President
should temporarily suspend restrictions on remittances, gift parcels, and family
travel to Cuba to allow Cuban-Americans to assist their relatives in Cuba in the
aftermath of Hurricane Dennis. Introduced July 12, 2005; referred to Committee on
International Relations.
H.R. 208 (Serrano). Cuba Reconciliation Act. Lifts the trade embargo.
Removes provisions restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including repeal
of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1996, and provisions of Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related to transactions or payments with
respect to trademarks. Introduced January 4, 2005; referred to the Committees on
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International Relations, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary,
Financial Services, Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 579 (Paul). Lifts the trade embargo. Removes provisions restricting
trade and other relations with Cuba, including repeal of the Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act of 1996, and provisions of Section
211 of the Department of Commerce and Relations Agencies Appropriations Act,
1999 related to transactions or payments with respect to trademarks. Prohibits U.S.
assistance to Cuba. Introduced February 2, 2005; referred to Committees on
International Relations, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary,
Financial Services, Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 719 (Moran of Kansas)/S. 328 (Craig). Agricultural Export Facilitation
Act of 2005. Identical bills to facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to
Cuba, as authorized by the Trade Sanctions and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.
The bills would provide for a general license by the Secretary of the Treasury for
travel-related transactions related to the sales and marketing of agricultural products
to Cuba; express the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should issue visas
for the temporary entry of Cuban nationals to conduct activities related to
purchasing U.S. agricultural goods; clarify the “payment of cash in advance” term
used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA)
to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the
seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the
purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser;
would prohibit the President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial
institution to a U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA; and
repeals Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Relations Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1999 related to transactions or payments with respect to
trademarks. H.R. 719 was introduced February 9, 2005; referred to the Committees
on International Relations, Judiciary, Financial Services, and Agriculture. S. 328
introduced February 9, 2005; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. S.Amdt.
140 (Martinez), an amendment intended to be proposed to S. 328, would require a
presidential certification to Congress that Cuba has released or properly accounted
for political prisoners in Cuba, including a list of 79 individuals, before the
provisions of the act take effect.
H.R. 1268 (Lewis). FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief. Introduced March 11,
2005. During April 20, 2005, Senate floor debate, S.Amdt. 475 (Craig), as modified
by S.Amdt. 549 (Baucus) and S.Amdt. 552 (Baucus), would have clarified the terms
of “payment of cash in advance” under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000. The amendment was ruled non-germane.
H.R. 1339 (Emerson)/S. 634 (Chambliss). Similar, although not identical,
bills, to amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
to clarify allowable payment terms for sales of agricultural commodities and
products to Cuba. The bills would clarify that “payment of cash in advance” means
the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs
prior to the transfer of title of such commodity or product to the purchaser and the
release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser. H.R. 1339
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introduced March 16, 2005; referred to Committees on Financial Services,
International Relations, and Agriculture. S. 634 was introduced March 16, 2005;
referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.R. 2361 (Taylor, Charles). FY2006 Interior, Environment, and Related
Agencies Appropriations. House passed May 19, 2005. Senate passed June 29,
2005. During June 29, 2005, Senate consideration, the Senate rejected (60-35; a
two-thirds majority vote was required) a motion to suspend the rules with respect
to S.Amdt. 1059 (Dorgan), which would have allowed travel to Cuba under a
general license for the purpose of visiting a member of the person’s immediate
family for humanitarian reasons. The amendment was then ruled out of order.
H.R. 2617 (Davis, Jim). Prohibits any additional restrictions on per diem
allowances, family visits to Cuba, remittances, and accompanied baggage beyond
those that were in effect on June 15, 2004. Introduced May 25, 2005; referred to the
Committee on International Relations.
H.R. 3064 (Lee). Prohibits the use of funds available to the Department of the
Treasury to implement regulations from June 2004 that tightened restrictions on
travel to Cuba for educational activities. Introduced June 24, 2005; referred to
Committee on International Relations.
H.R. 3372 (Flake). United States Trademark Defense Act of 2005. Repeals
Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Relations Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1999, related to transactions or payments with respect to
trademarks. Requires the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to examine
the polices and practices of Cuba with respect to protecting and enforcing
intellectual property rights, and requires USTR to give these findings due
consideration when identifying countries that deny adequate protection, or market
access, for intellectual property rights. Introduced July 21, 2005; referred to
Committee on the Judiciary and Committee on Ways and Means.
H.R. 5292 (Ros-Lehtinen)/S. 2795 (Martinez). Excludes from admission to
the United States aliens who have made investments contributing to the
enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources off its
northern coast. Requires the President to impose economic sanctions on persons
(including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made an investment
equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s
ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands of Cuba’s northern
coast. H.R. 5292 introduced May 4, 2006; referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary and in addition to the Committees on International Relations, Financial
Services, and Government Reform. S. 2795 introduced May 11, 2006; referred to
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
H.R. 5353 (Flake)/S. 2787 (Craig). Permits U.S. companies to participate in
Cuba’s exploration and exploitation of oil along Cuba’s northern coast contiguous
to the exclusive economic zone of the United States. Both bills were introduced
May 11, 2006. H.R. 5353 was referred to the Committee on International Relations.
S. 2787 was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
CRS-59
H.R. 5384 (Bonilla). FY2007 Agriculture Appropriations bill. Introduced and
reported by House Appropriations Committee May 12, 2006; passed House May 23,
2006. Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version June 22, 2006 (S.Rept.
109-266). The Senate version contains a provision, Section 755, providing for travel
to Cuba under a general license for travel related to the sale of agricultural and
medical goods to Cuba. Currently such travel is provided under a specific license
issued by the Treasury Department on a case-by-case basis. Final action was not
completed by the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5576 (Knollenberg). FY2007 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act. Introduced June 9, 2006; reported by House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-495). House passed (406-22) June 14,
2006. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 109-293) July 26,
2006. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill include a provision (Section
950 in the House version and Section 846 in the Senate version) that prohibits funds
from being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba that were issued in February 2005. In the House bill,
the provision was added by H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran, Kansas), approved by voice vote
during floor consideration on June 14, 2006. On the same day, the House rejected
two amendments that would have eased economic sanctions on Cuba: H.Amdt.
1050 (Rangel), defeated by a vote of 183-245, would have prohibited funds from
implementing the overall embargo, and H.Amdt. 1051 (Lee), defeated by a vote of
187-236, would have prohibited funs from being used to implement the
Administration’s June 2004 tightened restriction on educational travel to Cuba.
Another amendment, H.Amdt. 1032 (Flake), that would have prohibited the use of
funds to amend regulations relating to travel for religious activities in Cuba, was
withdrawn from consideration. Final action on the measure was not completed by
the end of the 109th Congress.
S. 600 (Lugar). Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and
2007. Introduced and reported by Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 10,
2005 (S.Rept. 109-35). During Senate floor consideration on April 6, 2005, the
Senate considered S.Amdt. 281 (Baucus) and a second-degree amendment, S.Amdt.
282 (Craig) that would facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba. The
language of the amendments consists of the provisions of S. 328 (Craig), the
Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2005 described above. Final action on the
measure was not taken by the end of the 109th Congress. (Also see amendments
above on assistance for Cuba Human Rights and Democracy Projects (S. 319), and
below on Television Broadcasting to Cuba (S.Amdt. 284).)
S. 691 (Domenici)/H.R. 1689 (Feeney). Modifies the prohibition (so-called
Section 211) on recognition by U.S. courts of certain rights relating to certain marks,
trade names, or commercial names. S. 691 introduced April 4, 2005; referred to
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. HR. 1689 introduced April 19, 2005; referred
to House Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 894 (Enzi)/H.R. 1814 (Flake). Similar, although not identical, bills to allow
travel between the United States and Cuba. S. 894 introduced April 25, 2005;
CRS-60
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. H.R. 1814 introduced April 26,
2005; referred to the Committee on International Relations.
S. 1604 (Craig). Judicial Powers Restoration Act of 2005. Repeals Section
211 of the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1999, related to transactions or payments with respect to trademarks. Introduced
July 29, 2005; referred to Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 2682 (Nelson of Florida). Excludes from admission to the United States
aliens who have made investments directly and significantly contributing to the
enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources. Introduced
April 27, 2006; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Migration
H.R. 209 (Serrano). Baseball Diplomacy Act. Waives certain prohibitions
with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized
baseball. Introduced January 4, 2005; referred to Committees on International
Relations and Judiciary.
H.R. 5670 (Frank). Repeals the Cuban Adjustment Act, P.L. 89-732.
Introduced June 22, 2006; referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Cuba Broadcasting
P.L. 109-108 (H.R. 2862). FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Reported by Appropriations Committee
(H.Rept. 109-118). House passed June 16, 2005. Senate passed September 15, 2005.
Conference report (H.Rept. 109-272) filed November 7, 2005. House approved
conference November 9; Senate approved conference November 16, 2005. Signed
into law November 22, 2005. The report to the House bill included a committee
recommendation of $27.9 million for Cuba broadcasting, $10 million below the
Administration’s request, and did not provide funding for an aircraft to transmit
Radio and TV Marti programming. Senate action on appropriations for Cuba
broadcasting were included in the Senate version of H.R. 3057 rather than H.R.
2862, and fully funded the Administration’s request of $37.7 million. The
conference report fully funds the Administration’s request of $37.7 million for
Broadcasting to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations account. Also
see above for failed amendments on Cuba Sanctions.
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057). FY2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs. Reported by House Committee on Appropriations June 24,
2005 (H.Rept. 109-152). House approved (393-32) June 29, 2005. Reported by
Senate Committee on Appropriations June 30, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-96). Senate
approved (98-1), amended, July 20, 2005. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-265)
filed November 2, 2005. House approved (358-39) November 4; Senate approved
(91-0) November 10. Signed into law November 14. The Senate-approved version
provided $37.7 million for Cuba broadcasting, including assistance for the
procurement of an aircraft to transmit Radio and TV Marti programming. During
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July 19, 2005 floor consideration, the Senate defeated (33-66) S.Amdt. 1294
(Dorgan) that would have provided no funding for television broadcasting to Cuba,
increased Peace Corps funding by $21.1 million, and reduced the amount provided
for the Broadcasting Board of Governors by $21.1 million (the amount requested for
TV Marti, including for the procurement of an aircraft). Final congressional action
on appropriations for Cuba broadcasting took place in H.R. 2862 (see above) where
the conference report fully funded the Administration’s request for $37.7 million.
(Also see Human Rights and Democracy and Anti-Drug Cooperation for additional
Cuba provisions in H.R. 3057)
S. 600 (Lugar)/H.R. 2601 (Smith). Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 2006 and 2007. S. 600 introduced and reported by Senate Foreign Relations
Committee March 10, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-35). H.R. 2601 introduced May 24, 2005;
reported by Committee on International Relations July 13, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-168).
House approved (351-78) July 20, 2005. Section 503 of each bill would authorize
the Office of Cuba Broadcasting to use additional AM frequencies as well as FM
and shortwave frequencies for Radio Marti in order to help improve signal delivery
to Cuba. H.R. 2601 (Section 106) would authorize the Administration’s full request
of $37.7 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2006 and $29.9 million for FY2007,
including funds for an aircraft to improve radio and television transmission and
reception. S. 600 (Section 111) would authorize funding for Cuba broadcasting
under the International Broadcasting Operations account, but without a specific
earmark. During Senate floor consideration on April 6, 2005, the Senate tabled
S.Amdt. 284 (Dorgan), by a vote of 65-35, that would have prohibited funds from
being used for television broadcasting to Cuba. Also see amendments above on
assistance for Cuba Human Rights and Democracy Projects (S. 319) and on Cuba
Sanctions (S.Amdt. 281).
H.R. 5672 (Wolf). FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related
Agencies appropriations. Introduced June 22, 2006; reported by House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-520). House passed June 29, 2006. As
approved, Cuba broadcasting is to be funded under the International Broadcasting
Operations account. The report to the bill recommends $36.102 million for Cuba
broadcasting, including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via
aerostat for broadcasting TV Marti. Final action on the measure was not completed
before the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5522 (Kolbe). FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
Related Programs. Introduced June 5, 2006, and reported by the House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486); House passed (373-34) June 9, 2006.
Senate Appropriations Committee reported July 10, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-277). The
Senate version would fund Cuba broadcasting. The Senate report to the bill
recommends full funding of the Administration’s request of $36.279 million. Final
action on the measure was not completed before the end of the 109th Congress. (Also
see Human Rights and Democracy and Anti-Drug Cooperation sections for
additional provisions.)
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Anti-Drug Cooperation
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057). FY2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs. Reported by House Committee on Appropriations June 24,
2005 (H.Rept. 109-152). House approved (393-32) June 29, 2005. Reported by
Senate Committee on Appropriations June 30, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-96). Senate
approved (98-1), amended, July 20, 2005. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-265)
filed November 2, 2005. House approved (358-39) November 4; Senate approved
(91-0) November 10. Signed into law November 14. As approved by the House,
Section 572 provided that no International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) funds may be made available for Cuba. As approved by the Senate,
Section 6089 provided $5 million in INCLE funds for preliminary work to establish
cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban government on counternarcotics
matters. The conference report did not include either provision. (Also See
Human Rights and Democracy and Cuba Broadcasting for additional Cuba
provisions in H.R. 3057.)
H.R. 5522 (Kolbe). FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
Related Programs. Introduced June 5, 2006, and reported by the House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486); House passed (373-34) June 9, 2006.
Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the bill July 10, 2006
(S.Rept. 109-277). The House version includes a provision (Section 570) providing
that no INCLE assistance can be made available to the Cuban government. The
House report to the bill maintains that full reporting and transparency by the Cuban
government and that U.S. monitoring of counternarcotics assistance in Cuba would
be difficult, if not impossible, given Cuba’s hostility toward the U.S. government.
The Senate version, in Section 551(e), would provide $5 million in INCLE funds
for preliminary work to establish cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics
matters. The money would not be available if the President certified that Cuba did
not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life
in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and
there was evidence of involvement of the Cuban government in drug trafficking.
Final action on the measure was not completed before the end of the 109th Congress.
(Also see Human Rights and Democracy and Cuba Broadcasting for additional
Cuba provisions in the bill.)
U.S. Fugitives
S. 600 (Lugar)/H.R. 2601 (Smith). Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 2006 and 2007. S. 600 introduced and reported by Senate Foreign Relations
Committee March 10, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-35). H.R. 2601 introduced May 24, 2005;
reported by Committee on International Relations July 13, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-168).
House approved (351-78) July 20, 2005. As approved by the House, H.R. 2601
includes a provision, Section 101(1)(H), that authorizes funds for the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana to disseminate the names of fugitives, such as Joanne Chesimard
and William Morales, who are residing in Cuba, and any rewards for their capture.
Also see amendments above on assistance for Cuba Human Rights and Democracy
Projects (S. 319) and on Cuba Sanctions (S.Amdt. 281). The provision was added
by H.Amdt. 484 (Fosella), approved by voice vote, during July 20, 2005 floor
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consideration. S. 600 does not have a similar provision. Final action on either
measure was not completed before the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 332 (King). Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a democratically elected
government in Cuba exists, the government extradite to the United States convicted
felon William Morales and all other individuals who are living in Cuba in order to
escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United
States. Introduced January 25, 2005; referred to the Committee on International
Relations.
Support for U.S. Diplomatic Personnel in Cuba
H.Con.Res. 428 (McCotter). Introduced June 13, 2006; referred to the
Committee on International Relations. Expresses support for U.S. diplomatic
personnel stationed at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba.
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RL33551, Transportation, the Treasury, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of
the President and Independent Agencies (TTHUD): FY2007 Appropriations,
coordinated by David Randall Peterman and John Frittelli.
CRS Report RL32905, Transportation, the Treasury, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of
the President and Independent Agencies: FY2006 Appropriations, coordinated
by David Randall Peterman and John Frittelli.
CRS Report RL33412, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2007 Appropriations,
coordinated by Jim Monke.
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL33622, Cuba after Fidel Castro: U.S. Policy Implications and
Approaches, by Mark P Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan
and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation in the 106th Congress, by Mark
P. Sullivan and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS-64
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959 -1999,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RS22173, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, by Jennifer Elsea.
CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S.
Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An
Overview, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and
Issues Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
CRS Report RL31370, State Department and Related Agencies: FY2006
Appropriations and FY2007 Request, by Susan B. Epstein.
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by
David M. Ackerman.
CRS Report RS21003, Travel Restrictions: U.S. Government Limits on American
Citizens’ Travel Abroad, by Susan B. Epstein and Dianne E. Rennack.
CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in
Pending Cases, by Jeanne J. Grimmett.

International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress

2007-01-11T12:32:00.000-08:00

Order Code RL33769
International Crises and Disasters: U.S.
Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and
Issues for Congress
December 21, 2006
Rhoda Margesson
Foreign Affairs Analyst
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
1 For background and information on this issue, see CRS Report RL33491, Restructuring
U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of the Director of Foreign Assistance, by Connie Veillette. See
also [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59398.htm] and remarks by Secretary Rice at
[http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59408.htm]. Ambassador Randall L. Tobias is the
first Director of Foreign Assistance and serves concurrently as the Administrator of USAID.
International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress
Summary
Humanitarian emergencies can emerge anywhere in the world, stemming from
natural disasters or man-made conflicts. U.S. and international humanitarian
assistance can have an important impact not only on the relief operation itself but on
broader foreign policy issues. In the 110th Congress, humanitarian assistance is likely
to enjoy continued bipartisan support, with key policy issues focused on budget
priorities, levels of funding, and the types of other support available worldwide.
The President can provide emergency humanitarian assistance through several
sources whose funding is authorized and appropriated by Congress. These are funds
appropriated to the Office of Foreign Disaster Administration (OFDA) in the Agency
for International Development (USAID); U.S. Department of Agriculture food aid
programs under P.L. 480 Food for Peace and Section 416 (b) of the Agriculture Act
of 1949; the State Department Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA)
a contingency account that can contain as much as $100 million for assistance to
refugees fleeing persecution; and funds appropriated to the Department of Defense,
Overseas Humanitarian and Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA).
In addition, the President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and
direct military personnel to respond to disasters and provide space-available
transportation on military aircraft and ships to private donors who wish to transport
humanitarian goods and equipment in response to a disaster. Finally, the President
can request other government agencies to assist within their capabilities. In FY2006
the United States contributed close to $3 billion to disaster relief worldwide.
This report examines U.S. humanitarian assistance in international crises and
disaster situations. It considers the sources of U.S. government aid (including the
governmental response mechanism), budget trends in humanitarian assistance, and
issues for Congress. It does not specifically address the creation of a new Director of
Foreign Assistance position at the State Department or the broader restructuring of
U.S. foreign aid programs that are currently under way.1 The development of the
FY2008 budget request will reportedly be a coordinated effort by joint State
Department and USAID teams. While programmatic decision-making on refugee and
humanitarian assistance may shift under the proposed foreign aid reform, it remains
to be seen what affect this will have on existing procedures. This report will be
updated as the restructuring initiatives evolve, or if in the meantime, the humanitarian
response mechanism within the U.S. government changes.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Defining Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Exemptions for Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Budget Trends: A Thirty-Year Review of U.S. Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . 3
Sources of U.S. Governmental Humanitarian Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
United States Agency for International Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Food for Peace (FFP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Office of Military Affairs (OMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Other Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Funding Sources and Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Roles of the U.S. Government and Private Sector in Humanitarian
Aid Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
International Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Sources of Post-Disaster and Post-Conflict Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Issues for the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Transparency and Efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Links to Broader Foreign Policy Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Figures
Figure 1. Humanitarian Assistance Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 This report draws on an earlier report on the same topic, now out of print, by Lois
McHugh.
3 Due to the unanticipated nature of many disasters, humanitarian aid budget allocations
often increase throughout the year as demands arise. Countries that have or are experiencing
a crisis or natural disaster receive U.S. aid through several key worldwide emergency
humanitarian assistance accounts for disaster (International Disaster and Famine Assistance
or IDFA); food relief (P.L. 480 Title II); and refugee programs (Emergency Refugee
Migration Assistance or ERMA). These accounts are generally used to respond to
emergency situations and are not integrated into long-term development strategies.
4 U.S. private contributions and efforts are also part of the overall response but not
addressed in this report.
5 Sec. 491-493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
International Crises and Disasters:
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget
Trends, and Issues for Congress
Introduction2
The United States is a major contributor to relief efforts in international crises
and disaster situations. Key relief-related policy issues likely to be of concern to the
110th Congress include budget priorities, levels of funding, and the types and levels
of support available from the international community. In FY2006, the U.S.
government contributed close to $3 billion to disaster relief worldwide.3 Congress has
consistently supported humanitarian efforts as a means of responding to natural
disasters (such as floods, earthquakes) and man-made crises (such as war) in the short
term, taking the lead and promoting a U.S. presence.4
Humanitarian assistance generally receives bipartisan congressional support.
Congress has given the President broad authority in this area. The Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, authorizes the United States to participate in
disaster relief efforts and gives the President great flexibility to respond to disasters
with a wide range of government-funded humanitarian assistance.5
CRS-2
6 Sec. 493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
7 Ambassador Randall L. Tobias was nominated by President Bush in January 2006 to serve
concurrently as the Administrator of USAID and the first Director of Foreign Assistance.
The Senate confirmed his appointment as USAID Administrator on March 29, 2006, and he
was sworn in on March 31. As Director of Foreign Assistance, Ambassador Tobias holds
the rank of Deputy Secretary of State and also reports to Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice. For more information, see [http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/bios/bio_rtobias.html].
8 A livelihood strategy considers the specific context and circumstances of the situation in
designing effective programs that work with local abilities to cope with emergencies.
9 What is less clear is when an activity might be considered humanitarian as differentiated
from post-conflict transition or reconstruction, and to what degree this distinction needs to
remain flexible to adapt to changes in policy or operations on the ground. In an operational
sense, humanitarian and other assistance is often provided on parallel tracks, and there is
usually an overlap in activities in the transition from one phase to another.
In 1993, President Clinton designated for the first time the Administrator of the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as the Special Coordinator for
International Disaster Assistance.6 In this capacity the Administrator coordinates the
U.S. government’s response to both natural or man-made disasters. The
Administrator also calls upon federal agencies to provide assistance; contracts with
and funds private voluntary agencies to provide humanitarian assistance; and
coordinates the U.S. response with that of other countries.7
Defining Humanitarian Assistance
The very nature of humanitarian emergencies — the need to respond quickly in
order to save lives and provide relief — has resulted in a broad definition of
humanitarian assistance, on both a policy and operational level. While humanitarian
assistance is assumed to address urgent food, shelter, and medical needs, the agencies
within the U.S. government providing this support expand or contract the definition
in response to circumstances.
The legislation governing humanitarian or disaster assistance leaves the decision
on the type of assistance required to the President. U.S. humanitarian assistance in
disasters and international crises is broad, far reaching and covers many elements
directly concerned with the provision of relief and strategies for strengthening how
people survive over time.8 Congress broadly defines humanitarian activities in an
effort to enable the U.S. response to be as flexible as possible to adapt to humanitarian
needs. Assistance can include the provision of basic needs, child survival strategies,
and assistance to refugees, but in practice the provision of humanitarian assistance is
typically case and time specific.9
CRS-3
10 The decision as to what is considered humanitarian versus non-humanitarian is often made
on a case-by-case basis. For example, in the India-Pakistan situation in 1998, sanctions were
applied following India’s nuclear tests; under the Pressler Amendment, all aid was cut off
except for specific relief assistance programs.
11 While there is no “official” definition of what constitutes U.S. humanitarian assistance,
for the purposes of a trend analysis, this discussion is based on spending appropriated in the
current Foreign Operations and Agriculture accounts for International Disaster and Famine
Assistance, Transition Initiatives, Migration and Refugee Assistance, Emergency Migration
and Refugee Assistance Fund, and title II of P.L. 480 food assistance. In addition, in
selected years, Congress created special accounts for specific relief efforts, such as the
Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund (2005) and Central America and the Caribbean
Emergency Fund (1999). Figures do not include amounts funded outside the Foreign Affairs
Budget Function 150, such as the Defense Department’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster,
and Civic Action account provided in annual DOD appropriations, i.e., the 151 Budget
Account. Data are expressed in FY2006 dollars taking in the effects of inflation over time.
This section is based on CRS Report RL33262, Foreign Policy Budget Trends: A Thirty-
Year Review, and was written by Larry Nowels.
12 Because many humanitarian emergencies continue well beyond the year in which they
first arise, aid programs may be ongoing for several of these cases.
Exemptions for Humanitarian Assistance
In general, humanitarian assistance is exempt from the regulations implementing
various types of foreign aid sanctions.10 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (P.L. 87-195), allows the President to provide disaster assistance,
“notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other Act,” which would otherwise
prohibit or restrict aid to selected countries, such as economic sanctions.
Budget Trends: A Thirty-Year Review of U.S.
Humanitarian Assistance11
The United States, consistently a large contributor to international disaster and
humanitarian relief operations, has spent unprecedented amounts on global
humanitarian emergencies, particularly in the last decade. The confluence of several
natural disasters — Hurricane Mitch, which struck Central America in late 1998; the
drought in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa since 2002; the Indian Ocean tsunami,
which struck in December 2004, and the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan — plus
continuing conflicts around the world — Kosovo (1999), Liberia (until 2003),
Afghanistan (2002), pre-war Iraq (2003), Haiti (2004), and Darfur (since 2003) —
combined to push foreign aid spending on humanitarian crises to their highest levels
in three decades.12 The $3.83 billion humanitarian aid budget for FY2003 was the
largest since the late 1970s, and slightly higher than the $3.73 billion funding level for
FY2005. Resources for FY2006 ($3 billion) are lower than the recent peak years,
although they remain one of the largest totals over the past 30 years.
In this 30-year review, there were only two instances where humanitarian aid
funding levels come close to recent totals. For FY1980-FY1981, large supplementals
for Indochina and Soviet/East European refugee resettlements brought amounts to
around $2.8 billion. In FY1985 humanitarian relief spending exceeded $2.75 billion,
CRS-4
13 It should be noted that comparisons across disasters may be helpful in general terms, but
the data cannot illustrate fully the complexities of each situation. The disasters themselves
are not equivalent: the areas in which they occur differ dramatically in terrain, underlying
economic conditions, and governmental capacity. Each U.S. agency has its own budget,
with its own criteria, accounting detail, and regional specificity. Budgets may reflect
regional support, a certain area, specific countries, or a combination thereof over time and
with changing events. Authority, definitions, and categories of services are not necessarily
equivalent across events. The fact that an urgent response to humanitarian crises is often
required only compounds the problem of tracking humanitarian aid funding levels.
largely due to a substantial U.S. response to a major famine in Africa. Assistance to
populations affected by the Gulf War in 1991 and to victims of conflict in Bosnia,
Haiti, and Rwanda in 1994 represented other “surge” years for humanitarian aid
budgets.13
CRS-5
Note: Unless otherwise stated, figures are expressed
in constant FY2006 dollars.
KEY TRENDS
! Due to the unforeseen and unpredictable nature
of events requiring humanitarian relief, spending
patterns have been highly erratic over the past 30
years.
! In general, however, resources committed for
food, disaster, and refugee support have been
growing for the past two decades. Amounts
have been especially large in several years since
FY1999.
! FY2006 appropriations for humanitarian aid
programs, at $3 billion, fell below recent years
— FY1999, FY2003, and FY2005.
! For the entire 30-year period, FY2006 spending
on humanitarian relief operations is nearly 30%
higher than the $2.32 billion annual average, but
only slightly larger than the annual average since
FY1999.
Figure 1. Humanitarian Assistance Spending
CRS-6
14 In addition, although not the focus of this report, other parts of the U.S. government that
support humanitarian assistance include the USDA Forest Service, the USGS, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS), Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which contribute technical assistance to OFDA
as needed in response to humanitarian emergencies.
Sources of U.S. Governmental Humanitarian Aid
Categories of humanitarian assistance can be broken down into several main
elements including, relief and rehabilitation, food assistance, refugee programs, and
logistical and operational support. Three central parts of the U.S. government —
USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense — provide
humanitarian assistance and cover a mix of these activities as described below.14
USAID is the central U.S. agency charged with coordinating U.S. government and
private sector foreign assistance.
United States Agency for International Development
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA, within USAID’s
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), provides
non-food humanitarian assistance during international crises and disasters and can
respond immediately with relief materials and personnel, many of whom are often
already in the field. OFDA was established in 1964 to coordinate what had
previously been an ad hoc U.S. response to international disasters. It facilitates the
U.S. government emergency assistance. OFDA provides some assistance through its
own personnel, but the bulk of its activities are carried out through grants to U.N.
agencies, other international organizations (IOs), international governmental and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and private or religious voluntary organizations
(PVOs). It also coordinates with the U.S. embassy or USAID mission in the affected
country, the government of the country suffering the disaster, and other governments.
Funding for USAID/OFDA is authorized and appropriated in the annual Foreign
Operations legislation.
A response to a disaster generally begins with the U.S. ambassador or Chief of
Mission responding to a request from the affected country’s government for
assistance. OFDA has use of up to $50,000 (through Disaster Assistance Authority)
immediately available, which it releases to the USAID mission or U.S. embassy,
generally within 24 hours. This money is then provided to the local Red Cross/ Red
Crescent or a similar local disaster response organization, or it may be used to buy
relief supplies or hire personnel locally. The United States also begins working with
the affected government through the Ambassador to determine what, if any,
additional aid may be needed.
USAID/OFDA can respond immediately with cash, relief materials and
personnel to any kind of disaster, whether man-made or natural. The President has
the authority to set the terms and conditions of the aid provided. As a general rule,
assistance provided by USAID/OFDA lasts about 90 days, although the agency may
continue monitoring and mitigation projects for a longer period. Some
CRS-7
15 Authorized in Section 201-207 of P.L. 83-480, the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.
USAID/OFDA personnel are located in various countries around the world and can
move quickly to a disaster area. OFDA also has Disaster Assistance Response
Teams (DARTS), experts who can be brought together quickly to respond to different
types of disasters. These groups may be sent to the area in anticipation of a disaster,
such as a tropical storm or flood that has been predicted by the weather service. Once
a DART is deployed, a Washington, DC-based Response Management Team (RMT)
is also activated.
Under the legislation governing disaster assistance, the President is authorized
to borrow up to $50 million in any fiscal year from any other section of the economic
assistance part of the foreign aid program if funding within the USAID/OFDA budget
is inadequate. Generally, this money is borrowed from programs already planned for
countries within the region. These borrowed funds may be repaid through passage
by Congress of a supplemental appropriation. USAID regional bureaus may also
reprogram their projects within the disaster region in response to local needs, or they
may transfer funds to USAID/OFDA to carry out disaster related programs.
USAID/OFDA can also request the use of facilities, equipment, or personnel
from other agencies as needed. For example, U.S. weather prediction facilities and
satellites may be used to track storms, droughts, or floods. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (HHS) specialists are relied upon for identifying and
responding to outbreaks of disease.
Food for Peace (FFP). The USAID Administrator also administers Title II
of P.L. 480, the Food For Peace program established in 1954.15 P.L. 480 is
authorized and appropriated in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
legislation and was most recently reauthorized and amended in the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. Title II provides food as grant
aid that does not need to be repaid. Title II is the primary disaster aid channel for
U.S. food aid. A Food Security Trust (P.L.105-385) can be used to provide
emergency humanitarian food aid if emergency needs exceed what could be provided
under regular Title II programming. The Food Security Trust is composed of stocks
of wheat, rice, corn or sorghum. Funds of the Commodity Credit Corporation may
be used to replenish the Trust.
The legislation gives the USAID Administrator wide authority to provide food
aid and contains a “notwithstanding clause” that allows food aid to be provided
despite prohibitions in other legislation. Commodities may be made available for
direct distribution to the needy, or for sale, barter, or other disposition, according to
the determination of the Administrator.
The United States is by far the largest international contributor of emergency
food aid in disaster situations. In recent years, most emergency food aid has been
provided to victims of complex humanitarian emergencies, helping people displaced
by warfare and unable to grow or obtain food in their traditional way. Crisis
conditions often last many years. Food aid programs generally target the most
CRS-8
16 For more information, see [http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/cent_progs/
central_dcha_oma.html. See also [http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/
ijpe1104.htm].
17 Other departments within USAID may provide some form of humanitarian assistance but
it is unclear how much because humanitarian activities may be a part but not the central
focus of the program, such as women’s health, child survival, trauma counseling and social
welfare, and demining, activities that may be considered by some to be humanitarian.
vulnerable populations, including children, pregnant and nursing mothers, the elderly,
sick and handicapped, and those identified as malnourished. Title II grant food aid
is mostly provided for humanitarian relief but may also be used for developmentoriented
purposes through governments, intergovernmental entities, PVOs, and
multilateral organizations, such as the World Food Program (WFP).
As with other USAID/OFDA aid, food aid may be prepositioned in regions that
are vulnerable to disaster, or diverted from a less pressing food aid program in a
nearby country that would be replenished later. Food aid that is not prepositioned or
diverted from nearby countries may take several months to reach a disaster site. At
least 75% of U.S. food aid tonnage must be shipped on U.S. flagged vessels.
Section 416 (b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 provides for the donation of surplus
U.S. agricultural commodities held by the Commodity Credit Corporation to needy
countries, including those suffering from disasters. This program is managed by the
USDA.
Office of Military Affairs (OMA). Also placed within the DCHA, the OMA
was established in October 2005 as an operational link to improve USAID’s
coordination of humanitarian assistance with the U.S. military. Senior USAID staff
are assigned to the five geographic Combatant Commands and help assess
development needs. Joint exercises with the military are planned for ongoing
training in preparation for future disasters. Training for both the military’s civil
affairs officers and USAID workers is also intended to increase knowledge and
cooperation, and capacity at the operational level. The OMA is also a contact point
between NGOs and the military, and allows each to benefit from the others
operational experience while at the same time contributing to the administration and
delivery of humanitarian assistance.16
Other Funds. There are three funds that can be used for disaster assistance and
that are focused on specific issues — Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF),
the Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF), and the Victims Torture Fund (VOT). They
are coordinated by DCHA through funds reserved by Congress each year.
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). OTI provides post-disaster transition
assistance, which includes mainly short-term peace and democratization projects with
some attention to humanitarian elements (e.g. community projects such as housing,
electricity, water) but not emergency relief.17
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM). CMM also
provides transition assistance towards development through early intervention in the
causes and consequences of conflict.
CRS-9
18 Authorized in Sections 2 and 3 of P.L. 87-510, the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act
of 1962.
Department of State
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM). PRM deals with
problems of refugees worldwide, conflict victims, and populations of concern to the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), often including Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs). Humanitarian assistance includes a range of services from
basic needs to community services to tolerance building and dialogue initiatives.
Key issues include protection (refugee, asylum issues, identification, returns, tracing
activities) and quick impact, small community projects.
Refugee funds are provided as cash grants to international governmental and
NGO refugee organizations. These include U.N. agencies such as UNHCR and the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and international organizations such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGOs, such as CARE,
Doctors without Borders, and Catholic Relief Services (CRS).
Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA). ERMA is a
contingency fund that remains available until spent and is replenished as needed by
Congress. P.L. 103-236 sets the maximum amount of money that can be in this
account at $100 million although appropriations have been made that exceed this
amount. Established in 196218, ERMA gives the President wide latitude in
responding to refugee emergencies. Refugees are defined as those fleeing their
homeland due to persecution on account of their religion, race, political opinion or
social or ethnic group. The law contains a “notwithstanding clause” that waives
prohibitions against providing aid contained in any other legislation. The legislation
establishing ERMA places certain requirements on the President. The President must
publish a Presidential Determination in the Federal Register and keep the appropriate
Congressional committees informed of drawdowns. Refugee emergencies lasting
more than a year are incorporated into the regular budget of the Migration and
Refugee Account (MRA) through the Bureau of Population, Migration and Refugees
(PRM). Both ERMA and MRA are authorized in the Department of State legislation
and appropriated in the foreign operations legislation.
Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DOD) provides support to stabilize emergency
situations, including the transport and provision of food, shelter and supplies,
logistical support, search and rescue, medical evacuations, and refugee assistance.
This includes the provision of 2,300 calorie low-cost humanitarian daily rations to
alleviate hunger after foreign disasters. The incremental costs for all DOD
humanitarian assistance for both natural and man-made disasters is funded through
the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Action (OHDACA) account in
annual DOD appropriations.
DOD provides assistance in humanitarian emergencies under several provisions
in law. The primary authority is Title 10, Section 2561 (formerly Section 2551),
CRS-10
19 Section 404 of Title 10 also authorizes DOD to provide foreign disaster assistance. It is
not generally used because it is considered to be somewhat cumbersome and requires an
expansive report to Congress.
which allows the use of appropriated funds for humanitarian assistance “for the
purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian
purposes worldwide.”19 The Secretary of State determines that this provision should
be used and requests DOD to respond to a disaster with specific assistance such as
helicopter transport, provision of temporary water supplies, or road and bridge repair.
DOD response time depends upon what is being requested and how long it takes to
get personnel and equipment to the site of the emergency. If possible, military
personnel join the USAID’s OFDA assessment team to help determine the type of aid
that can be provided by DOD. Under this provision, DOD generally limits its service
activities to those that stabilize the emergency situation, such as road or bridge repair,
but generally does not undertake projects that include rebuilding. The law requires
an annual report to Congress on the use of funds.
Title 10 also contains a section that helps private voluntary agencies transport
donated humanitarian goods to disaster sites. Section 402, the Denton program,
named after former Member of Congress Jeremiah Denton, authorizes shipment of
privately donated humanitarian goods on U.S. military aircraft on a space-available
basis. The donated goods must be certified as appropriate for the disaster by
USAID’s OFDA and can be bumped from the transport if other U.S. government aid
must be transported. Donated goods can also be shipped on commercial vessels,
using Section 2561 funds.
Section 506 (a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 allows the draw down
of military equipment to a limit of $100 million in any fiscal year if the President
determines that an unforseen emergency exists that requires immediate military
assistance and the requirement cannot be met under any other provision. Before this
provision can be used the President must notify the Speaker of the House and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in writing by issuing a Presidential Directive
explaining and justifying the need for the equipment being used. This request is
handled by the Department of State and the National Security Council.
The Role of Congress
Funding Sources and Oversight
OFDA, ERMA, and P.L. 480 requests are generally approved by Congress at the
requested level. At times, however, the amount of disaster assistance provided during
a Fiscal Year exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress. Congress has provided
the President with the authority to borrow up to $50 million from economic
assistance accounts in the foreign aid program. In some cases, particularly when
disasters occur during the appropriations process, Congressional amendments
reimbursing a particular agency for a specific disaster may become part of the next
year’s appropriation for that agency.
CRS-11
20 This section appears in CRS Report 98-916, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of
U.S. Programs and Policy, and was written by Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels.
21 Defined broadly as those seeking asylum outside their country of citizenship with
(continued...)
Congress is also generally supportive of supplemental appropriations that
reimburse agencies for their expenditures, either to replenish the emergency accounts
or other accounts that have been used to provide assistance. When there is difficulty
in passing supplemental legislation, the debate is generally over non-disaster items,
such as long-term reconstruction aid for the devastated area, or non-germane
amendments added to the legislation rather than opposition to disaster assistance
funding itself.
Roles of the U.S. Government and Private Sector in
Humanitarian Aid Delivery20
Most development and humanitarian assistance activities are not directly
implemented by U.S. government personnel but by private sector entities, either nonprofit
or commercial. Generally speaking, government foreign service and civil
servants determine the direction and priorities of the aid program, allocate funds
while keeping within congressional requirements, ensure that appropriate projects are
in place to meet aid objectives, select implementors, and monitor the implementation
of those projects for effectiveness and financial accountability. At one time, USAID
professionals played a larger role in implementing aid programs, but the affect of
budget cuts on personnel and the emergence of private sector alternatives over the
past thirty years has led to a shift in responsibilities. Private sector aid implementors,
usually employed as contractors or grantees, may be individual “personal service
contractors,” consulting firms, non-profit NGOs, universities, or charitable PVOs.
These currently carry out the vast array of aid projects in all sectors.
International Humanitarian Assistance
The complex humanitarian emergency has emerged as a category of crisis that
can be defined in different ways. It can be viewed according to the situation on the
ground — scale and intensity of population dislocation, destruction of social
networks/community and infrastructure, insecurity of civilians and noncombatants,
human rights abuses; by the complexity of the response needed to address these
problems; or by the multi-causal factors that may have contributed to the escalation
of conflict in the first place.
Beginning in the 1990s, crisis operations increased in war-torn countries and
regions throughout the world along with the numbers of those providing relief,
primarily humanitarian organizations and international actors. Multinational military
forces also served a greater peacekeeping role in these internal wars. The media
added a new measure of influence to the response to such crises in the form of greater
access and live reporting. In these situations the plight of the refugee21 was one
CRS-12
21 (...continued)
protection provided under international law.
22 A direct result of internal wars, the internally displaced are also seeking asylum but within
their state’s borders. IDPs do not have the same protection as refugees under international
law. The plight of this group has gained international recognition as a problem that needs
to be addressed. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has often been
involved in providing assistance for IDPs.
23 As one of its functions, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) tracks worldwide contributions to disasters. See [http://www.reliefweb.int]. Also,
see [http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/] for
USAID’s OFDA webpage. Relief Web is a good source of information, although the
accuracy is not guaranteed. See [http://www.reliefweb.int].
critical element of population movement; the internally displaced person (IDP)
became another.22 Conducting a humanitarian operation in areas of conflict often
means that access to populations in need and the distribution of emergency relief
supplies is hampered by security concerns, not only for those needing assistance but
for humanitarian personnel as well.
The United States responds with varying amounts of relief and recovery
assistance, typically in coordination with its international partners. The sheer number
of players in the field, including a range of actors and interests, creates a complicated
coordination challenge and often contributes to duplication of efforts or competition
over the same sources of money and projects. Those involved may include, for
example, numerous U.N. agencies, other international organizations (IOs), bilateral
and multilateral donors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). International
actors provide relief either through financial contributions to the government of the
affected country or aid organizations, or by directly providing relief supplies and
emergency personnel. Local, regional, and national authorities may also have a role
in the provision of assistance, law enforcement and access control. It is important to
note that local aid organizations may be critical because they often know the terrain,
the available resources, and the community, whereas the international community
may bring to bear greater resources and coordinating capacity.
While the relief operation itself is often daunting in terms of the demands of
those in need — from life saving action required to the provision of food and shelter
under harsh physical conditions — the response system has many moving parts. The
United Nations works with a wide number and variety of aid organizations and
donors. Within the U.N. system, in addition to the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Health
Organization (WHO), the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP)
all contribute to efforts to respond to a crisis.23 OCHA also coordinates with IOs
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), and NGOs such as the International Rescue
Committee (IRC), CARE, Mercy Corps and perhaps hundreds of others, many of
which are implementing partners and provide much of the operational support on the
ground. In addition, other internationals — governments, militaries,
CRS-13
24 “What Can we Learn from Year of Disasters?” December 29, 2005, Reuters AlertNet,
[http://www.alertnet.org].
25 Department of Defense humanitarian assistance for use in post-emergency disaster
situations includes Sections 401 and 2547 of Title 10, which have already been discussed.
intergovernmental entities such as the European Union — are often part of the
response network.
A key determinant in the response to humanitarian emergencies is, not
surprisingly, level of prior planning, including the identification of responders —
local, national, or international — and their level of preparedness. Furthermore, it
is widely recognized that in many crises, it is the people who are least able to help
themselves — those who are poor and those who have few, if any, options to live
elsewhere — who are most affected.24 Experts continue to emphasize the
importance of drawing on lessons learned from responses to previous crises and
disasters. Some of the ongoing challenges include communication between the
government, aid agencies, and the public; coordination among emergency responders;
civil-military cooperation and division of duties; and the planning and logistics
involved in providing aid to less accessible, often more insecure, areas.
Sources of Post-Disaster and
Post-Conflict Assistance
After the emergency is over, reconstruction or recovery aid is provided through
other channels, such as the regular bilateral country development programs of
USAID or in some cases, through the USAID/OTI, funded as part of the disaster
response account. USAID/OTI may be involved in providing assistance to countries
that are in a stage of transition from man-made crisis to recovery. OTI focuses on
areas such as demobilizing and reemploying military combatants, and furthering
democratic governance such as supporting elections and building judicial systems.
USAID/OFDA also includes disaster prevention within its budget. The Prevention,
Mitigation, Preparedness, and Planning Division has helped countries and regions
minimize the damage and loss of life in repeated natural disasters. USAID/FFP aid
is also available for non-emergency humanitarian aid. Title II contains provisions
for providing non-emergency development food aid. This program can be used in the
transition period after a disaster for reconstruction purposes. Titles III and Section
416 (b) of the 1949 Agriculture act support longer-term development aid.25
Title 10 includes two sections that are used to provide longer-term humanitarian
assistance, but are not normally useful in fast moving emergencies. Section 401
allows the use of U.S. military personnel to carry out humanitarian and civic
activities in conjunction with military operations (these are usually training
exercises). These activities must complement, not duplicate, any other social or
economic assistance provided, and must be approved by the Secretary of State.
Services can include medical, dental, and veterinary care, construction and repair of
rudimentary roads and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities, and
well-drilling and construction of basic sanitary facilities. There are conditions on
CRS-14
26 For more information on debt relief issues, see CRS Report RS22534, The Multilateral
Debt Relief Initiative, by Martin A. Weiss.
27 Elizabeth Becker, “No New Funds Needed For Relief, Bush Aides Say,” New York Times,
January 4, 2005.
assistance regarding land mines. This provision requires an annual report to
Congress.
Section 2557 authorizes the donation of non-lethal excess property, such as
trucks. It can include any item of excess property except weapons, ammunition, or
other items designed to inflict harm. Both of these sections are used for later stage
recovery programs or transition programs aimed at restoring a country to the
development path.
Although not a focus of this report, debt relief, or at least a temporary
moratorium on debt repayment has also become part of the U.S. and international
response to disasters in heavily indebted developing countries. In 1997,
industrialized countries participating in the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
Trust Fund agreed to include special consideration for countries emerging from
disaster.26
Issues for the 110th Congress
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities
Amid efforts to tackle rising budget deficits by, among other measures, slowing
or reducing discretionary spending or finding the resources to sustain U.S. aid
pledges may be difficult. After the 2004 tsunami disaster, some Members of
Congress publicly expressed concern that funding for tsunami relief and
reconstruction, which depleted most worldwide disaster contingency accounts, could
jeopardize resources for subsequent international disasters or for other aid priorities
from which tsunami emergency aid had been transferred.27 These accounts were fully
restored through supplemental appropriations. At the time, others noted the
substantial size of American private donations for tsunami victims and argued that
because of other budget pressures, the United States government did not need to
transfer additional aid beyond what was already pledged. The point remains,
however, that when disasters require immediate emergency relief, the Administration
may fund pledges by depleting most worldwide disaster accounts. In order to
respond to future humanitarian crises, however, these resources would need to be
replenished. If not replenished, U.S. capacity to respond to other emergencies could
be curtailed.
CRS-15
28 Although the United States is the world’s largest provider of overall foreign assistance
(which includes humanitarian assistance) in absolute terms, it is often one of the lowest
contributors among developed countries when measured as a percentage of its economic
capacity. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the United States provided 0.16% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2004 for
Overseas Disaster Assistance (ODA). By comparison the average of major donors is 0.25%.
The percentages for other major donors are as follows: Japan (0.19%), the United Kingdom
(0.36%), France (0.42%), and Germany (0.28%).
29 Relief Web is a good source of information, although the accuracy is not guaranteed. See
[http://www.reliefweb.int]. Obtaining an exact up-to-date record of all international
contributions in response to an ongoing disaster is often not possible — in part because
some assistance is not reported to governments or coordinating agencies — and in part
because of the delay in their recording.
30 This fund should not be confused with the Commander’s Emergency Response Fund, or
CERP. This is a program initiated by DOD that allows commanders in the field to provide
resources immediately to support local needs and projects.
31 Resolution A/RES/60/124 was approved by consensus at the General Assembly on
December 15, 2005. See [http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=2101]. Also see
(continued...)
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue
Both Congress and the Administration also encourage other countries to provide
disaster assistance.28 It is not always evident whether figures listing donor amounts
represent pledges of support or more specific obligations.29 Pledges made by
governments do not always result in actual contributions — the earthquake of
December 2003 in Bam, Iran, is but one example used by the United Nations.
Billions of dollars were pledged to help the victims of the 2004 tsunami disaster in
the Indian Ocean, but there is skepticism over whether all these pledges will ever be
honored. It also cannot be assumed that the funds committed to relief actually
represent new contributions, since the money may previously have been allocated
elsewhere. It also takes time for a more complete picture to reveal how the actual
costs of a disaster will be shared among international donors. Comparing USG and
international aid is also difficult because of the often dramatically different forms the
assistance takes (in-kind contributions vs. cash, for instance).
Finding a balance between burdensharing on the one hand and donor fatigue on
the other often results in delay and can negatively impact relief operations during
emergencies when immediate funds are required for a response. Some experts are
concerned about funding priorities and the ongoing need for resources for other
disaster areas.
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
One approach to the donor fatigue problem is the Central Emergency Response
Fund (CERF).30 As part of the United Nations’ reform process, in March 2006, the
CERF was launched based on several earlier resolutions approved by the U.N.
General Assembly to strengthen the United Nations’ capacity to respond to natural
disasters and humanitarian emergencies.31 As an international, multilateral funding
CRS-16
31 (...continued)
[http://cerf.un.org] and United Nations General Assembly Resolutions: A/RES/46/182
(December 19, 1991) and A/RES/56/107 (February 7, 2002).
32 See [http://cerf.un.org] for more detailed information on CERF.
33 “New UN Disaster Relief Fund has Committed Over $170 million Since March,” UN
News Centre, September 29, 2006 and [http://ochaonline2.un.org/Default.aspx?tabid=7480].
34 Edward Clay, “Lessons for Life,” The Guardian Review, January 12, 2005.
mechanism, the CERF aims to focus on early intervention, timely response, and
increased capacity and support to underfunded crises. The CERF will have a grant
facility of up to $450 million and a loan facility of up to $50 million. The funds
come from voluntary contributions by member states and from the private sector.
A high-level conference was held in New York on December 7, 2006. The
focus of the meeting was on progress to date and fundraising.32 As of December 13,
nearly $300 million had been pledged and contributed to the CERF for 2006, with
$230 million committed to projects. The United States reportedly committed $10
million.33 To date, fifty one donors have pledged a total of $345 million for 2007.
The CERF is seen by proponents as a way to enable the United Nations to
respond more efficiently, effectively, and consistently to humanitarian crises
worldwide. Others also believe that U.S. support for this idea is critical to sustaining
momentum for donor contributions and continued support for the disaster relief fund.
Transparency and Efficacy
Some Members of Congress have also raised concerns about transparency of
donor contributions, allocation of monies, and monitoring of projects by the United
Nations. The United Nations is improving its financial tracking and reporting
system. In responding to international disasters, many contributions are also made
directly to IOs and NGOs, which could raise the same questions about transparency
requirements. Moreover, while earmarks and time limits may ensure greater
accountability, they can also add pressure for organizations to spend contributed
funds, sometimes leading to unnecessary spending, waste and duplicated efforts.
Restrictions on use of funds also often do not allow flexibility to adapt projects to
better meet the changing needs on the ground.34
Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance
The provision of humanitarian assistance also raises the potential for unexpected
consequences. First, it is important to examine whether humanitarian assistance is
going to those for whom it is intended. Evaluating and tracking provision of supplies
is difficult during a conflict and impossible to completely control. Second, there is
the role of the NGO, including its mission and sources of funding, in what has
become a major independent enterprise in conflict areas. There is the potential for
misuse, intended or unintended, which may require closer analysis of the
performance of providers. Third, the safety and protection of refugees, IDPs, and
humanitarian workers is another important issue. A growing number of humanitarian
CRS-17
workers in various parts of the world have been put at great risk or lost their lives in
providing humanitarian assistance. The degree to which a security force protects
humanitarian relief workers and parties to the conflict will have some bearing on who
is in charge, the security measures taken and provided, and the perception of whether
the humanitarian community has taken sides in the conflict. Fourth, there is the
question raised by some experts as to whether the provision of humanitarian
assistance is helpful — particularly in cases where there is no consensus on how or
when to intervene but only on the need to demonstrate action. Some question
whether humanitarian assistance in some instances actually prolongs conflict.
Links to Broader Foreign Policy Goals
Political considerations play a role in the way assistance is given and to whom.
The images of human suffering portrayed by the media only reinforce the need to do
something. Humanitarian assistance carries some weight as an instrument of
“neutral” intervention in crisis and is the most flexible policy tool that can be quickly
brought to bear in a crisis. It can buy time and keep options opens and may be an
avenue to achieve minimal consensus. Sometimes the easiest decision in terms of
finding a path of least resistance, humanitarian assistance can also expand beyond its
immediate function. It may provide the means to maintain some form of contact with
a country/region, or mitigate tensions over policy towards a region within the U.S.
government or with and among its allies. Humanitarian assistance often means doing
something to avert a crisis, to provide support to allies, and to maintain a presence
in the region. How it is used and whether it becomes more of a strategic, policy tool
depends upon the situation, what other governments are doing, and the degree to
which the United States has further interest in the region. In addition, it raises
questions about implications for future action. On the one hand, if the United States
decides to reduce its humanitarian support, would this diminish its standing among
its allies or affect its interests in other ways? On the other hand, since the President
has a great deal of flexibility over U.S. involvement, once commitment to a
humanitarian effort is made, does this make the long-term U.S. participation in
reconstruction and political solutions more likely? Regardless, it is clear that as
crises proliferate, the level and sources of U.S. humanitarian assistance will
inevitably have an important impact not only on the relief operation itself, but on
broader foreign policy goals

Department of Homeland Security Grants to State and Local Governments: FY2003 to FY2006

2007-01-11T12:30:00.000-08:00

Order Code RL33770
Department of Homeland Security Grants to State
December 22, 2006
Steven Maguire
Analyst in Public Finance
Government and Finance Division
Shawn Reese
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Summary
This report analyzes federal grants to state and local governments that are
administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These grants, which
are allocated primarily at the discretion of DHS, are intended to enhance homeland
security.
This report summarizes seven DHS grant programs — the State Homeland
Security Grant Program (SHSGP), the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), the
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG), the Metropolitan Medical
Response System (MMRS), the Citizen Corps Program (CCP), and the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Program (CIP — funded only in FY2003). These seven
DHS programs were chosen for analysis because the allocations were made to state
and local governments, not to private individuals or entities. These seven programs
accounted for $1.85 billion in FY2006.
The report also provides a state-by-state analysis of state and local spending on
public safety more generally. The homeland security grants described in this report
are likely included in the public safety categories of spending as reported by the states
and tabulated by the U.S. Census Bureau. The federal grants identified in this report
are a relatively small portion of overall public safety spending, ranging from 0.48%
in Virginia to a maximum of 5.6% in North Dakota.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
DHS State and Local Assistance Programs: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
State Homeland Security Grant Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Urban Area Security Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Critical Infrastructure Protection Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Metropolitan Medical Response System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Citizen Corps Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Evolution of Grant Allocation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Risk and Threat Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Congressional Response to FY2006 Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Federal Goals and State and Local Spending
on Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
State and Local Spending on Public Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Implications for Homeland Security Grant Program Allocations . . . . 16
Methodological Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. DHS Homeland Security Grants: Funding for FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. FY2003-FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Allocation Methods . . . . . 12
Table 3. State and Local Spending on Public Safety, Selected Measures . . . . . 18
Table A. State Allocations of Office of Grants and Training Homeland
Security Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1 Community Oriented Policing Services and Justice Assistance Grants, within the
Department of Justice, provide funding for numerous public safety activities that may not
be considered as part of homeland security.
2 For more on the Firefighter Grant Program, see CRS Report RS21302, Assistance to
Firefighters Program, by Len Kruger. The appropriation for the program for FY2007 was
$662 million. For information on the distribution of grants among the states, see CRS
Report RL32341, Assistance to Firefighters Program: Distribution of Fire Grant Funding,
by Len Kruger.
3 Among the states (i.e., excluding the District of Columbia), the mean is 1.39%; the median
(continued...)
Department of Homeland Security Grants to
State and Local Governments: FY2003 to
FY2006
Introduction
This report summarizes seven programs that make homeland security grants to
states and selected local governments, and it analyzes the distribution of those grants
from FY2003 through FY2006. The seven grant programs, which are identified
below, are administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
are designed to help elected state and local general-purpose governments enhance
their homeland security capabilities.
The report does not include all federal assistance programs with homeland
security or public safety components. It does not include such programs as
Community Oriented Policing Services and Justice Assistance Grants.1 Nor does it
include discretionary grants intended for such critical infrastructure sectors as ports,
rail and intercity bus systems, trucking, and buffer zone protection; these grants are
not allocated to elected, general-purpose state and local governments, but to private,
non-governmental, or special-purpose governmental organizations. Finally, the report
does not cover the Firefighter Grant Program because its grants are made not to
general-purpose governments, but directly to individual fire departments, be they
municipal or volunteer, and because the grant allocation method is different.2
The discussion that follows first summarizes the seven programs — their intent,
eligible recipients, and eligible activities — and then reviews the evolution of the
methods DHS has used to allocate funds in those programs. Finally, the report
examines how important the grants are in overall public safety spending by the state
and local governments that receive the grants. The rough estimates resulting from this
CRS analysis suggest that the DHS homeland security grants are relatively small
when compared to the level of recent state public safety expenditures. The ratio of
grant amounts to total state public safety spending averages 1.39%,3 and ranges from
CRS-2
3 (...continued)
is 1.0%.
4 The District of Columbia, with grants representing 6.74% of total public safety spending,
is greater than North Dakota, but is a special case because it is not a state and is home to the
federal government.
5 The Office for Domestic Preparedness was transferred to DHS in FY2003 (P.L. 107-296),
and renamed the Office of Grants and Training, within DHS, in FY2006.
6 The State Domestic Preparedness Program was renamed and transferred to DHS in
FY2003 (P.L. 107-296). Funded at the time of transfer through appropriations for FY2003
(P.L. 108-7 and P.L. 108-11).
7 Transferred to DHS in FY2003 (P.L. 107-296). Funded at the time of transfer through
appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7 and P.L. 108-11).
8 Transferred to DHS in FY2003 (P.L. 107-296).
9 Funded at the time of transfer through DHS appropriations for FY2004 (P.L. 108-90).
10 Funded at the time of transfer through appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7 and P.L.
108-11).
11 Funded only in FY2003 through appropriations for that year (P.L. 108-7 and P.L. 108-11).
12 Funded at the time of transfer through appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7 and P.L.
108-11).
approximately 0.5% in Virginia to approximately 5.6% in North Dakota.4 The ratio
is less than 1% in 23 states, less than 2% in 41 states, and less than 3% in 46 states.
DHS State and Local Assistance Programs: An Overview
Before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent creation of
DHS, state and local governments were eligible for three grants pertinent to
homeland security: the State Domestic Preparedness Program (SDPP) administered
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) through the Office for Domestic Preparedness
(ODP),5 the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) Program
administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) administered by the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS). These three grant programs were
subsequently augmented with the funding of four more homeland security grant
programs. To date, the seven programs are
! State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) — formerly
called the State Domestic Preparedness Program (SDPP),6
! Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG),7
! Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS),8
! Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP),9
! Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI),10
! Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIP),11 and
! Citizen Corps Program (CCP).12
CRS-3
13 Only metropolitan medical systems, however, are eligible for MMRS grants.
14 Congress appropriated the FY2007 amounts for these programs in P.L. 109-295, but DHS
has yet to allocate funds to states, urban areas, and U.S. insular areas. When DHS
announces these allocations, this report will be updated.
15 P.L. 107-56, Sec. 1014(a).
16 P.L. 107-56, Sec. 1014 (b).
States; the District of Columbia; U.S. insular areas; and certain high-risk, high-threat
urban areas are eligible for one or more of these programs.13 Funding for the seven
programs for FY2006 is shown in Table 1, below.
Table 1. DHS Homeland Security Grants: Funding for FY200614
DHS Program
FY2006 Funding
Amount
($millions)
Share of
Total
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) $711 38.4%
State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) $528 28.5%
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) $384 20.8%
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) $179 9.7%
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) $29 1.6%
Citizen Corps Program (CCP) $19 1.0%
Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIP) $0 0.0%
Total $1,850 100.0%
Source: P.L. 109-90 (FY2006 DHS Appropriations).
Funds for five of the seven programs — SHSGP, LETPP, CIP, EMPG, and
CCP — are appropriated and allocated among the states in accord with the provisions
of the USA PATRIOT Act, which says that states are to use the grants
in conjunction with units of local government, to enhance the capability of
State and local jurisdictions to prepare for and respond to terrorist acts
including events of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction and
biological, nuclear, radiological, incendiary, chemical, and explosive
devices.15
The act also says, “Grants under this section may be used to purchase needed
equipment and to provide training and technical assistance to State and local first
responders.”16
The act goes on to authorize appropriations for FY2002 through FY2007 and
sets a minimum allocation to states and territories:
Each State shall be allocated in each fiscal year under this section not less
than 0.75 percent of the total amount appropriated in the fiscal year for
grants pursuant to this section, except that the United States Virgin Islands,
CRS-4
17 P.L. 107-56, Sec. 1014(c).
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Grants and Training, Fiscal Year 2006
Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance and Application Kit (Washington:
2005), p. 2.
19 Ibid.
America Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands each shall be
allocated 0.25 percent.17
The other two programs — UASI and MMRS — provide grants allocated to
certain urban areas and metropolitan medical systems entirely at the discretion of
DHS. The only constraint on departmental administrative discretion is the budget
authority appropriated for the programs for each fiscal year.
Over the years, the DHS method of allocating discretionary grant amounts has
changed. Table 2 traces the grant allocation method for each of the programs for
each fiscal year since FY2003. Table A in the appendix presents the funding for
each program for FY2003 through FY2006, by state. Table A also presents the per
capita amounts for each state and the growth rate over the four-year period. A
description of the programs and their objectives follows below.
Within DHS, the Office of Grants and Training (G&T) administers these
homeland security assistance grants for state and local governments. The grants help
such state and local entities as law enforcement agencies, fire departments,
emergency medical services, hospitals, and emergency managers prepare for, prevent,
mitigate, and respond to manmade or natural disasters.
Although DHS appropriations for FY2007 have been passed and signed by
the President (P.L. 109-295), as of this writing, DHS had not made the FY2007
allocations. Accordingly, the most recent information on program allocations is for
FY2006. That amount for each program is shown in italics below. This report will
be updated when DHS announces the FY2007 allocations.
State Homeland Security Grant Program. ($528 million for FY2006)
SHSGP provides assistance to state and local entities to prepare for terrorist attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It authorizes purchase of
specialized equipment to enhance state and local agencies’ capability in preventing
and responding to WMD incidents and other terrorist incidents, and provides funds
for protecting critical infrastructure of national importance. This program provides
funds for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating terrorism response
exercises; developing and conducting counter-terrorism training programs; and
updating and implementing each state’s Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS).18
Funds from this program may also be used to plan, design, develop, conduct,
and evaluate exercises that train first responders, and to assess the readiness of state
and local jurisdictions to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. Exercises must be
threat- and performance-based, in accordance with G&T’s Homeland Security
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) manuals.19 Allowable training costs
include establishment of new training programs within existing training academies,
CRS-5
20 Ibid., p. 3.
21 Ibid., p. 2.
22 The percentage is based on the total spending in the seven programs analyzed in this
report.
23 P.L. 108-90, Title III.
universities, and junior colleges.20 In accordance with their approved homeland
security plans, states must allocate 80% of the grant funds to localities. There is no
state or local matching fund requirement for this program.
States are the only authorized applicants, with the following state and local
entities eligible to receive and use funding:
! emergency management agencies or offices,
! homeland security agencies or offices,
! fire departments,
! law enforcement agencies,
! emergency medical services,
! hazardous material-handling personnel,
! public works agencies,
! public health agencies,
! governmental administrative agencies or offices, and
! public safety communication agencies or offices.21
This program represented 28.5% of federal grants to state and local
governments for public safety analyzed here for FY2006.22 Since FY2003, however,
SHSGP allocations have declined 74.4%, due to the reduction in appropriations for
the program. In FY2003, just over $2 billion was distributed, or roughly $7.18 per
capita. In FY2006, the per capita spending was $1.78. The total spending under the
SHSGP over the FY2003 to FY2006 period has been $5.34 billion, or over half of
the total amount provided through these seven grant programs.
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. ($384 million for
FY2006) In FY2004 DHS appropriations, Congress directed DHS to establish a local
law enforcement terrorism prevention program for states and localities.23 LETPP
provides funds to support activities to establish and enhance state and local law
enforcement efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. In accordance with
their approved homeland security plans, states must allocate 80% of the grant funds
to localities.
Authorized program activities include the following:
! information sharing to preempt terrorist attacks,
! target hardening to reduce vulnerability of identified high value
targets,
! recognition of potential or actual threats, and
! interdiction of terrorists and terrorist cells.
CRS-6
24 S.Rept. 108-86 to accompany P.L. 108-334.
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Grants and Training, Fiscal Year 2006
Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance and Application Kit, p. 2.
26 Ibid.
Approved costs for the program include, but are not limited to, personnel
costs (overtime as approved by the state administering agency), equipment, computer
systems, and related expenses.24 State and local law enforcement entities are eligible
to receive funding from this program. There is no matching requirement for this
program.
This program represented almost 20.8% of federal assistance to state and
local governments through the programs analyzed here for FY2006. Since FY2004,
the first year of the program, LETPP allocations have declined 23.2%. In FY2004,
$500 million was distributed, or roughly $1.72 per capita. In FY2006, the per capita
spending was $1.30. Over the FY2003 to FY2006 window, $1.27 billion has been
allocated through this program.
Urban Area Security Initiative. ($711 million for FY2006) UASI is a
discretionary program that provides funding to high-risk, high-threat urban areas
(including counties and mutual aid partners), to prepare for, prevent, and respond to
terrorist incidents.
The identified high-risk, high-threat urban areas are authorized to use funds
to purchase specialized WMD equipment, plan and execute exercises, pay first
responder overtime costs associated with heightened Homeland Security Advisory
System threat levels, and train first responders. Additionally, funds from this
program can be used for port and mass transit security, radiological defense systems,
pilot projects, and technical assistance.25
The DHS Secretary determines which urban areas are to receive funding, and
the following local entities are eligible to receive funding:
! emergency management agencies or offices,
! homeland security agencies or offices,
! fire departments,
! law enforcement agencies,
! emergency medical services,
! hazardous material-handling personnel,
! public works agencies,
! public health agencies,
! governmental administrative agencies or offices, and
! public safety communication agencies or offices.26
In FY2003, the UASI program distributed $596 billion, or $2.07 per capita,
to 29 metropolitan areas. Unlike the first two programs, UASI grants increased over
19% from FY2003 to FY2006. Nationally, per capita spending increased to $2.40,
but because more metropolitan areas were included in the eligible list of recipients
CRS-7
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Fiscal Year
2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance and Application Kit,
Part II (Washington: 2003), Annex A.
28 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Grants and Training, Fiscal Year 2006
Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance and Application Kit, p. 2.
in FY2006 (46 metropolitan areas), many individual metropolitan areas actually
realized a decline in per capita allocations. In addition, the FY2006 amount was
roughly $139 million less than the FY2005 allocations. Nevertheless, over the
FY2003 to FY2006 budget window, over $2.8 billion has been distributed through
the UASI program. This amount represents about 27% of the total aid distributed
through these programs.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Program. (Program expired) As part
of the FY2003 SHSGP, funding was provided to pay for costs associated with
increased security measures at critical infrastructure sites during the invasion of Iraq
(March 17, 2003, to April 16, 2003) and future periods of heightened threat. States
and localities were to consider critical infrastructure to include any system or asset
an attack on which would result in catastrophic loss of life or catastrophic economic
loss. States and localities were to consider some of the following types of
infrastructure:
! public water systems,
! data storage and processing facilities,
! chemical facilities,
! major power generation facilities,
! rail and highway bridges,
! natural gas transmission pipelines,
! petroleum handling facilities, and
! mass transit subway systems.27
CIP was funded with a total of $200 million in FY2003. The base amount for
each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico was 0.75%, and U.S. insular
areas received a base of 0.25%. DHS, given the discretion to allocate the remainder,
used the jurisdiction’s portion of the U.S. population as the basis for allocation. The
CIP program was in place for FY2003 only and represented 6.5% of total grants to
state and local governments in that year.
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program. ($179
million for FY2006) EMPG is designed to assist in the development, maintenance,
and improvement of state and local emergency management capabilities. It provides
support to state and local governments to achieve measurable results in key
functional areas of emergency management.28 The distribution of funds from states
to localities is at the discretion of each state’s EMPG administering agency, typically
the state emergency management agency or office. The state matching requirement
for the program is 50%.
EMPG funds are used for emergency management personnel costs, travel,
training, supplies, and other routine expenditures for emergency management
CRS-8
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
“MMRS Fact Sheet,” available at [http://mmrs.fema.gov/main/events/mmrsfactsheet.aspx].
32 For additional information on the MMRS, see CRS Report RL31719, An Overview of the
U.S. Public Health System in the Context of Emergency Preparedness, by Sarah A. Lister.
activities. Funds for the program may also be used for consequence management
preparedness projects and programs that develop and improve the capabilities of
states and localities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents.29
States may use the funds provided through EMPG to structure their individual
emergency management programs based on identified needs and priorities for
strengthening emergency management capabilities. States may also use EMPG funds
to develop intrastate emergency management systems that encourage partnership
building among government, business, and volunteer and community organizations.30
In FY2006, EMPG grants accounted for 9.7% of total DHS grants to state and
local governments, approximately $0.61 per capita. In FY2003, EMPG grants totaled
$165 million, or $0.57 per capita. From FY2003 to FY2006, EMPG grants increased
8.7%, and $692 million has been allocated.
Metropolitan Medical Response System. ($29 million for FY2006)
The MMRS program assists DHS-selected jurisdictions with funding to develop
plans and training, and conduct exercises related to terrorist attacks. Funding is
intended to enhance jurisdictions’ capability in responding to WMD mass casualty
events. Additionally, the program is used to prepare identified jurisdictions for mass
casualty incidents involving hazardous materials, epidemic disease outbreaks, or
natural disasters. The program intends to promote coordination among first
responders, medical treatment resources, public health officials, emergency
management offices, volunteer organizations, and other local entities to reduce the
catastrophic effects of a terrorist attack. Program funding is awarded in three
categories:
! Capability Focus: Prepares localities to respond to WMD threats;
! Sustainment Focus: Provides funding for planning, training, and
equipment needed to maintain a locality’s capability to respond to
human health needs in the event of a mass casualty incident; and
! Special Project Focus: Provides funding for innovative solutions to
local issues and publicizes their applicability to localities across the
nation.31
In FY2006, the MMRS allocation was 31.9% less than the allocation in
FY2003 of $42.29 million. The FY2006 amount was just 1.6% of the total amount
of grants awarded to state and local governments. On a per capita basis, the
allocation has dropped from $0.15 to $0.10.32
CRS-9
33 U.S. President Bush, “Establishing the USA Freedom Corps,” Executive Order 13254,
Federal Register, vol. 67, Feb. 1, 2002, Sec. 1, p. 4869.
34 Besides CERT, the other Citizen Corps Programs include Volunteers in Police Service,
Enhanced Neighborhood Watch, and Medical Response Corps.
Citizen Corps Program. ($19 million for FY2006) On January 29, 2002,
President Bush issued an executive order establishing the USA Freedom Corps.33
The USA Freedom Corps’ mission is to increase opportunities for citizens to
participate in their communities by expanding and enhancing public service. Within
the USA Freedom Corps, the Citizen Corps Program was created to coordinate
volunteer organizations with the mission to make local communities safe and
prepared to respond to any emergency situation. Community Emergency Response
Teams (CERT) is the only program that the Citizen Corps administers that funds
volunteer first responders.34
CERT trains citizens to be prepared to respond to emergency situations in
their own local communities. CERTs are groups of volunteers within communities
who are trained by professional first responders to assist in the event of a manmade
or natural disaster. CERT volunteers give support to first responders, provide
immediate assistance to victims, and organize spontaneous volunteers at a disaster
site. The program authorizes the funding to provide training to CERT volunteers.
This is the smallest of the seven programs analyzed here. In FY2003, $18.8
million was dedicated to the Citizen Corps Program, or approximately 0.6% of all
grants in that year. In FY2006, the Citizen Corps Program was allocated 1.0% of the
total grants awarded, and the FY2006 CCP allocation was 2.2% more than in
FY2003.
Evolution of Grant Allocation Methods
Congress gave DHS a considerable degree of discretion to allocate homeland
security grants among eligible states and urban areas. As noted in Table 2, the only
constraints on that discretion are
! the total amounts appropriated for any given fiscal year;
! instructions in the USA PATRIOT Act setting minimum grant
amounts ( applicable to the SHSGP, LETPP, CIP, EMPG, and CCP
programs); and
! an appropriations act (P.L. 108-334, Title III) instruction for FY2005
directing DHS to allocate the remainder for SHSGP, LETPP,
EMPG, and CCP as it had done in FY2004 (i.e., in direct proportion
to state population).
Within those constraints, the DHS method for allocating SHSGP, LETPP,
EMPG, and CCP funds remaining after state and territorial minimums are met has
evolved to reflect the department’s calculations of risk, need, and the homeland
security capacities of grant recipients. Table 2 traces the annual steps in this
evolution.
CRS-10
35 FY2006 HSGP Fact Sheet, Allocation Methodology.
36 Tracy Henke, DHS, Assistant Secretary for Grants and Training, Press Release, May 31,
2006.
In FY2003, the first year of the grant programs, DHS chose to allocate the
remainder for SHSGP, CIP, EMPG, and CCP in proportion to the state’s population.
In FY2004, the department used the same method for all those programs except CIP,
which was not funded after FY2003. In FY2005, the appropriations act for that year
directed DHS once again to allocate the remainder in proportion to population. In
FY2006, however, for SHSGP and LETPP, DHS decided to evaluate and score
homeland security grant applications on the basis of risk and the expected
effectiveness of the applicant’s proposed solutions to identified homeland security
needs. DHS allocated two-thirds of the remainder using its risk and threat
assessments and scoring system. It allocated one-third of the remainder based on
how well the state’s application demonstrated state capacity to effectively use federal
homeland security assistance.
From FY2003 through FY2006, DHS has allocated UASI grants at its own
discretion. From FY2003 through FY2005, the allocations of UASI grants were
based on risk and threat assessments. In FY2006, DHS chose to allocate two-thirds
of each UASI grant based on risk and threat assessments and one-third based on how
well applications demonstrated the ability to effectively use federal homeland
security assistance (see Table 2).
As with grants to states, DHS reasoned that using the effectiveness
component rewards “the significant efforts undertaken by applicants in presenting
effective solutions.”35
Risk and Threat Assessment. According to DHS, the degree of risk is
determined (or measured) using three variables: threat, consequences, and
vulnerability.36 DHS further evaluates the risk associated with specific assets and
geographic attributes using these variables. Shopping malls and airports are
examples of assets, and gross domestic product (GDP) and ratio of law enforcement
to population are examples of geographic attributes. DHS adds the score for asset
risk to the score for geographic attribute risk to arrive at total risk. DHS describes
the two risk measures as complementary, though asset risk and geographic attribute
risk arguably overlap. For example, the GDP of a location (a “geographic attribute”)
and the number and value of assets are likely highly correlated. Thus, adding the two
risk measures would tend to overvalue total risk.
Congressional Response to FY2006 Allocations
DHS was criticized after the most recent allocation announcement, in part
because most jurisdictions received considerably less than in past years. In addition,
a new factor, effectiveness of proposed spending, was considered in this round
(FY2006) of allocations. Less effective proposals, as determined by a peer review
process, received less than they would have otherwise. What is unclear to many is
whether there exists a risk threshold where effectiveness would be irrelevant. For
example, if a jurisdiction submitted an ineffective plan for protecting a high risk
CRS-11
target, should the federal government fully fund an alternative mitigation strategy
based on peer recommendations?
DHS was also criticized for not providing enough guidance to the state and
local governments applying for grants. For more on DHS’s allocation methods and
issues, see CRS Report RL33583, Homeland Security Grants: Evolution of Program
Guidance and Grant Allocation Methods, by Shawn Reese.
CRS-12
Table 2. FY2003-FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Allocation Methods
Program FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006*
SHSGP Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-7,
P.L. 108-11]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the remainder
of total SHSGP appropriations in
direct proportion to the state’s
percentage of the nation’s population.
[FY2003 SHSGP Program Guidance
and Application Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-90,
Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the remainder
of total SHSGP appropriations in
direct proportion to the state’s
percentage of the nation’s population.
[FY2004 SHSGP Program Guidance
and Application Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Congress required DHS to
allocate the remainder of total
appropriations in the same
manner as in FY2004. [P.L. 108-
334, Title III]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 109-
90, Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the
remainder of total SHSGP
appropriations based on risk and the
effectiveness of the state’s proposed
solutions to identified homeland
security needs. [FY2006 HSGP
Program Guidance and Application
Kit]
LETPP NA Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-90,
Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the remainder
of total LETPP appropriations in direct
proportion to the state’s percentage of
the nation’s population. [FY2004
SHSGP Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Congress required DHS to
allocate the remainder of total
appropriations in the same
manner as in FY2004. [P.L. 108-
334, Title III]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 109-
90, Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the
remainder of total LETPP
appropriations based on risk and the
effectiveness of the state’s proposed
solution to identified homeland
security needs. [FY2006 HSGP
Program Guidance and Application
Kit]
CRS-13
Program FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006*
UASI Guaranteed Amount
NA
Remainder of Appropriations
Allocation of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-7,
P.L. 108-11]
DHS Implementation
DHS allocated UASI funds based on
the following indicators of risk:
credible threat, presence of critical
infrastructure, vulnerability,
population, population density, law
enforcement investigative and
enforcement activity, and the existence
of formal mutual aid agreements
among jurisdictions.[FY2003 UASI
Program Guidance and Application
Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
NA
Remainder of Appropriations
Allocation of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-90,
Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS allocated UASI funds based on
the following indicators of risk:
credible threat, presence of critical
infrastructure, vulnerability,
population, population density, law
enforcement investigative and
enforcement activity, and the existence
of formal mutual aid agreements
among jurisdictions.[FY2004 UASI
Program Guidance and Application
Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
NA
Remainder of Appropriations
Allocation of total appropriations
at the discretion of DHS. [P.L.
108-334, Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS allocated UASI funds based
on the following indicators of
risk: credible threat, presence of
critical infrastructure,
vulnerability, population,
population density, law
enforcement investigative and
enforcement activity, and the
existence of formal mutual aid
agreements among
jurisdictions.[FY2005 UASI
Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
NA
Remainder of Appropriations
Allocation of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 109-
90, Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS allocated UASI funds based
on risk and effectiveness of urban
area’s proposed solutions to
identified homeland security needs.
[FY2006 HSGP Program Guidance
and Application Kit]
CIP Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-7,
P.L. 108-11]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the remainder
of total CIP appropriations in direct
proportion to the state’s percentage of
the nation’s population. [FY2003
SHSGP Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
NA NA NA
CRS-14
Program FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006*
EMPG Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-7,
P.L. 108-11]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the remainder
of total EMPG appropriations in direct
proportion to the state’s percentage of
the nation’s population. [FY2003
SHSGP Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-90,
Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the remainder
of total EMPG appropriations in direct
proportion to the state’s percentage of
the nation’s population. [FY2004
SHSGP Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Congress required DHS to
allocate the remainder of total
appropriations in the same
manner as in FY2004. [P.L. 108-
334, Title III]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 109-
90, Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the
remainder of total EMPG
appropriations in direct proportion
to the state’s percentage of the
nation’s population. [FY2006
HSGP Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
CCP Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-7,
P.L. 108-11]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the remainder
of total CCP appropriations in direct
proportion to the state’s percentage of
the nation’s population. [FY2003
SHSGP Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 108-90,
Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the remainder
of total CCP appropriations in direct
proportion to the state’s percentage of
the nation’s population. [FY2004
SHSGP Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Congress required DHS to
allocate the remainder of total
appropriations in the same
manner as in FY2004. [P.L. 108-
334, Title III]
Guaranteed Amount
Each state, DC, and Puerto Rico
guaranteed 0.75% of total
appropriations. [P.L. 107-56, Sec.
1014]
Remainder of Appropriations
Remainder of total appropriations at
the discretion of DHS. [P.L. 109-
90, Title III]
DHS Implementation
DHS chose to allocate the
remainder of total CCP
appropriations in direct proportion
to the state’s percentage of the
nation’s population. [FY2006
HSGP Program Guidance and
Application Kit]
MMRS Guaranteed Amount
DHS determines what metropolitan
medical systems receive funding and
amount. [P.L. 108-7 and P.L. 108-11]
Guaranteed Amount
DHS determines what metropolitan
medical systems receive funding and
amount. [P.L. 108-90, Title III]
Guaranteed Amount
DHS determines what
metropolitan medical systems
receive funding and amount.
[P.L. 108-334, Title III]
Guaranteed Amount
DHS determines what metropolitan
medical systems receive funding
and amount. [P.L. 109-90, Title III]
*In the FY2007 DHS appropriations act (P.L. 109-295), Congress does not alter the funding methods for these grant programs. DHS has yet to
announce the allocation of FY2007 discretionary funds.
CRS-15
37 On December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8,
National Preparedness (HSPD-8).
38 For more information on the national preparedness goal as related to federal homeland
security grants to states and selected urban areas, see CRS Report RL33583, Homeland
Security Grants: Evolution of Program Guidance and Grant Allocation Methods, by Shawn
Reese.
Federal Goals and State and Local Spending
on Homeland Security
Domestic public safety has traditionally been the responsibility of state and
local governments; and within each state, spending that generates the greatest benefit
for the state is a state priority. For the federal government, however, spending that
generates the greatest benefit for the nation is a priority; and the federal government’s
priorities for additional spending do not always align with state objectives. Under
the rubric of homeland security following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
federal government increased its role in public safety. The various grants to state and
local governments, including the seven programs that are examined in this report and
that are now primarily administered by DHS, are manifestations of an elevated
federal role.
After the attacks of 9/11, a homeland security presidential directive (HSPD-8)
identified the need to implement a “national preparedness goal” that would
establish policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to
prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic
all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved
delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments,
and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal,
State, and local entities.37
The definition for “Federal preparedness assistance” in HSPD-8 did suggest the
notion that the federal aid is intended for preparedness spending whose benefit would
be national in scope. The definition, however, was somewhat ambiguous because the
catchall phrase “other emergencies” was included in it. Specifically, according to
HSPD-8, federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments is intended
“to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies” [emphasis added]. Throughout HSPD-8, preparing
for and responding to terrorist attacks is the primary concern. Since HSPD-8 was
promulgated, DHS has issued several drafts of the National Preparedness Goal.
Throughout those drafts, government spending that enhances national preparedness
has remained a guiding principle.38
In the American federal system, a variety of police, public health, emergency
management, and other functions pertinent to homeland security are performed by
state and local governments. Thus, to assess the importance of the seven federal
homeland security grants relative to total public safety spending by state and local
CRS-16
39 DHS allocates grants to states and urban areas based on risk and other factors; but, as far
as CRS can determine, the department does not explicitly consider current state and local
spending on public safety.
40 Another measure might be the actual output, like the number of police officers or fire
houses. Still other measures might be the reduction in crime rates, or the number of crimes
solved as a portion of total crimes committed.
grant recipients, we must measure how much state and local governments spend on
public safety and how expenditures vary among states.39
State and Local Spending on Public Safety. Generally, spending on
public safety is a strong indicator of a jurisdiction’s provision of this government
service.40 The level of state and local spending on public safety varies considerably
by state and could serve as a rough approximation of existing government supply
(and thus public demand) for this service in the respective states. For example, in
FY2004, total state and local spending on public safety in California was 1.86% of
California’s gross domestic product (GDP). In contrast, South Dakota dedicated
0.83% of its GDP to public safety spending (see Table 3, column 4).
Another means of measuring a state’s provision of public safety is the
spending on public safety relative to a national mean. In the United States, 1.39%
of total U.S. GDP is devoted to public safety spending. Thus, if all states were
equally invested in public safety, 1.39% of each state’s GDP would be spent on fire,
police, corrections, and protective inspections activities. Multiplying this percentage
by GDP yields what a state would spend on public safety if it were spending the
national average (or “par” value). If actual spending exceeds the estimated par value,
then the state demands (and provides) relatively more public safety spending.
Conversely, if a state is below the national average, then the citizens demand less
public safety spending.
Using this method, each state can be scored in relation to par (see Table 3,
column 5). Again, states over par spend relatively more on public safety, and those
that are under par spend relatively less. Table 3 presents the par calculation for
each state based on FY2004 data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. The top three
states in relation to par are Florida (26.3% over par), California (25.3%), and Arizona
(19.1%). The bottom three states are South Dakota (-67.2%), North Dakota
(-63.5%), and New Hampshire (-51.7%).
Implications for Homeland Security Grant Program Allocations.
One perspective on public safety spending is that it reflects the needs, not necessarily
the desires, of state and local governments. For example, of the top 10 states in
public safety spending as a share of state GDP, all but Nevada are international
border states, have extensive coastline, or both (see Table 3). One could argue that
the national benefit from state and local spending on border control and monitoring
is readily apparent. State and local public safety spending for the protection of
critical infrastructure also generates a national benefit. These assets include, but are
not limited to seaports, chemical facilities, federal facilities, dams, public utilities,
oil and natural gas refineries and pipelines, financial centers, and transportation
assets. Federal grants could be relatively larger for those states that spend more on
CRS-17
activities that generate a measurable national benefit. The unpredictable nature of
terrorism and terrorists’ selection of targets, however, could lend credibility to the
argument that states and localities without international borders or large
concentrations of critical infrastructure assets may still need some level of federal
homeland security assistance to ensure their preparedness and protection.
The extent to which the objectives behind the federal grant programs
correspond with current state and local public safety spending objectives is critical.
The additional federal funds for public safety spending will initially augment existing
spending, but over time could begin to substitute for state and local own-source
spending. This outcome would mean that the federal tax system, primarily federal
income taxes, would substitute for state and local tax systems, typically property and
sales taxes. The shift, however, would be relatively small, given that FY2006 public
safety grants were about 1% of total state and local public safety spending in FY2004
(the latest available year for state and local public safety spending data).
Methodological Note. Data limitations are important to consider while
reviewing the data presented in Table 3. First, Table 3 reports data on Gross
Domestic Product by state for the 2004 calendar year. More recent estimates are
available, but the most recent state and local finance data are for fiscal year 2004.
For most states, FY2004 ended on or near June 30, 2004. Thus, data on GDP by
state for 2004 are the most appropriate to use for standardized comparison of states.
Second, the last column in Table 3 reports the FY2006 federal grants to states as
shares of FY2004 state and local public safety spending. Ideally, data for state and
local spending on public safety for FY2006 would be available, though the FY2004
data do allow for relatively robust comparisons among states. If FY2006 data were
available, they would likely show that the FY2006 federal grants as shares of state
and local public safety spending are less than reported in Table 3. The federal grants
have declined, whereas state and local public safety spending has likely remained
constant or increased in absolute terms since 2004.
CRS-18
Table 3. State and Local Spending on Public Safety, Selected Measures
State
Total S&L
Public Safety
Expenditures
FY2004
(thousands)
2004 State Gross
Domestic Product
(GDP)
(millions)
S&L Public
Safety
Spending as
Share of State
GDP
Over/Under
Amount Relative
to National
Average
Over/Under as
Percentage
of S&L
Spending
Total DHS Grants, FY2006
Amount
Share of S&L
Public Safety
Expenditures
Alabama $1,764,422 $141,366 1.25% ($197,603) -11.2% $15,578,025 0.9%
Alaska $490,536 $35,988 1.36% ($8,943) -1.8% $8,294,137 1.7%
Arizona $3,333,580 $194,246 1.72% $637,632 19.1% $20,170,965 0.6%
Arkansas $1,136,281 $82,712 1.37% ($11,682) -1.0% $8,342,875 0.7%
California $28,208,145 $1,519,202 1.86% $7,123,076 25.3% $231,950,605 0.8%
Colorado $2,561,220 $201,392 1.27% ($233,908) -9.1% $21,079,809 0.8%
Connecticut $1,905,816 $182,468 1.04% ($626,665) -32.9% $13,520,893 0.7%
Delaware $484,160 $52,298 0.93% ($241,686) -49.9% $10,296,370 2.1%
D.C. $801,682 $77,510 1.03% ($274,083) -34.2% $54,015,142 6.7%
Florida $11,470,989 $609,372 1.88% $3,013,489 26.3% $100,122,080 0.9%
Georgia $4,426,127 $339,730 1.30% ($289,000) -6.5% $44,406,375 1.0%
Hawaii $572,420 $50,238 1.14% ($124,835) -21.8% $12,935,242 2.3%
Idaho $640,210 $43,509 1.47% $36,347 5.7% $11,758,809 1.8%
Illinois $7,064,410 $533,735 1.32% ($343,321) -4.9% $90,405,480 1.3%
Indiana $2,417,932 $229,449 1.05% ($766,600) -31.7% $21,129,053 0.9%
Iowa $1,019,956 $110,210 0.93% ($509,653) -50.0% $13,480,048 1.3%
Kansas $1,230,507 $98,927 1.24% ($142,505) -11.6% $14,273,884 1.2%
Kentucky $1,624,188 $133,003 1.22% ($221,766) -13.7% $24,118,634 1.5%
Louisiana $2,356,127 $160,186 1.47% $132,899 5.6% $30,436,715 1.3%
CRS-19
State
Total S&L
Public Safety
Expenditures
FY2004
(thousands)
2004 State Gross
Domestic Product
(GDP)
(millions)
S&L Public
Safety
Spending as
Share of State
GDP
Over/Under
Amount Relative
to National
Average
Over/Under as
Percentage
of S&L
Spending
Total DHS Grants, FY2006
Amount
Share of S&L
Public Safety
Expenditures
Maine $517,738 $43,258 1.20% ($82,642) -16.0% $7,784,686 1.5%
Maryland $3,503,625 $230,698 1.52% $301,758 8.6% $24,290,987 0.7%
Massachusetts $3,533,282 $312,700 1.13% ($806,695) -22.8% $41,246,241 1.2%
Michigan $5,467,987 $366,601 1.49% $379,916 6.9% $46,898,876 0.9%
Minnesota $2,345,018 $224,620 1.04% ($772,493) -32.9% $13,395,399 0.6%
Mississippi $1,128,986 $77,107 1.46% $58,815 5.2% $8,528,314 0.8%
Missouri $2,419,289 $205,847 1.18% ($437,670) -18.1% $42,860,979 1.8%
Montana $356,288 $27,583 1.29% ($26,538) -7.4% $7,929,901 2.2%
Nebraska $711,620 $67,989 1.05% ($232,002) -32.6% $21,746,103 3.1%
Nevada $1,612,240 $99,143 1.63% $236,230 14.7% $20,508,913 1.3%
New Hampshire $476,545 $52,084 0.92% ($246,331) -51.7% $7,886,573 1.7%
New Jersey $5,181,668 $410,306 1.26% ($512,986) -9.9% $51,982,785 1.0%
New Mexico $990,473 $63,645 1.56% $107,141 10.8% $8,270,273 0.8%
New York $14,557,355 $906,783 1.61% $1,972,075 13.5% $183,673,552 1.3%
North Carolina $3,457,217 $323,962 1.07% ($1,039,065) -30.1% $30,483,786 0.9%
North Dakota $192,622 $22,692 0.85% ($122,321) -63.5% $10,788,443 5.6%
Ohio $5,710,111 $425,173 1.34% ($190,883) -3.3% $41,347,339 0.7%
Oklahoma $1,504,172 $111,838 1.35% ($48,032) -3.2% $19,496,662 1.3%
Oregon $2,173,637 $134,615 1.61% $305,310 14.0% $17,955,904 0.8%
Pennsylvania $5,591,577 $463,752 1.21% ($844,857) -15.1% $49,335,020 0.9%
Rhode Island $669,989 $41,844 1.60% $89,234 13.3% $7,837,616 1.2%
CRS-20
State
Total S&L
Public Safety
Expenditures
FY2004
(thousands)
2004 State Gross
Domestic Product
(GDP)
(millions)
S&L Public
Safety
Spending as
Share of State
GDP
Over/Under
Amount Relative
to National
Average
Over/Under as
Percentage
of S&L
Spending
Total DHS Grants, FY2006
Amount
Share of S&L
Public Safety
Expenditures
South Carolina $1,601,653 $131,492 1.22% ($223,330) -13.9% $14,679,434 0.9%
South Dakota $246,481 $29,699 0.83% ($165,713) -67.2% $7,733,780 3.1%
Tennessee $2,197,748 $216,769 1.01% ($810,798) -36.9% $13,761,872 0.6%
Texas $10,088,160 $903,208 1.12% ($2,447,502) -24.3% $89,880,352 0.9%
Utah $1,025,243 $82,546 1.24% ($120,416) -11.7% $8,271,012 0.8%
Vermont $228,978 $21,992 1.04% ($76,250) -33.3% $10,907,921 4.8%
Virginia $3,555,043 $327,032 1.09% ($983,848) -27.7% $16,888,018 0.5%
Washington $3,316,389 $253,085 1.31% ($196,188) -5.9% $32,221,988 1.0%
West Virginia $498,085 $49,903 1.00% ($194,521) -39.1% $13,293,669 2.7%
Wisconsin $3,107,195 $207,739 1.50% $223,977 7.2% $24,430,858 0.8%
Wyoming $289,768 $24,092 1.20% ($44,606) -15.4% $7,673,562 2.6%
United States $161,764,890 $11,655,338 1.39% na na $1,650,307,965 1.0%
CRS-21
Appendix
Table A. State Allocations of Office of Grants and Training
Homeland Security Grants
(all amounts in millions except dollar per capita figures)
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Alabama
Population** 4,480,139 4,501,862 4,525,375 4,557,808 1.7%
SHSGP $88.64 $34.51 $28.14 $17.69 $8.30 -75.9% $7.70 $6.25 $3.91 $1.82 -76.4%
LETPP $20.81 na $8.35 $6.43 $6.03 -27.8% $0.00 $1.85 $1.42 $1.32 -28.7%
EMPG $11.53 $2.75 $2.89 $2.90 $2.99 8.7% $0.61 $0.64 $0.64 $0.66 6.9%
MMRS $4.76 $1.32 $1.60 $0.91 $0.93 -29.5% $0.29 $0.36 $0.20 $0.20 -30.7%
CCPa $1.43 $0.31 $0.58 $0.22 $0.32 3.2% $0.07 $0.13 $0.05 $0.07 1.5%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $3.34 $3.34 na na na na $0.75 na na na na
Total $130.51 $42.23 $41.56 $28.15 $18.57 -56.0% $9.43 $9.23 $6.22 $4.07 -56.8%
Alaska
Population** 640,699 648,510 657,755 663,661 3.6%
SHSGP $45.12 $16.46 $14.86 $9.37 $4.43 -73.1% $25.69 $22.92 $14.24 $6.68 -74.0%
CRS-22
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
LETPP $11.05 na $4.41 $3.41 $3.23 -26.8% $0.00 $6.80 $5.18 $4.87 -28.4%
EMPG $6.09 $1.45 $1.53 $1.53 $1.58 8.6% $2.27 $2.36 $2.33 $2.38 4.8%
MMRS $1.80 $0.88 $0.00 $0.46 $0.46 -47.2% $1.37 $0.00 $0.69 $0.70 -49.0%
CCP $0.76 $0.17 $0.31 $0.12 $0.17 2.2% $0.26 $0.48 $0.18 $0.26 -1.3%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $1.76 $1.76 na na na na $2.75 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $66.59 $20.73 $21.11 $14.88 $9.87 -52.4% $32.35 $32.55 $22.62 $14.88 -54.0%
Arizona
Population** 5,438,159 5,577,784 5,739,879 5,939,292 9.2%
SHSGP $95.05 $34.88 $31.49 $20.02 $8.66 -75.2% $6.41 $5.65 $3.49 $1.46 -77.3%
LETPP $22.91 na $9.34 $7.28 $6.29 -32.7% $0.00 $1.68 $1.27 $1.06 -36.8%
EMPG $12.90 $3.08 $3.24 $3.24 $3.35 8.8% $0.57 $0.58 $0.56 $0.56 -0.4%
MMRS $4.81 $1.12 $1.85 $0.91 $0.93 -17.0% $0.21 $0.33 $0.16 $0.16 -24.0%
CCP $1.63 $0.35 $0.65 $0.25 $0.37 5.8% $0.06 $0.12 $0.04 $0.06 -3.1%
UASI
Phoenix $37.15 $11.03 $12.20 $10.00 $3.92 -64.5% $2.03 $2.19 $1.74 $0.66 -67.5%
CIP $3.74 $3.74 na na na na $0.69 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $178.19 $54.20 $58.77 $41.70 $23.52 -56.6% $9.97 $10.54 $7.27 $3.96 -60.3%
CRS-23
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Arkansas
Population** 2,706,606 2,726,166 2,750,000 2,779,154 2.7%
SHSGP $67.38 $26.98 $22.00 $13.85 $4.55 -83.1% $9.97 $8.07 $5.04 $1.64 -83.6%
LETPP $14.88 na $6.53 $5.04 $3.31 -49.3% $0.00 $2.39 $1.83 $1.19 -50.3%
EMPG $9.02 $2.15 $2.26 $2.26 $2.34 8.6% $0.80 $0.83 $0.82 $0.84 5.8%
MMRS $0.74 $0.28 $0.00 $0.23 $0.23 -17.0% $0.10 $0.00 $0.08 $0.08 -19.2%
CCP $1.13 $0.25 $0.46 $0.18 $0.25 2.1% $0.09 $0.17 $0.06 $0.09 -0.6%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.61 $2.61 na na na na $0.96 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $95.76 $32.27 $31.25 $21.56 $10.68 -66.9% $11.92 $11.46 $7.84 $3.84 -67.8%
California
Population** 34,988,088 35,456,602 35,842,038 36,132,147 3.3%
SHSGP $430.44 $164.28 $133.96 $84.61 $47.58 -71.0% $4.70 $3.78 $2.36 $1.32 -72.0%
LETPP $112.89 na $39.75 $30.77 $42.37 6.6% $0.00 $1.12 $0.86 $1.17 4.6%
EMPG $54.89 $13.09 $13.77 $13.79 $14.24 8.7% $0.37 $0.39 $0.38 $0.39 5.3%
MMRS $21.17 $6.04 $6.85 $4.10 $4.18 -30.8% $0.17 $0.19 $0.11 $0.12 -33.0%
CCP $6.88 $1.49 $2.78 $1.07 $1.53 2.3% $0.04 $0.08 $0.03 $0.04 -1.0%
UASI
Anaheim $57.21 $0.00 $25.40 $19.83 $11.98 -52.8% $0.00 $0.72 $0.55 $0.33 -53.7%
Bay Area $134.80 $28.94 $44.32 $33.23 $28.32 -2.1% $0.83 $1.25 $0.93 $0.78 -5.2%
Fresno $7.08 $0.00 $7.08 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.20 $0.00 $0.00 na
CRS-24
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Los Angeles $228.02 $37.76 $40.40 $69.24 $80.61 113.5% $1.08 $1.14 $1.93 $2.23 106.7%
Sacramento $28.41 $6.91 $8.02 $6.09 $7.39 6.9% $0.20 $0.23 $0.17 $0.20 3.5%
San Diego $44.61 $11.36 $10.48 $14.78 $7.99 -29.7% $0.32 $0.30 $0.41 $0.22 -31.9%
CIP $15.90 $15.90 na na na na $0.45 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $1,142.30 $285.78 $332.83 $277.50 $246.19 -13.9% $8.17 $9.39 $7.74 $6.81 -16.6%
Colorado
Population** 4,498,407 4,548,071 4,601,821 4,665,177 3.7%
SHSGP $88.68 $34.59 $28.21 $17.80 $8.08 -76.64% $7.69 $6.20 $3.87 $1.73 -77.5%
LETPP $22.44 na $8.37 $6.47 $7.60 -9.20% $0.00 $1.84 $1.41 $1.63 -11.5%
EMPG $11.56 $2.76 $2.90 $2.90 $3.00 8.61% $0.61 $0.64 $0.63 $0.64 4.7%
MMRS $3.42 $0.84 $1.20 $0.68 $0.70 -16.67% $0.19 $0.26 $0.15 $0.15 -19.6%
CCP $1.45 $0.31 $0.59 $0.23 $0.32 3.23% $0.07 $0.13 $0.05 $0.07 -0.5%
UASI
Denver $37.32 $15.57 $8.65 $8.72 $4.38 -71.87% $3.46 $1.90 $1.89 $0.94 -72.9%
CIP $0.00 na na na na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $164.87 $54.07 $49.92 $36.80 $24.08 -55.47% $12.02 $10.98 $8.00 $5.16 -57.1%
Connecticut
Population** 3,458,382 3,485,881 3,498,966 3,510,297 1.5%
SHSGP $81.40 $30.16 $24.59 $15.49 $11.16 -63.0% $8.72 $7.05 $4.43 $3.18 -63.5%
LETPP $14.78 na $7.30 $5.63 $1.85 -74.7% $0.00 $2.09 $1.61 $0.53 -74.8%
EMPG $10.08 $2.41 $2.53 $2.53 $2.61 8.4% $0.70 $0.73 $0.72 $0.74 6.8%
MMRS $1.34 $0.48 $0.40 $0.23 $0.23 -52.1% $0.14 $0.11 $0.07 $0.07 -52.8%
CRS-25
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
CCP $1.26 $0.27 $0.51 $0.20 $0.28 3.7% $0.08 $0.15 $0.06 $0.08 2.2%
UASI $9.63 $0.00 $9.63 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $2.76 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.92 $2.92 na na na na $0.84 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $121.41 $36.24 $44.96 $24.08 $16.13 -55.5% $10.48 $12.90 $6.88 $4.60 -56.1%
Delaware
Population** 805,767 817,827 830,069 843,524 4.7%
SHSGP $50.15 $18.92 $15.43 $9.73 $6.07 -67.9% $23.48 $18.87 $11.72 $7.20 -69.4%
LETPP $12.17 na $4.58 $3.54 $4.05 -11.6% $0.00 $5.60 $4.26 $4.80 -14.3%
EMPG $6.33 $1.51 $1.59 $1.59 $1.64 8.6% $1.87 $1.94 $1.92 $1.94 3.7%
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.79 $0.17 $0.32 $0.12 $0.18 5.9% $0.21 $0.39 $0.14 $0.21 1.1%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $1.83 $1.83 na na na na $2.27 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $71.27 $22.43 $21.92 $14.98 $11.94 -46.8% $27.84 $26.80 $18.05 $14.15 -49.2%
D.C.
Population** 564,624 557,846 554,239 550,521 -2.5%
SHSGP $45.98 $17.92 $14.61 $9.18 $4.27 -76.2% $31.74 $26.19 $16.56 $7.76 -75.6%
LETPP $10.79 na $4.34 $3.34 $3.11 -28.3% $0.00 $7.78 $6.03 $5.65 -27.4%
EMPG $5.98 $1.43 $1.50 $1.50 $1.55 8.6% $2.53 $2.69 $2.71 $2.82 11.3%
CRS-26
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.75 $0.16 $0.30 $0.12 $0.17 6.3% $0.28 $0.54 $0.22 $0.31 9.0%
UASI
N.C.R.b $218.26 $60.49 $29.30 $82.00 $46.47 -23.2% $107.13 $52.52 $147.95 $84.41 -21.2%
CIP $1.73 $1.73 na na na na $3.06 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $283.49 $81.73 $50.05 $96.14 $55.57 -32.0% $144.75 $89.72 $173.46 $100.95 -30.3%
Florida
Population** 16,677,860 16,993,369 17,385,430 17,789,864 6.7%
SHSGP $227.01 $86.31 $70.38 $44.73 $25.59 -70.4% $19.27 $15.63 $9.88 $5.61 -70.9%
LETPP $55.76 na $20.89 $16.26 $18.61 -10.9% na $4.64 $3.59 $4.08 -12.0%
EMPG $28.82 $6.87 $7.23 $7.24 $7.48 8.9% $1.53 $1.61 $1.60 $1.64 7.0%
MMRS $7.97 $2.36 $2.39 $1.59 $1.63 -30.9% $0.53 $0.53 $0.35 $0.36 -32.1%
CCP $3.65 $0.79 $1.46 $0.57 $0.83 5.1% $0.18 $0.32 $0.13 $0.18 3.3%
UASI
Ft. Lauderdale $9.98 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $9.98 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.56 na
Jacksonville $16.15 $0.00 $0.00 $6.88 $9.27 34.7% $0.00 $0.00 $0.40 $0.52 31.7%
Miami $64.14 $13.18 $19.15 $15.83 $15.98 21.2% $0.79 $1.13 $0.91 $0.90 13.7%
Orlando $18.21 $0.00 $8.77 $0.00 $9.44 7.6% $0.00 $0.52 $0.00 $0.53 2.8%
Tampa $31.62 $5.77 $9.28 $7.77 $8.80 52.5% $0.35 $0.55 $0.45 $0.49 43.0%
CIP $8.35 $8.35 na na na na $0.50 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $471.66 $123.63 $139.55 $100.87 $107.61 -13.0% $7.41 $8.21 $5.80 $6.05 -18.4%
CRS-27
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Georgia
Population** 8,581,731 8,746,849 8,918,129 9,072,576 5.7%
SHSGP $134.07 $51.77 $42.21 $26.73 $13.36 -74.2% $6.03 $4.83 $3.00 $1.47 -75.6%
LETPP $33.68 na $12.53 $9.72 $11.43 -8.8% $0.00 $1.43 $1.09 $1.26 -12.1%
EMPG $17.30 $4.12 $4.34 $4.35 $4.49 8.9% $0.48 $0.50 $0.49 $0.49 3.0%
MMRS $2.02 $0.60 $0.50 $0.46 $0.46 -23.3% $0.07 $0.06 $0.05 $0.05 -27.5%
CCP $2.18 $0.47 $0.88 $0.34 $0.49 4.3% $0.05 $0.10 $0.04 $0.05 -1.4%
UASI
Atlanta $42.73 $0.00 $10.74 $13.33 $18.66 73.7% $0.00 $1.23 $1.49 $2.06 67.5%
CIP $5.01 $5.01 na na na na $0.58 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $236.99 $61.97 $71.20 $54.93 $48.89 -21.1% $7.22 $8.14 $6.16 $5.39 -25.4%
Hawaii
Population** 1,234,401 1,248,200 1,262,124 1,275,194 3.3%
SHSGP $52.88 $20.77 $16.94 $10.68 $4.49 -78.4% $16.83 $13.57 $8.46 $3.52 -79.1%
LETPP $12.17 na $5.03 $3.88 $3.26 -35.2% $0.00 $4.03 $3.07 $2.56 -36.6%
EMPG $6.94 $1.66 $1.74 $1.74 $1.80 8.4% $1.34 $1.39 $1.38 $1.41 5.0%
MMRS $1.14 $0.28 $0.40 $0.23 $0.23 -17.9% $0.23 $0.32 $0.18 $0.18 -20.5%
CRS-28
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
CCP $0.87 $0.19 $0.35 $0.14 $0.19 0.0% $0.15 $0.28 $0.11 $0.15 -3.2%
UASI
Honolulu $18.08 $6.87 $0.00 $6.45 $4.76 -30.7% $5.57 $0.00 $5.11 $3.73 -32.9%
CIP $2.01 $2.01 na na na na $1.63 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $94.09 $31.78 $24.46 $23.12 $14.73 -53.7% $25.75 $19.60 $18.32 $11.55 -55.1%
Idaho
Population** 1,343,973 1,368,111 1,395,140 1,429,096 6.3%
SHSGP $56.06 $21.18 $17.27 $10.92 $6.69 -68.4% $15.76 $12.62 $7.83 $4.68 -70.3%
LETPP $13.97 na $5.13 $3.97 $4.87 -5.1% $0.00 $3.75 $2.85 $3.41 -9.1%
EMPG $7.09 $1.69 $1.78 $1.78 $1.84 8.6% $1.26 $1.30 $1.28 $1.28 2.1%
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.89 $0.19 $0.36 $0.14 $0.20 5.3% $0.14 $0.26 $0.10 $0.14 -1.0%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.05 $2.05 na na na na $1.53 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $80.06 $25.11 $24.54 $16.81 $13.60 -45.9% $18.68 $17.94 $12.05 $9.51 -49.1%
CRS-29
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Illinois
Population** 12,586,839 12,649,940 12,712,016 12,763,371 1.4%
SHSGP $179.43 $68.88 $56.17 $35.30 $19.08 -72.3% $5.47 $4.44 $2.78 $1.49 -72.7%
LETPP $47.71 na $16.67 $12.84 $18.20 9.2% $0.00 $1.32 $1.01 $1.43 8.2%
EMPG $23.00 $5.48 $5.77 $5.78 $5.97 8.9% $0.44 $0.46 $0.45 $0.47 7.4%
MMRS $1.14 $0.28 $0.40 $0.23 $0.23 -17.9% $0.02 $0.03 $0.02 $0.02 -19.0%
CCP $2.88 $0.63 $1.17 $0.45 $0.63 0.0% $0.05 $0.09 $0.04 $0.05 -1.4%
UASI
Chicago $175.27 $40.87 $34.14 $48.00 $52.26 27.9% $3.25 $2.70 $3.78 $4.09 26.1%
CIP $6.67 $6.67 na na na na $0.53 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $436.10 $122.81 $114.32 $102.60 $96.37 -21.5% $9.76 $9.04 $8.07 $7.55 -22.6%
Indiana
Population** 6,154,739 6,196,269 6,226,537 6,271,973 1.9%
SHSGP $107.68 $41.59 $33.92 $21.35 $10.82 -74.0% $6.76 $5.47 $3.43 $1.73 -74.5%
LETPP $22.92 na $10.07 $7.76 $5.09 -49.5% $0.00 $1.63 $1.25 $0.81 -50.1%
EMPG $13.89 $3.31 $3.49 $3.49 $3.60 8.9% $0.54 $0.56 $0.56 $0.57 6.9%
MMRS $2.48 $0.76 $0.80 $0.46 $0.46 -39.5% $0.12 $0.13 $0.07 $0.07 -40.6%
CRS-30
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
CCP $1.73 $0.38 $0.70 $0.27 $0.38 0.0% $0.06 $0.11 $0.04 $0.06 -1.9%
UASI
Indianapolis $20.18 $0.00 $10.15 $5.66 $4.37 -56.9% $0.00 $1.64 $0.91 $0.70 -57.5%
CIP $4.03 $4.03 na na na na $0.65 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $106.82 $50.07 $25.21 $17.64 $13.90 -72.2% $8.14 $4.07 $2.83 $2.22 -72.7%
Iowa
Population** 2,934,340 2,941,362 2,952,904 2,966,334 1.1%
SHSGP $72.57 $27.94 $22.78 $14.33 $7.52 -73.1% $9.52 $7.74 $4.85 $2.54 -73.4%
LETPP $17.44 na $6.76 $5.21 $5.47 -19.1% $0.00 $2.30 $1.76 $1.84 -19.8%
EMPG $9.34 $2.23 $2.34 $2.35 $2.42 8.6% $0.76 $0.80 $0.80 $0.82 7.4%
MMRS $0.74 $0.28 $0.00 $0.23 $0.23 -17.9% $0.10 $0.00 $0.08 $0.08 -18.7%
CCP $1.16 $0.25 $0.47 $0.18 $0.26 4.0% $0.09 $0.16 $0.06 $0.09 2.9%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.70 $2.70 na na na na $0.92 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $103.95 $33.40 $32.35 $22.30 $15.90 -52.4% $11.38 $11.00 $7.55 $5.36 -52.9%
CRS-31
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Kansas
Population** 2,712,454 2,724,224 2,733,697 2,744,687 1.2%
SHSGP $70.72 $27.00 $22.02 $13.85 $7.85 -70.9% $9.95 $8.08 $5.07 $2.86 -71.3%
LETPP $17.28 na $6.53 $5.04 $5.71 -12.6% $0.00 $2.40 $1.84 $2.08 -13.2%
EMPG $9.02 $2.15 $2.26 $2.27 $2.34 8.8% $0.79 $0.83 $0.83 $0.85 7.6%
MMRS $2.36 $0.76 $0.68 $0.46 $0.46 -39.5% $0.28 $0.25 $0.17 $0.17 -40.2%
CCP $1.14 $0.25 $0.46 $0.18 $0.25 0.0% $0.09 $0.17 $0.07 $0.09 -1.2%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.61 $2.61 na na na na $0.96 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $103.13 $32.77 $31.95 $21.80 $16.61 -49.3% $12.08 $11.73 $7.97 $6.05 -49.9%
Kentucky
Population** 4,088,510 4,116,780 4,141,835 4,173,405 2.1%
SHSGP $86.99 $32.84 $26.78 $16.86 $10.51 -68.0% $8.03 $6.51 $4.07 $2.52 -68.6%
LETPP $18.40 na $7.95 $6.13 $4.32 -45.7% $0.00 $1.93 $1.48 $1.04 -46.4%
EMPG $10.98 $2.62 $2.75 $2.76 $2.85 8.6% $0.64 $0.67 $0.67 $0.68 6.4%
MMRS $1.85 $0.28 $0.65 $0.46 $0.46 64.3% $0.07 $0.16 $0.11 $0.11 60.9%
CCP $1.37 $0.30 $0.56 $0.21 $0.30 0.0% $0.07 $0.14 $0.05 $0.07 -2.0%
CRS-32
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
UASI
Louisville $22.51 $0.00 $8.99 $5.00 $8.52 -5.2% $0.00 $2.18 $1.21 $2.04 -6.5%
CIP $3.18 $3.18 na na na na $0.78 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $145.28 $39.22 $47.68 $31.42 $26.96 -31.3% $9.59 $11.58 $7.59 $6.46 -32.7%
Louisiana
Population** 4,475,003 4,490,380 4,506,685 4,523,628 1.1%
SHSGP $92.32 $34.49 $28.13 $17.68 $12.02 -65.1% $7.71 $6.26 $3.92 $2.66 -65.5%
LETPP $23.52 na $8.35 $6.43 $8.74 4.7% $0.00 $1.86 $1.43 $1.93 3.9%
EMPG $11.53 $2.75 $2.89 $2.90 $2.99 8.7% $0.61 $0.64 $0.64 $0.66 7.5%
MMRS $4.60 $1.32 $1.44 $0.91 $0.93 -29.5% $0.30 $0.32 $0.20 $0.21 -30.3%
CCP $1.43 $0.31 $0.58 $0.22 $0.32 3.2% $0.07 $0.13 $0.05 $0.07 2.1%
UASI
Baton Rouge $16.16 $0.00 $7.19 $5.23 $3.74 -48.0% $0.00 $1.60 $1.16 $0.83 -48.4%
New Orleans $21.15 $0.00 $7.15 $9.31 $4.69 -34.4% $0.00 $1.59 $2.07 $1.04 -34.9%
CIP $3.34 $3.34 na na na na $0.75 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $174.04 $42.21 $55.73 $42.68 $33.43 -20.8% $9.43 $12.41 $9.47 $7.39 -21.7%
CRS-33
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Maine
Population** 1,296,978 1,308,245 1,314,985 1,321,505 1.9%
SHSGP $53.27 $20.98 $17.11 $10.79 $4.39 -79.1% $16.18 $13.08 $8.21 $3.32 -79.5%
LETPP $12.20 na $5.08 $3.92 $3.20 -37.0% $0.00 $3.88 $2.98 $2.42 -37.6%
EMPG $7.01 $1.67 $1.76 $1.76 $1.82 8.9% $1.29 $1.35 $1.34 $1.38 6.9%
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.88 $0.19 $0.36 $0.14 $0.19 0.0% $0.15 $0.28 $0.11 $0.14 -1.9%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.03 $2.03 na na na na $1.57 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $75.39 $24.87 $24.31 $16.61 $9.60 -61.4% $19.18 $18.58 $12.63 $7.26 -62.1%
Maryland
Population** 5,442,268 5,512,477 5,561,332 5,600,388 2.9%
SHSGP $98.11 $38.62 $31.50 $19.87 $8.12 -79.0% $7.10 $5.71 $3.57 $1.45 -79.6%
LETPP $22.48 na $9.35 $7.22 $5.91 -36.8% $0.00 $1.70 $1.30 $1.06 -37.8%
EMPG $12.91 $3.08 $3.24 $3.24 $3.35 8.7% $0.57 $0.59 $0.58 $0.60 5.6%
MMRS $1.20 $0.28 $0.46 $0.23 $0.23 -17.9% $0.05 $0.08 $0.04 $0.04 -20.2%
CCP $1.61 $0.35 $0.65 $0.25 $0.36 2.9% $0.06 $0.12 $0.05 $0.06 0.0%
CRS-34
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
UASI
Baltimore $47.93 $10.90 $15.92 $11.44 $9.67 -11.3% $2.00 $2.89 $2.06 $1.73 -13.8%
CIP $3.74 $3.74 na na na na $0.69 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $187.98 $56.97 $61.12 $42.25 $27.64 -51.5% $10.47 $11.09 $7.60 $4.93 -52.9%
Massachusetts
Population** 6,411,568 6,417,565 6,407,382 6,398,743 -0.2%
SHSGP $111.15 $42.73 $34.85 $21.86 $11.71 -72.6% $6.66 $5.43 $3.41 $1.83 -72.5%
LETPP $28.53 na $10.34 $7.95 $10.24 -1.0% $0.00 $1.61 $1.24 $1.60 -0.7%
EMPG $14.28 $3.41 $3.58 $3.59 $3.70 8.6% $0.53 $0.56 $0.56 $0.58 8.8%
MMRS $3.77 $1.24 $1.15 $0.68 $0.70 -43.5% $0.19 $0.18 $0.11 $0.11 -43.4%
CCP $1.78 $0.39 $0.72 $0.28 $0.39 0.0% $0.06 $0.11 $0.04 $0.06 0.2%
UASI
Boston $82.15 $16.73 $19.13 $28.08 $18.21 8.8% $2.61 $2.98 $4.38 $2.85 9.1%
CIP $4.14 $4.14 na na na na $0.65 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $245.80 $68.64 $69.77 $62.44 $44.95 -34.5% $10.71 $10.87 $9.75 $7.03 -34.4%
CRS-35
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Michigan
Population** 10,039,379 10,078,146 10,104,206 10,120,860 0.8%
SHSGP $150.83 $58.08 $47.36 $29.74 $15.65 -73.1% $5.79 $4.70 $2.94 $1.55 -73.3%
LETPP $36.25 na $14.05 $10.81 $11.39 -18.9% $0.00 $1.39 $1.07 $1.13 -19.3%
EMPG $19.41 $4.63 $4.87 $4.88 $5.03 8.7% $0.46 $0.48 $0.48 $0.50 7.8%
MMRS $3.07 $1.04 $0.65 $0.68 $0.70 -32.7% $0.10 $0.06 $0.07 $0.07 -33.2%
CCP $2.42 $0.53 $0.98 $0.38 $0.53 0.0% $0.05 $0.10 $0.04 $0.05 -0.8%
UASI
Detroit $62.23 $12.27 $13.75 $17.58 $18.63 51.8% $1.22 $1.36 $1.74 $1.84 50.6%
CIP $5.62 $5.62 na na na na $0.56 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $279.83 $82.17 $81.66 $64.07 $51.93 -36.8% $8.18 $8.10 $6.34 $5.13 -37.3%
Minnesota
Population** 5,023,526 5,061,662 5,096,546 5,132,799 2.2%
SHSGP $90.44 $36.77 $29.98 $18.90 $4.79 -87.0% $7.32 $5.92 $3.71 $0.93 -87.3%
LETPP $19.26 na $8.90 $6.87 $3.49 -60.8% $0.00 $1.76 $1.35 $0.68 -61.3%
EMPG $12.29 $2.93 $3.08 $3.09 $3.19 8.7% $0.58 $0.61 $0.61 $0.62 6.4%
MMRS $2.28 $0.56 $0.80 $0.46 $0.46 -17.9% $0.11 $0.16 $0.09 $0.09 -19.6%
CRS-36
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
CCP $1.53 $0.33 $0.62 $0.24 $0.34 3.0% $0.07 $0.12 $0.05 $0.07 0.8%
UASI
Minneapolis $30.18 $0.00 $20.11 $5.76 $4.31 -78.6% $0.00 $3.97 $1.13 $0.84 -78.9%
CIP $3.56 $3.56 na na na na $0.71 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $159.54 $44.15 $63.49 $35.32 $16.58 -62.5% $8.79 $12.54 $6.93 $3.23 -63.3%
Mississippi
Population** 2,866,349 2,880,793 2,900,768 2,921,088 1.9%
SHSGP $69.07 $27.67 $22.56 $14.19 $4.65 -83.2% $9.65 $7.83 $4.89 $1.59 -83.5%
LETPP $15.24 na $6.69 $5.16 $3.39 -49.3% $0.00 $2.32 $1.78 $1.16 -50.0%
EMPG $9.25 $2.21 $2.32 $2.32 $2.40 8.5% $0.77 $0.81 $0.80 $0.82 6.4%
MMRS $1.14 $0.28 $0.40 $0.23 $0.23 -17.9% $0.10 $0.14 $0.08 $0.08 -19.4%
CCP $1.16 $0.25 $0.47 $0.18 $0.26 4.0% $0.09 $0.16 $0.06 $0.09 2.1%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.68 $2.68 na na na na $0.94 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $98.54 $33.09 $32.44 $22.08 $10.93 -67.0% $11.54 $11.26 $7.61 $3.74 -67.6%
CRS-37
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Missouri
Population** 5,681,045 5,718,717 5,759,532 5,800,310 2.1%
SHSGP $110.04 $39.53 $32.24 $20.29 $17.98 -54.5% $6.96 $5.64 $3.52 $3.10 -55.5%
LETPP $22.56 na $9.57 $7.38 $5.61 -41.4% $0.00 $1.67 $1.28 $0.97 -42.2%
EMPG $13.21 $3.15 $3.31 $3.32 $3.43 8.8% $0.55 $0.58 $0.58 $0.59 6.5%
MMRS $2.53 $0.56 $1.05 $0.46 $0.46 -17.9% $0.10 $0.18 $0.08 $0.08 -19.5%
CCP $1.66 $0.36 $0.67 $0.26 $0.37 2.8% $0.06 $0.12 $0.05 $0.06 0.7%
UASI
Kansas City $40.45 $9.70 $13.30 $8.21 $9.24 -4.7% $1.71 $2.33 $1.43 $1.59 -6.7%
St. Louis $36.88 $9.85 $10.79 $7.04 $9.20 -6.6% $1.73 $1.89 $1.22 $1.59 -8.5%
CIP $3.83 $3.83 na na na na $0.67 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $231.16 $66.98 $70.93 $46.96 $46.29 -30.9% $11.79 $12.40 $8.15 $7.98 -32.3%
Montana
Population** 910,395 917,885 926,920 935,670 2.8%
SHSGP $49.57 $19.35 $15.78 $9.95 $4.49 -76.8% $21.25 $17.19 $10.73 $4.80 -77.4%
LETPP $11.56 na $4.68 $3.62 $3.26 -30.3% $0.00 $5.10 $3.91 $3.48 -31.7%
EMPG $6.46 $1.54 $1.62 $1.62 $1.68 8.9% $1.69 $1.76 $1.75 $1.79 5.9%
CRS-38
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.82 $0.18 $0.33 $0.13 $0.18 0.0% $0.20 $0.36 $0.14 $0.19 -2.7%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $1.87 $1.87 na na na na $2.05 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $70.28 $22.94 $22.41 $15.32 $9.61 -58.1% $25.20 $24.41 $16.53 $10.27 -59.3%
Nebraska
Population** 1,726,753 1,738,013 1,747,704 1,758,787 1.9%
SHSGP $64.35 $22.82 $18.61 $11.72 $11.20 -50.9% $13.22 $10.71 $6.71 $6.37 -51.8%
LETPP $11.32 na $5.52 $4.26 $1.54 -72.1% $0.00 $3.18 $2.44 $0.88 -72.4%
EMPG $7.63 $1.82 $1.91 $1.92 $1.98 8.7% $1.05 $1.10 $1.10 $1.12 6.7%
MMRS $1.98 $0.56 $0.50 $0.46 $0.46 -17.9% $0.32 $0.29 $0.26 $0.26 -19.4%
CCP $0.96 $0.21 $0.39 $0.15 $0.21 0.0% $0.12 $0.22 $0.09 $0.12 -1.8%
UASI
Omaha $13.48 $0.00 $0.00 $5.15 $8.33 61.7% $0.00 $0.00 $2.95 $4.74 60.7%
CIP $2.21 $2.21 na na na na $1.28 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $101.93 $27.62 $26.93 $23.66 $23.72 -14.1% $16.00 $15.49 $13.54 $13.49 -15.7%
CRS-39
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Nevada
Population** 2,167,867 2,241,700 2,332,898 2,414,807 11.4%
SHSGP $65.78 $24.71 $20.15 $12.81 $8.11 -67.2% $11.40 $8.99 $5.49 $3.36 -70.5%
LETPP $14.82 na $5.98 $4.66 $4.18 -30.1% $0.00 $2.67 $2.00 $1.73 -35.1%
EMPG $8.25 $1.97 $2.07 $2.07 $2.14 8.7% $0.91 $0.92 $0.89 $0.89 -2.4%
MMRS $1.14 $0.28 $0.40 $0.23 $0.23 -17.9% $0.13 $0.18 $0.10 $0.10 -26.3%
CCP $1.04 $0.22 $0.42 $0.16 $0.24 9.1% $0.10 $0.19 $0.07 $0.10 -2.1%
UASI
Las Vegas $26.74 $0.00 $10.53 $8.46 $7.75 -26.4% $0.00 $4.70 $3.63 $3.21 -31.7%
CIP $2.39 $2.39 na na na na $1.10 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $120.16 $29.57 $39.55 $28.39 $22.65 -23.4% $13.64 $17.64 $12.17 $9.38 -31.2%
New Hampshire
Population** 1,274,666 1,287,594 1,299,169 1,309,940 2.8%
SHSGP $53.01 $20.90 $17.04 $10.75 $4.32 -79.3% $16.40 $13.23 $8.27 $3.30 -79.9%
LETPP $12.11 na $5.06 $3.91 $3.14 -37.9% $0.00 $3.93 $3.01 $2.40 -39.0%
EMPG $6.98 $1.67 $1.75 $1.75 $1.81 8.5% $1.31 $1.36 $1.35 $1.38 5.5%
MMRS $1.46 $0.60 $0.40 $0.23 $0.23 -61.7% $0.47 $0.31 $0.18 $0.18 -62.7%
CRS-40
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
CCP $0.87 $0.19 $0.35 $0.14 $0.19 0.0% $0.15 $0.27 $0.11 $0.15 -2.7%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.02 $2.02 na na na na $1.58 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $76.45 $25.38 $24.60 $16.78 $9.69 -61.8% $19.91 $19.11 $12.92 $7.40 -62.8%
New Jersey
Population** 8,576,089 8,640,028 8,685,166 8,717,925 1.7%
SHSGP $130.01 $51.89 $42.32 $26.63 $9.17 -82.3% $6.05 $4.90 $3.07 $1.05 -82.6%
LETPP $29.78 na $12.56 $9.68 $7.54 -40.0% $0.00 $1.45 $1.11 $0.86 -40.5%
EMPG $17.35 $4.14 $4.35 $4.36 $4.50 8.6% $0.48 $0.50 $0.50 $0.52 6.9%
MMRS $2.13 $0.56 $0.65 $0.46 $0.46 -17.9% $0.07 $0.08 $0.05 $0.05 -19.2%
CCP $2.17 $0.47 $0.88 $0.34 $0.48 2.1% $0.05 $0.10 $0.04 $0.06 0.5%
UASI
Jersey City $97.56 $11.89 $32.17 $19.17 $34.33 188.7% $1.39 $3.72 $2.21 $3.94 184.0%
CIP $5.02 $5.02 na na na na $0.59 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $284.02 $73.97 $92.93 $60.64 $56.48 -23.6% $8.63 $10.76 $6.98 $6.48 -24.9%
CRS-41
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
New Mexico
Population** 1,855,400 1,879,252 1,903,006 1,928,384 3.9%
SHSGP $58.96 $23.36 $19.05 $12.02 $4.53 -80.6% $12.59 $10.14 $6.32 $2.35 -81.3%
LETPP $13.31 na $5.65 $4.37 $3.29 -41.8% $0.00 $3.01 $2.30 $1.71 -43.3%
EMPG $7.80 $1.86 $1.96 $1.96 $2.02 8.8% $1.00 $1.04 $1.03 $1.05 4.7%
MMRS $0.91 $0.28 $0.40 $0.00 $0.23 -17.9% $0.15 $0.21 $0.00 $0.12 -21.0%
CCP $0.98 $0.21 $0.40 $0.15 $0.22 4.8% $0.11 $0.21 $0.08 $0.11 0.8%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.26 $2.26 na na na na $1.22 na na na na
Total $84.22 $27.97 $27.46 $18.50 $10.29 -63.2% $15.07 $14.61 $9.72 $5.34 -64.6%
New York
Population** 19,164,755 19,228,031 19,280,727 19,254,630 0.5%
SHSGP $252.37 $96.66 $78.83 $49.42 $27.46 -71.6% $5.04 $4.10 $2.56 $1.43 -71.7%
LETPP $67.37 na $23.39 $17.97 $26.01 11.2% $0.00 $1.22 $0.93 $1.35 11.0%
EMPG $32.29 $7.70 $8.10 $8.11 $8.38 8.8% $0.40 $0.42 $0.42 $0.44 8.3%
MMRS $6.79 $1.60 $2.89 $1.14 $1.16 -27.5% $0.08 $0.15 $0.06 $0.06 -27.8%
CCP $4.03 $0.88 $1.64 $0.63 $0.88 0.0% $0.05 $0.09 $0.03 $0.05 -0.5%
CRS-42
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
UASI
Buffalo $31.29 $10.27 $10.10 $7.21 $3.71 -63.9% $0.54 $0.53 $0.37 $0.19 -64.0%
New York $528.79 $149.77 $47.01 $207.56 $124.45 -16.9% $7.81 $2.44 $10.77 $6.46 -17.3%
CIP $9.36 $9.36 na na na na $0.49 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $932.29 $276.24 $171.96 $292.04 $192.05 -30.5% $14.41 $8.94 $15.15 $9.97 -30.8%
North Carolina
Population** 8,312,755 8,422,375 8,540,468 8,683,242 4.5%
SHSGP $129.04 $50.75 $41.38 $26.13 $10.78 -78.8% $6.11 $4.91 $3.06 $1.24 -79.7%
LETPP $31.34 na $12.28 $9.50 $9.56 -22.2% $0.00 $1.46 $1.11 $1.10 -24.5%
EMPG $16.96 $4.05 $4.25 $4.26 $4.40 8.6% $0.49 $0.50 $0.50 $0.51 4.0%
MMRS $5.43 $2.62 $1.20 $0.91 $0.70 -73.3% $0.32 $0.14 $0.11 $0.08 -74.4%
CCP $2.13 $0.46 $0.86 $0.33 $0.48 4.3% $0.06 $0.10 $0.04 $0.06 -0.1%
UASI
Charlotte $21.85 $0.00 $7.40 $5.48 $8.97 21.2% $0.00 $0.88 $0.64 $1.03 17.6%
CIP $4.91 $4.91 na na na na $0.59 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $211.66 $62.79 $67.37 $46.61 $34.89 -44.4% $7.55 $8.00 $5.46 $4.02 -46.8%
CRS-43
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
North Dakota
Population** 633,571 633,051 636,308 636,677 0.5%
SHSGP $48.62 $18.18 $14.83 $9.34 $6.27 -65.5% $28.69 $23.43 $14.68 $9.85 -65.7%
LETPP $12.14 na $4.40 $3.39 $4.35 -1.1% $0.00 $6.95 $5.33 $6.83 -1.7%
EMPG $6.08 $1.45 $1.52 $1.53 $1.58 8.7% $2.29 $2.40 $2.40 $2.48 8.1%
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.77 $0.17 $0.31 $0.12 $0.17 0.0% $0.27 $0.49 $0.19 $0.27 -0.5%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $1.76 $1.76 na na na na $2.78 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $69.37 $21.56 $21.06 $14.38 $12.37 -42.6% $34.03 $33.27 $22.60 $19.42 -42.9%
Ohio
Population** 11,404,651 11,431,748 11,450,143 11,464,042 0.5%
SHSGP $161.29 $63.89 $52.10 $32.67 $12.63 -80.2% $5.60 $4.56 $2.85 $1.10 -80.3%
LETPP $36.52 na $15.46 $11.88 $9.18 -40.6% $0.00 $1.35 $1.04 $0.80 -40.8%
EMPG $21.36 $5.10 $5.36 $5.36 $5.54 8.6% $0.45 $0.47 $0.47 $0.48 8.0%
MMRS $6.75 $1.68 $2.31 $1.37 $1.39 -17.3% $0.15 $0.20 $0.12 $0.12 -17.7%
CCP $2.65 $0.58 $1.08 $0.41 $0.58 0.0% $0.05 $0.09 $0.04 $0.05 -0.5%
UASI
Cincinnati $31.27 $7.99 $12.75 $5.87 $4.66 -41.7% $0.70 $1.12 $0.51 $0.41 -42.0%
Cleveland $28.45 $5.87 $10.46 $7.39 $4.73 -19.4% $0.51 $0.92 $0.65 $0.41 -19.8%
CRS-44
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Columbus $20.60 $0.00 $8.71 $7.57 $4.32 -50.4% $0.00 $0.76 $0.66 $0.38 -50.5%
Toledo $9.16 $0.00 $0.00 $5.31 $3.85 -27.5% $0.00 $0.00 $0.46 $0.34 -27.6%
CIP $6.18 $6.18 na na na na $0.54 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $324.23 $91.29 $108.23 $77.83 $46.88 -48.7% $8.00 $9.47 $6.80 $4.09 -48.9%
Oklahoma
Population** 3,487,076 3,504,917 3,523,546 3,547,884 1.7%
SHSGP $79.04 $30.30 $24.71 $15.55 $8.48 -72.0% $8.69 $7.05 $4.41 $2.39 -72.5%
LETPP $19.16 na $7.33 $5.66 $6.17 -15.8% $0.00 $2.09 $1.61 $1.74 -16.8%
EMPG $10.13 $2.42 $2.54 $2.54 $2.63 8.5% $0.69 $0.72 $0.72 $0.74 6.6%
MMRS $2.90 $0.56 $1.42 $0.46 $0.46 -17.9% $0.16 $0.40 $0.13 $0.13 -19.3%
CCP $1.27 $0.28 $0.51 $0.20 $0.28 0.0% $0.08 $0.15 $0.06 $0.08 -1.7%
UASI
Ok. City $9.67 $0.00 $0.00 $5.57 $4.10 -26.4% $0.00 $0.00 $1.58 $1.16 -26.9%
CIP $2.93 $2.93 na na na na $0.84 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $125.09 $36.49 $36.51 $29.98 $22.12 -39.4% $10.46 $10.42 $8.51 $6.23 -40.4%
CRS-45
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Oregon
Population** 3,522,342 3,562,681 3,591,363 3,641,056 3.4%
SHSGP $75.56 $30.42 $24.80 $15.66 $4.68 -84.6% $8.64 $6.96 $4.36 $1.29 -85.1%
LETPP $16.45 na $7.36 $5.69 $3.40 -53.8% $0.00 $2.07 $1.58 $0.93 -54.8%
EMPG $10.16 $2.42 $2.55 $2.55 $2.64 8.9% $0.69 $0.72 $0.71 $0.72 5.4%
MMRS $1.14 $0.28 $0.40 $0.23 $0.23 -17.9% $0.08 $0.11 $0.06 $0.06 -20.5%
CCP $1.28 $0.28 $0.52 $0.20 $0.28 0.0% $0.08 $0.15 $0.06 $0.08 -3.3%
UASI
Portland $34.78 $6.77 $8.16 $10.49 $9.36 38.3% $1.92 $2.29 $2.92 $2.57 33.7%
CIP $2.94 $2.94 na na na na $0.83 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $142.31 $43.11 $43.79 $34.82 $20.59 -52.2% $12.24 $12.29 $9.70 $5.65 -53.8%
Pennsylvania
Population** 12,324,415 12,364,930 12,394,471 12,429,616 0.9%
SHSGP $170.51 $67.76 $55.26 $34.68 $12.81 -81.1% $5.50 $4.47 $2.80 $1.03 -81.3%
LETPP $40.06 na $16.40 $12.61 $11.05 -32.6% $0.00 $1.33 $1.02 $0.89 -33.0%
EMPG $22.64 $5.40 $5.68 $5.69 $5.87 8.7% $0.44 $0.46 $0.46 $0.47 7.8%
MMRS $1.88 $0.56 $0.40 $0.46 $0.46 -17.9% $0.05 $0.03 $0.04 $0.04 -18.6%
CRS-46
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
CCP $2.83 $0.62 $1.15 $0.44 $0.62 0.0% $0.05 $0.09 $0.04 $0.05 -0.8%
UASI
Philadelphia $79.64 $14.22 $23.08 $22.82 $19.52 37.3% $1.15 $1.87 $1.84 $1.57 36.1%
Pittsburgh $33.31 $6.82 $11.98 $9.64 $4.87 -28.6% $0.55 $0.97 $0.78 $0.39 -29.2%
CIP $6.56 $6.56 na na na na $0.53 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $357.43 $101.94 $113.95 $86.34 $55.20 -45.8% $8.27 $9.22 $6.97 $4.44 -46.3%
Rhode Island
Population** 1,068,550 1,075,729 1,079,916 1,076,189 0.7%
SHSGP $51.11 $20.03 $16.33 $10.29 $4.46 -77.7% $18.75 $15.18 $9.53 $4.14 -77.9%
LETPP $11.55 na $4.85 $3.74 $2.96 -39.0% $0.00 $4.51 $3.46 $2.75 -39.0%
EMPG $6.70 $1.60 $1.68 $1.68 $1.74 8.5% $1.50 $1.56 $1.56 $1.61 7.7%
MMRS $0.94 $0.48 $0.00 $0.23 $0.23 -52.1% $0.45 $0.00 $0.21 $0.21 -52.4%
CCP $0.84 $0.18 $0.34 $0.13 $0.19 5.6% $0.17 $0.32 $0.12 $0.18 4.8%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $1.94 $1.94 na na na na $1.82 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $73.08 $24.23 $23.20 $16.07 $9.58 -60.5% $22.68 $21.57 $14.88 $8.90 -60.8%
CRS-47
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
South Carolina
Population** 4,102,568 4,146,753 4,197,892 4,255,083 3.7%
SHSGP $86.70 $32.90 $26.83 $16.93 $10.04 -69.5% $8.02 $6.47 $4.03 $2.36 -70.6%
LETPP $18.21 na $7.96 $6.15 $4.10 -48.5% $0.00 $1.92 $1.47 $0.96 -49.8%
EMPG $10.99 $2.62 $2.76 $2.76 $2.85 8.8% $0.64 $0.67 $0.66 $0.67 4.9%
MMRS $1.19 $0.48 $0.25 $0.23 $0.23 -52.1% $0.12 $0.06 $0.05 $0.05 -53.8%
CCP $1.38 $0.30 $0.56 $0.21 $0.31 3.3% $0.07 $0.14 $0.05 $0.07 -0.4%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $3.18 $3.18 na na na na $0.78 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $121.65 $39.48 $38.36 $26.28 $17.53 -55.6% $9.62 $9.25 $6.26 $4.12 -57.2%
South Dakota
Population** 760,368 764,599 770,621 775,933 2.0%
SHSGP $47.99 $18.72 $15.27 $9.62 $4.38 -76.6% $24.62 $19.97 $12.48 $5.64 -77.1%
LETPP $11.21 na $4.53 $3.50 $3.18 -29.8% $0.00 $5.92 $4.54 $4.10 -30.8%
EMPG $6.25 $1.49 $1.57 $1.57 $1.62 8.9% $1.96 $2.05 $2.04 $2.09 6.7%
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.78 $0.17 $0.32 $0.12 $0.17 0.0% $0.22 $0.42 $0.16 $0.22 -2.0%
CRS-48
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $1.81 $1.81 na na na na $2.38 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $68.04 $22.19 $21.69 $14.81 $9.35 -57.9% $29.18 $28.37 $19.22 $12.05 -58.7%
Tennessee
Population** 5,790,312 5,841,585 5,893,298 5,962,959 3.0%
SHSGP $98.10 $40.06 $32.67 $20.59 $4.78 -88.1% $6.92 $5.59 $3.49 $0.80 -88.4%
LETPP $20.66 na $9.69 $7.49 $3.48 -64.1% $0.00 $1.66 $1.27 $0.58 -64.8%
EMPG $13.38 $3.19 $3.36 $3.36 $3.47 8.8% $0.55 $0.58 $0.57 $0.58 5.7%
MMRS $4.81 $1.52 $1.45 $0.91 $0.93 -38.8% $0.26 $0.25 $0.15 $0.16 -40.6%
CCP $1.67 $0.36 $0.68 $0.26 $0.37 2.8% $0.06 $0.12 $0.04 $0.06 -0.2%
UASI
Memphis $20.34 $6.07 $10.07 $0.00 $4.20 -30.8% $1.05 $1.72 $0.00 $0.70 -32.8%
CIP $3.88 $3.88 na na na na $0.67 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $162.84 $55.08 $57.92 $32.61 $17.23 -68.7% $9.51 $9.92 $5.53 $2.89 -69.6%
Texas
Population** 21,722,394 22,099,136 22,471,549 22,859,968 5.2%
SHSGP $277.55 $107.78 $87.89 $55.74 $26.14 -75.7% $4.96 $3.98 $2.48 $1.14 -76.9%
LETPP $71.09 na $26.08 $20.27 $24.74 -5.1% $0.00 $1.18 $0.90 $1.08 -8.3%
EMPG $36.00 $8.58 $9.03 $9.05 $9.34 8.8% $0.40 $0.41 $0.40 $0.41 3.4%
MMRS $15.18 $4.36 $4.84 $2.96 $3.02 -30.7% $0.20 $0.22 $0.13 $0.13 -34.2%
CRS-49
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
CCP $4.54 $0.98 $1.83 $0.71 $1.02 4.1% $0.05 $0.08 $0.03 $0.04 -1.1%
UASI
Dallas $60.79 $10.40 $12.20 $24.36 $13.83 33.0% $0.48 $0.55 $1.08 $0.61 26.4%
Houston $78.97 $23.77 $19.96 $18.57 $16.67 -29.9% $1.09 $0.90 $0.83 $0.73 -33.4%
San Antonio $16.73 $0.00 $6.30 $5.97 $4.46 -29.2% $0.00 $0.29 $0.27 $0.20 -31.6%
CIP $10.43 $10.43 na na na na $0.48 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $571.28 $166.30 $168.13 $137.63 $99.22 -40.3% $7.66 $7.61 $6.12 $4.34 -43.3%
Utah
Population** 2,336,673 2,378,696 2,420,708 2,469,585 5.7%
SHSGP $63.52 $25.31 $20.64 $13.05 $4.52 -82.1% $10.83 $8.68 $5.39 $1.83 -83.1%
LETPP $14.15 na $6.13 $4.74 $3.28 -46.5% $0.00 $2.58 $1.96 $1.33 -48.5%
EMPG $8.45 $2.02 $2.12 $2.12 $2.19 8.6% $0.86 $0.89 $0.88 $0.89 2.7%
MMRS $1.14 $0.28 $0.40 $0.23 $0.23 -17.9% $0.12 $0.17 $0.10 $0.09 -22.3%
CCP $1.07 $0.23 $0.43 $0.17 $0.24 4.3% $0.10 $0.18 $0.07 $0.10 -1.3%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.45 $2.45 na na na na $1.05 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $90.78 $30.29 $29.72 $20.31 $10.46 -65.5% $12.96 $12.49 $8.39 $4.24 -67.3%
CRS-50
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
Vermont
Population** 616,274 619,092 621,233 623,050 1.10%
SHSGP $49.40 $18.11 $14.77 $9.30 $7.22 -60.1% $29.39 $23.86 $14.97 $11.59 -60.6%
LETPP $11.28 na $4.38 $3.38 $3.52 -19.6% $0.00 $7.07 $5.44 $5.65 -20.1%
EMPG $6.05 $1.44 $1.52 $1.52 $1.57 9.0% $2.34 $2.46 $2.45 $2.52 7.8%
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.76 $0.16 $0.31 $0.12 $0.17 6.3% $0.26 $0.50 $0.19 $0.27 5.1%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $1.75 $1.75 na na na na $2.84 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $69.24 $21.46 $20.98 $14.32 $12.48 -41.8% $34.82 $33.89 $23.05 $20.03 -42.5%
Virginia
Population** 7,286,061 7,383,387 7,481,332 7,567,465 3.9%
SHSGP $116.88 $46.40 $37.84 $23.92 $8.72 -81.2% $6.37 $5.13 $3.20 $1.15 -81.9%
LETPP $26.27 na $11.23 $8.70 $6.34 -43.5% $0.00 $1.52 $1.16 $0.84 -44.9%
EMPG $15.50 $3.70 $3.89 $3.89 $4.02 8.7% $0.51 $0.53 $0.52 $0.53 4.6%
MMRS $7.84 $2.35 $2.73 $1.37 $1.39 -40.9% $0.32 $0.37 $0.18 $0.18 -43.1%
CCP $1.94 $0.42 $0.79 $0.30 $0.43 2.4% $0.06 $0.11 $0.04 $0.06 -1.4%
CRS-51
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
UASI $6.54 $0.00 $6.54 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.89 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $4.49 $4.49 na na na na $0.62 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $179.46 $57.36 $63.02 $38.18 $20.90 -63.6% $7.87 $8.54 $5.10 $2.76 -64.9%
Washington
Population** 6,066,319 6,131,131 6,207,046 6,287,759 3.7%
SHSGP $108.76 $41.21 $33.61 $21.21 $12.73 -69.1% $6.79 $5.48 $3.42 $2.02 -70.2%
LETPP $26.94 na $9.97 $7.71 $9.26 -7.1% $0.00 $1.63 $1.24 $1.47 -9.4%
EMPG $13.76 $3.28 $3.45 $3.46 $3.57 8.9% $0.54 $0.56 $0.56 $0.57 5.0%
MMRS $3.02 $0.84 $0.80 $0.68 $0.70 -16.7% $0.14 $0.13 $0.11 $0.11 -19.6%
CCP $1.72 $0.37 $0.70 $0.27 $0.38 2.7% $0.06 $0.11 $0.04 $0.06 -0.9%
UASI
Seattle $67.05 $29.39 $16.52 $11.99 $9.15 -68.9% $4.84 $2.69 $1.93 $1.46 -70.0%
CIP $3.99 $3.99 na na na na $0.66 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $225.24 $79.08 $65.05 $45.32 $35.79 -54.7% $13.04 $10.61 $7.30 $5.69 -56.3%
CRS-52
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
West Virginia
Population** 1,804,529 1,810,347 1,812,548 1,816,856 0.7%
SHSGP $61.44 $23.13 $18.86 $11.88 $7.57 -67.3% $12.82 $10.42 $6.55 $4.17 -67.5%
LETPP $15.43 na $5.60 $4.32 $5.51 -1.6% $0.00 $3.09 $2.38 $3.03 -2.0%
EMPG $7.72 $1.84 $1.94 $1.94 $2.00 8.9% $1.02 $1.07 $1.07 $1.10 8.2%
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.96 $0.21 $0.39 $0.15 $0.21 0.0% $0.12 $0.22 $0.08 $0.12 -0.7%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $2.24 $2.24 na na na na $1.24 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $87.79 $27.42 $26.79 $18.29 $15.29 -44.2% $15.20 $14.80 $10.09 $8.42 -44.6%
Wisconsin
Population** 5,439,137 5,471,792 5,503,533 5,536,201 1.8%
SHSGP $98.49 $38.55 $31.44 $19.79 $8.71 -77.4% $7.09 $5.75 $3.60 $1.57 -77.8%
LETPP $22.86 na $9.33 $7.20 $6.33 -32.2% $0.00 $1.71 $1.31 $1.14 -32.9%
EMPG $12.88 $3.07 $3.23 $3.24 $3.34 8.8% $0.56 $0.59 $0.59 $0.60 6.9%
MMRS $2.28 $0.56 $0.80 $0.46 $0.46 -17.9% $0.10 $0.15 $0.08 $0.08 -19.3%
CCP $1.61 $0.35 $0.65 $0.25 $0.36 2.9% $0.06 $0.12 $0.05 $0.07 1.1%
CRS-53
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
UASI
Milwaukee $25.08 $0.00 $10.18 $6.33 $8.57 -15.8% $0.00 $1.86 $1.15 $1.55 -16.8%
CIP $3.73 $3.73 na na na na $0.69 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $166.93 $46.26 $55.63 $37.27 $27.77 -40.0% $8.51 $10.17 $6.77 $5.02 -41.0%
Wyoming
Population** 499,045 501,915 505,887 509,294 2.1%
SHSGP $45.44 $17.61 $14.36 $9.05 $4.42 -74.9% $35.29 $28.61 $17.89 $8.68 -75.4%
LETPP $10.64 na $4.26 $3.29 $3.09 -27.5% $0.00 $8.49 $6.50 $6.07 -28.5%
EMPG $5.90 $1.41 $1.48 $1.48 $1.53 8.2% $2.83 $2.95 $2.93 $3.00 6.1%
MMRS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $0.73 $0.16 $0.30 $0.11 $0.16 0.0% $0.32 $0.60 $0.22 $0.31 -2.0%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $1.71 $1.71 na na na na $3.43 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $64.42 $20.89 $20.40 $13.93 $9.20 -56.0% $41.86 $40.64 $27.54 $18.06 -56.9%
Puerto Rico
Population** 3,859,606 3,877,881 3,895,107 3,912,054 1.4%
SHSGP $78.46 $31.85 $25.97 $16.34 $4.30 -86.5% $8.25 $6.70 $4.20 $1.10 -86.7%
CRS-54
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
LETPP $16.78 na $7.71 $5.94 $3.13 -59.4% $0.00 $1.99 $1.53 $0.80 -59.8%
EMPG $10.64 $2.54 $2.67 $2.67 $2.76 8.6% $0.66 $0.69 $0.69 $0.71 7.2%
MMRS $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CCP $1.33 $0.29 $0.54 $0.21 $0.29 0.0% $0.08 $0.14 $0.05 $0.07 -1.3%
UASI $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
CIP $3.08 $3.08 na na na na $0.80 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $110.29 $37.76 $36.89 $25.16 $10.48 -72.2% $9.78 $9.51 $6.46 $2.68 -72.6%
U.S. Virgin Is.
Population** 108,612 108,612 108,612 108,612 0.0%
SHSGP $14.67 $5.63 $4.59 $2.89 $1.56 -72.3% $51.84 $42.26 $26.61 $14.36 -72.3%
LETPP $3.54 na $1.36 $1.05 $1.13 -16.9% $0.00 $12.52 $9.67 $10.40 -16.9%
EMPG $2.54 $0.63 $0.63 $0.63 $0.65 3.8% $5.80 $5.80 $5.80 $6.02 3.8%
CCP $0.24 $0.05 $0.10 $0.04 $0.05 0.0% $0.46 $0.92 $0.37 $0.46 0.0%
CIP $0.55 $0.55 na na na na $5.06 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $21.54 $6.86 $6.68 $4.61 $3.39 -50.5% $63.16 $61.50 $42.44 $31.25 -50.5%
American Samoa
Population** 57,794 57,794 57,794 57,794 0.0%
SHSGP $14.72 $5.41 $4.41 $2.78 $2.12 -60.8% $93.61 $76.31 $48.10 $36.68 -60.8%
LETPP $4.85 na $1.31 $1.01 $2.53 93.1% $0.00 $22.67 $17.48 $43.78 93.1%
CRS-55
State and Program
Amount Allocated (in millions) Per Capita Amount
FY2003 to
FY2006
Total
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Percent
Change*
FY2003 to
FY2006
EMPG $1.80 $0.43 $0.45 $0.45 $0.47 9.0% $7.44 $7.79 $7.79 $8.11 9.0%
CCP $0.23 $0.05 $0.09 $0.04 $0.05 0.0% $0.87 $1.56 $0.69 $0.87 0.0%
CIP $0.52 $0.52 na na na na $9.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $22.12 $6.41 $6.26 $4.28 $5.17 -19.4% $110.91 $108.32 $74.06 $89.43 -19.4%
Guam
Population** 171,019 171,019 171,019 171,019 0.0%
SHSGP $15.11 $5.82 $4.75 $2.99 $1.55 -73.4% $34.03 $27.77 $17.48 $9.06 -73.4%
LETPP $3.63 na $1.41 $1.09 $1.13 -19.9% $0.00 $8.24 $6.37 $6.61 -19.9%
EMPG $2.38 $0.59 $0.59 $0.59 $0.61 3.3% $3.45 $3.45 $3.45 $3.56 3.3%
CCP $0.24 $0.05 $0.10 $0.04 $0.05 0.0% $0.29 $0.58 $0.23 $0.29 0.0%
CIP $0.56 $0.56 na na na na $3.27 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $21.92 $7.02 $6.85 $4.71 $3.34 -52.4% $41.05 $40.05 $27.54 $19.53 -52.4%
Northern Marianas
Population** 82,459 82,459 82,459 82,459 0.0%
SHSGP $14.42 $5.46 $4.45 $2.81 $1.70 -68.9% $66.21 $53.97 $34.08 $20.62 -68.9%
LETPP $3.31 na $1.32 $1.02 $0.97 -26.5% $0.00 $16.01 $12.37 $11.76 -26.5%
EMPG $1.90 $0.47 $0.47 $0.47 $0.49 3.7% $5.70 $5.70 $5.70 $5.91 3.7%
CCP $0.23 $0.05 $0.09 $0.04 $0.05 0.0% $0.61 $1.09 $0.49 $0.61 0.0%
CIP $0.53 $0.53 na na na na $6.43 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $20.39 $6.51 $6.33 $4.34 $3.21 -50.7% $78.95 $76.77 $52.63 $38.90 -50.7%
CRS-56
Total for the United States, Puerto Rico, and Outlying Areas
Population** 287,984,799 290,850,005 293,656,842 296,410,404 2.9%
SHSGP $5,341.76 $2,066.30 $1,685.00 $1,062.29 $528.17 -74.4% $7.18 $5.79 $3.62 $1.78 -75.2%
LETPP $1,270.41 na $500.00 $386.29 $384.12 -23.2% $0.00 $1.72 $1.32 $1.30 -24.6%
EMPG $691.99 $165.14 $173.57 $173.83 $179.45 8.7% $0.57 $0.60 $0.59 $0.61 5.6%
MMRS $145.47 $42.29 $46.15 $28.22 $28.81 -31.9% $0.15 $0.16 $0.10 $0.10 -33.8%
CCP $86.50 $18.80 $35.00 $13.49 $19.21 2.2% $0.07 $0.12 $0.05 $0.06 -0.7%
UASI $2,822.23 $596.35 $665.72 $849.54 $710.62 19.2% $2.07 $2.29 $2.89 $2.40 15.8%
CIP $200.00 $200.00 na na na na $0.69 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 na
Total $10,558.36 $3,088.88 $3,105.44 $2,513.66 $1,850.38 -40.1% $10.73 $10.68 $8.56 $6.24 -45.9%
Source: Data for FY2003 to FY2005 are from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, program guidance and application kit for each respective
fiscal year. For FY2006, the data are from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Grants and Training.
* In some instances, the beginning year for calculating percentage change is a fiscal year later than FY2003.
** Population for the stated fiscal year is the population estimate on July 1 of the previous calendar year. For example, the population estimate for FY2006 is the population on July
1, 2005.
a. CRS calculations based on FY2003 CCP appropriations (P.L. 108-7).
b. The National Capital Region population used for this table is the Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., 2002 estimated population from the U.S. Census Bureau.